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Democracy Betrayed
give us convincing reasons why we should not either (1) seek the same military rights in
the Ryukyus as in the main islands, but on a permanent basis, or (2) seek a 99-year lease of
the particular areas in the Ryukyus that we require, leaving the rest under Japanese owner
ship and administration.®

Acheson himself took up the issue with Marshall, asking if the Department of Defense
objected to “leaving the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands under Japanese sovereignty, subject to
the provisions of the contemplated military security agreement [with Japan].”'” He sug
gested that a presidential mission to Japan, headed by Dulles, develop arrangements with
Japan such as an agreement concerning U.S. forces to be garrisoned “in and about Japan,
including the Ryukyus.”
But the issue of Okinawa’s disposition had already been closed, for now, by the presi
dential approval (September 8) of the U.S. policy toward the Japanese. MacArthur dis
missed Acheson’s suggestion as “highly objectionable from a military point of view. . . .
It would be unthinkable to surrender control and render our use of these areas, fortified at
United States expense, subject to treaty arrangement under Japanese administration.”"
The Joint Chiefs of Staff “strongly disagree[d]” with any relaxation of the terms of its
approved policy (NSC 60/1) toward the Ryukyus. “On the contrary,” they said they con
sidered that “exclusive strategic control of those islands must be retained by the United
States in order for us to be able to carry out our commitments, policies, and military plans
in the Pacific in peace or war.”'^
In early January 1951, Dulles (consultant to the Secretary of State), Dean Rusk (As
sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) and John M. Allison (special assistant
to Dulles) had a long discussion with General of the Army Omar N. Bradley (chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the peace treaty. They agreed,
among other things, to leave the Ryukyu and Bonin islands under Japanese sovereignty.'”
The United States also needed to accommodate different views among the allied pow
ers regarding the status of the Ryukyu Islands. “Several of the allied powers urged that
the treaty should require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over these islands in favor of
United States sovereignty,” Dulles said. “Others suggested that these islands should be
restored completely to Japan.”'"' India, in particularly, was strongly opposed to the U.S.
proposal. “It is only natural to expect that Japan should desire the restoration in full of her
sovereignty over territory of which the inhabitants have a historical affinity with her own
^Fearey to the Deputy Director of the Office of the Northeast Asian Affairs, State Department, 14
November 1950. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6, 1347.
'"secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense, 13 December 1950. Ibid., 1364.
"MacArthur to the Department of the Army, 28 December 1950. Ibid., 1384.
'”jCS 2190/2, “Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 28
December 1950. Ibid., 1391.
'^Secretary of State to Sebald, U.S. Political Adviser to SCAP, 3 January 1951. FRUS, 1951, vol. 6,
778-79.
'"'statement by Dulles, special representative of the President at San Francisco, 5 September 1951.
American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-1955, vol.l, 453. Dulles later told Ambassador
Vijaya Lakashmi Pandit of India that the wording was “a compromise between the views of those
countries which wished to see us out completely (i.e., India), and of those who insisted that we
remain as a barrier against the possible resurgence of Japanese militarism (i.e., the Philippines,
Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and France).” Memorandum of conversation by Witman, Officer in Charge of India, Nepal, and Ceylon Affairs, Department of State, 14 August 1951,
FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, 1269.
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people and which she has not acquired by aggression from any other country,” an Indian
charge d’affaires wrote Dulles in August 1951. “The Ryukyu and the Bonin islands fully
satisfy this description. ... It is apparent to the government of India that such an ar
rangement [as proposed by the United States] cannot but be a source of dissatisfaction to
large sections of the Japanese people and must carry the seed of future dispute and possi
ble conflict in the Far East.”'^
The American answer was “residual sovereignty.” “In the face of this division of al
lied opinion,” Dulles continued, “the United States felt that the best formula would be to
permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these people to
be brought into the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as adminis
tering authority.” Besides, the American field manual had authorized the United States to
exercise only “some of the rights of sovereignty” over an occupied territory, and not the
full sovereignty. “The sovereignty of the occupied territory is not vested in the occupying
power,” it stated. “The occupation is essentially provisional.”’®
A memorandum prepared by Dulles in June 1951 explained the basic position the
government should follow. Once again referring to “residual sovereignty” over the Ryu
kyu Islands, he affirmed that;
1.
2.

3.

The United States does not itself desire to acquire sovereignty, for the reason . . . that [it]
seeks scrupulously to conform to its January 1, 1942, declaration that it seeks “no
aggrandizement, territorial or other.”
If Japan renounces sovereignty [over the islands] in favor of no one, this would create a
chaotic international situation, particularly if. . . the United Nations does not approve the
trusteeship agreement we shall propose.
The present formula [Article 3 of a draft peace treaty dated June 14, giving the United
States the right to all powers over the Ryukyus and their people, pending U.N. approval of
a U.S. proposal for trusteeship] fully complies with the prevision of the September 7,
1950, joint memorandum [of the Secretaries of State and Defense to President Truman]
that the treaty should “secure to the United States exclusive strategic control.””

A State Department internal memo noted that the United States “yielded to India’s views re
garding the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to the extent of changing the March 28 draft so as to permit
Japan to retain sovereign[ty] over the islands.”'* On the other hand, John M. Allison, deputy to
Dulles in the negotiation of the peace treaty, attributed the concept to Japan’s efforts to retain Oki
nawa. “We were . . . deeply impressed [in 1951] by the Japanese plea for the restoration of the
Ryukyus and the Bonin Islands,” he wrote. “While we could not grant their wishes at that time, I
believe it was then that Mr. Dulles conceived the idea . . . that Japan should retain residual sover
eignty over the islands ...

In any case, “exclusive strategic control” was, in Dulles’ view, “entirely compatible
with residual sovereignty elsewhere, provided the sovereign grants it.” The United States,
he added, maintained such control over the former Japanese mandated islands and over
the Panama Canal Zone. But he admitted that sovereignty was vested in the United States
'^Kirpalani to Dulles, 23 August 1951. Ibid., 1290.
^^Rules of Land Warfare (Field Manual 27-10), 1 October 1940. See Article 273 and 275, Chapter
10 (“Military Occupation and Government of Enemy Territory”).
” Memorandum by Dulles, 27 June 1951. FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, 1152-53.
'*Memorandum by William L. S. Williams, Office of South Asian Affairs, 29 August 1951. ibid.,
1304.
'^John M. Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison Wonderland (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1973), 157.
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in the case of the former and in Panama in the latter case.
The American proposal rested on feeble grounds. First of all, the Japanese govern
ment was not agreeable. It was Tokyo’s position that the Okinawans belonged to the
Japanese race “beyond any doubt,” that they had enjoyed the full rights and benefits as
Japanese before the war, and that they were anxious to have their islands confirmed as
Japanese territory. “We hope,” a memorandum stated, “to be allowed to retain all the
islands that always belonged to Japan linguistically and racially.”^®
When the United States proposed at the end of January 1950 that in the peace treaty
Japan would “agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the U.S. as administering authority, of the
Ryukyu and Bonin Islands,” Yoshida personally requested Dulles that Washington give
“reconsideration” of the proposal “in the interest of lasting friendly relations” between
the two countries.^’ Specifically, he asked that the islands be returned to Japan “as soon
as the need of trusteeship disappears,” that the inhabitants be allowed to retain Japanese
nationality, and that Japan be made “a joint authority [over the islands] together with the
United States.”
Dulles acknowledged that there were “strong ties, of a sentimental, economic and
political character” between the people in Okinawa and in mainland Japan,” which he
said “cannot be ignored without creating a permanent state of dissatisfaction, both among
the islanders and in Japan proper.” ^ A government official feared “antagonizing
Japanese public opinion,” “doing violence [to] public commitments re no territorial
acquisitions,” and giving “appearances of outright and irrevocable alienation” of the
Okinawan people from Japan.^^ An aide to Prime Minister Yoshida told a State Depart
ment official in January 1951 that “it would be a serious mistake, greatly reducing the
benefits which may otherwise be derived from a treaty, to transfer title to the Ryukyus
and Bonins from Japan. Japan is prepared to give the U.S. all required military rights
there for as long as necessary, but the Japanese people will not understand why their
peacefully acquired islands, populated ... by people as Japanese as any other, should be
taken from them. Such action would be a continual source of bitterness...
Secondly, the American negotiators themselves had doubts about the validity of their
arguments. Dulles himself, as discussed above, rested his concept of “residual sover
eignty” on the consent of the sovereign. Thus, if the U.S. proposal for a trusteeship
agreement was rejected by the United Nations, he said, “it might be claimed . . . that sov
ereignty was invested in the inhabitants, who could hereafter assert, perhaps with United
States backing, a right to oust the United States.”^^ Besides, it was questionable whether
the United States understood the burdens of administering a trusteeship. “Aside from the
problem of close United Nations supervision over the territory which might at some time
result in criticism of United States policies in that form, particularly in regard to the pos^““Ryodo Mondai-ni taisuru Kihonteki Tachiba,” 30 May 1950. DROMFA, microfiche
B’-0008, flash 6.
^'Memorandum by Prime Minister Yoshida, n.d. FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, 833-35. The request was
made on January 31.
^^Dulles to the Under Secretary of State (Webb), 10 September 1951. Ibid., 1346. Also see
DROMFA microfiche B’-0009, flash 3.
^^Sebald to the Secretary of State, 6 January 1951. FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, 786. Also see DROMFA
microfiche B’-0009, flash 3.
^‘'Robert A. Fearey (Office of Northeast Asian Affairs) to Dulles, 25 January 1951. FRUS, 1951,
vol. 6, 810-811.
^^Memorandum by Dulles, 27 June 1951, Ibid., 1152.
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sible alienation of land for military purposes,” the consultant to the Secretary of State
noted, “trusteeship may raise political difficulties with the inhabitants, the great majority
of whom desire that the islands be returned to Japan. Furthermore, the possibility that the
area, which is seriously deficient in food, basic raw materials, and industry could ever
become self-sufficient, is remote, and the islands will be an economic liability to any
administering power.”^® In any case. Article 3 would not require the United States to seek
a trusteeship. Dulles himself told the Far East Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in March 1946 that the United States should not “commit itself in
the [peace] treaty, but should simply obtain an option to seek a trusteeship.” In addition.
Senator H. Alexander Smith expressed concern that, if the United States retained the is
lands indefinitely, the countiy might be charged with imperialism.^^
Thirdly, there was significant opposition to the proposal from among the emerging
third world countries. “A number of. . . countries, notably India, have been sensitive” to
the [draft] provisions [on the Ryukyu Islands], choosing to regard it as a device to per
petuate Western imperialism,” a State Department official wrote in January 1951. “[I]t is
possible that the anti-colonial bloc in the United Nations would seek to assure that any
trusteeship proposal submitted by the United States not subordinate the welfare of the
native population to security considerations.”^* India, as discussed, believed that the pro
posed treaty fell short of acknowledging Japan as a fully sovereign state, and would “car
ry the seed of future dispute and possible conflict in the Far East.” The Egyptian delegate
asked that the principle of self-determination and desire of the inhabitants be considered.
Burma declined to attend the San Francisco conference because of several provisions in
the draft treaty including the one on the status of the Ryukyus.^^
The same State Department official concluded that the United States should not seek a
trusteeship, citing such “liabilities” as “the pronounced feeling on the part of the inhabi
tants favoring a return to Japanese control, irredentist sentiment in Japan, the depressed
economic status of the islands, and the problems which might be raised by continuing full
United States responsibility for the administration of the area.”
It was against this backdrop that the Department of State was cautious about commit
ting itself to an early decision on the issue. “The Department. .. believes that it would be
a mistake to move so promptly on this matter as to inject the Ryukyus into debates on
ratification of the Japanese peace treaty either in the United States or in other countries,”
a senior official noted. “Further, it would be undesirable to have the Ryukyus come be
fore the present session of the General Assembly. Lastly, it would be undesirable to dis
cuss the administrative agreement and the Ryukyus with the Japanese in such a way as to
permit the use of one for bargaining on the other.”*®
Okinawans were increasingly apprehensive about their political future. In February
1951, the Socialist Masses Party and the People’s Party demanded Okinawa’s immediate
administrative reunification with Japan, while the Socialist Party called for a U.S. trustee
ship and the Republican Party for Okinawa’s independence. A month later a resolution
*®Myron M. Cowen to the Secretary of State, 25 January 1952. Ibid., 1119.
^^Memorandum by Robert A. Fearey, 19 March \95\. Ibid., 933.
^*Myron M. Cowen (Consultant to the Secretary of State) to the Secretary of State, 25 January
1951. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 14, 1116
*®Burmese Ambassador (Key) to the U.S. Secretary of State, 21 August 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. 6,
1281.
*®Rusk (Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) to Nash (Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs), 29 October 1951. Ibid., 1387.
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passed by a vote of fifteen to three in the Okinawa-gwwto legislative assembly requesting
reunification. In April, the Association for the Promotion of the Reversion to Japan (Ni
hon Fukki Sokushin Kisei-kai) and a youth group with the same purpose were established.
A campaign conducted by these two groups collected more than 199,000 signatures of
eligible voters, or 72 percent of the total in Okinawa-gw«to, on a petition for reversion.
The percentage was even higher in the Miyako islands where the same campaign was
conducted.^* The petitions were forwarded to the American and Japanese delegations
attending the peace conference in San Francisco.^^ At the end of August, the Okinawagunto governor and assembly cabled Ambassador Dulles of the United States, Prime
Minister Yoshida and the president of the conference, petitioning for Okinawa’s reunifi
cation with their “homeland,” Japan, which alone, they said, would bring peace and hap
piness to the inhabitants.
In Tokyo, the lower house of the Diet passed a resolution calling on Yoshida and his
cabinet to “respect public opinion,” which “rightfully believed the Ryukyus to be part of
Japan historically and ethnically,” and to “make special efforts so that the allied powers
would give favorable consideration” to the islands’ request.” Yoshida himself considered
it essential to make such efforts in order to prevent the allied powers from extending their
definition of territories which Japan had taken “by violence and greed” to include Okinawa.^"* To argue that Karafiito (Sakhalin) and the Chishima (Kuril) islands, “to say noth
ing of the Ryukyu and Bonin islands,” were “an inseparable part of Japan historically,
ethnically, geographically and economically,” his government submitted seven volumes
of briefing material on the territorial question alone to the U.S. government. In the course
of the negotiations, the government repeatedly conveyed to Washington its wishes that
the people in the Ryukyus be treated as Japanese nationals and Japan’s economic and
other relations with them be allowed to continue as before. At one time, there was even
an indication that Japan’s request might be respected.”
The peace treaty was signed by the United States and forty-seven other countries and
Japan on September 8, 1951. The Soviet Union (which urged that full Japanese sover
eignty should be extended to the islands), its satellites, India, Indonesia and a few other
countries rejected it. It recognized “the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan
and its territorial waters” (Article 1) and thereby ended the American occupation of Japan,
but allowed the United States to retain its exclusive control over the Ryuk^oi Islands. Ar
ticle 3 stated:
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place
under its trusteeship, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei
Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Is
lands), Nanto Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island, and
the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a
^^Uruma Shimpo, 27 August 1951. See also Okinawa Times, ed., Okinawa no Shogen: Gekido no
25-Nen-shi, Vol. 2 (Naha: Okinawa Times, 1973), 18-19.
^^Yoshio Nakano, ed., Sengo Shiryo Okinawa (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoron-sha, 1969), 72-73. See also
Nampo Doho Engokai, ed., Okinawa Mondai Shiryo-shu (Tokyo: Nampo Doho Engokai, 1968),
1009-1026.
^^The resolution was passed on 2 June 1951.
^^Shigeru Yoshida, Kaiso Ju-nen, Vol. 3 (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1957), 60. Several years after the
signing of the treaty, he would “regret” that the situation was “not necessarily satisfactory in meet
ing Japan’s wishes and expectations.”(/6/rf., 65.)
^^Ibid, 64-65.
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proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all
and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabi
tants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

The treaty stopped short of forcing Japan to relinquish its sovereignty over the Ryukyus. The islands ceased to be “enemy territory,” but they were placed under the control
of the U.S. Department of the Army. In the words of Ambassador Dulles, the “architect”
of the peace treaty, Japan would maintain “residual sovereignty” over the islands.^®
It made no reference to the international status of the Okinawans. The Japanese pro
position that they be allowed to retain their nationality and, if that was impossible, be
given at least an option of choosing Japanese nationality That would have guaranteed the
same democratic rights and freedoms as other Japanese and the same right to trade with
foreign countries, but even that had been ignored.” As it would turn out, they would be
classified as “Ryukyuans” under U.S. administration, making them neither Japanese nor
Americans and with the protection of neither the Japanese nor American constitution.
Prime Minister Yoshida expressed gratitude to the United States for allowing Japan to
retain “residual sovereignty” over the Ryukyus and hoped that “the administration of
these islands will be put back into Japanese hands in the not distant future with the estab
lishment of world security.” Since Japan had unconditionally surrendered and left the
disposition of these and other islands to the judgment of the allied powers, he later told
the Diet, “residual sovereignty” was the most Japan could hope for at this time.^* To him,
the fact that Japan was allowed to retain residual sovereignty was “a success” because
this would enable Tokyo to recover the islands eventually, unlike Karafuto, the Chishima
islands and Taiwan over which Japan relinquished all its rights and claims. Since “it was
clear that the United States had no territorial designs” on the Ryukyus and that its control
of the islands was “based entirely on its strategic necessities,” he was convinced that im
provement in the international situation would make it possible gradually to achieve the
wishes of the Japanese people.”
For their part, U.S. authorities in Okinawa, aware of the reversion movement, had de
cided to furnish the people with information on “the status of American control” of their
islands after the treaty was signed. Although they were cautious not to release speeches
or press releases concerning the future of the islands before they received clearance from
the Department of State, they had already established a policy. “With the signing of the ..
. peace treaty ... in the next few days,” a USCAR memorandum stated, “only one course
of action will remain open as affecting the future of the Ryukyu Islands, namely, the con
templated U.N. trusteeship arrangements.” It suggested that “an explanation of other
terms, such as ‘independence’ and ‘reversion’ to Japan, would be unnecessary as a basis
for news media [reporting], and further comment on these alternatives would only create
confusion in the minds of the people.”'*'’ General Robert S. Beightler, the deputy governor
^*For a detailed discussion of how the United States came to recognize Japan’s “residual sover
eignty,” see Robert D. Eldridge, “Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952: The Ori
gins of the Bilateral Problem” (Ph.D. dissertation, Kobe University, 1998).

”Legal Section, Treaties Bureau, Foreign Ministry, “Heiwa Joyaku-ni okeru Kokuseki
Mondai,” DROMFA, microfiche B’OOlO, flash 5.
^*Statement in the House of Representatives, 12 October 1951.
”Yoshida, 64-65.
‘*'’james B. Shahan, Office of the Deputy Governor, USCAR, “Memorandum for Record: Informa
tion on Trusteeship Relative to Publicity Releases,” 6 September 1951.
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of the Ryukyu Islands, responded coldly to the petition from the Social Masses Party call
ing for reversion. “I realize the feeling for continuing your close relationship with Japan
is one of sincere and continuous concern to the people of the Ryukyus,” he wrote. “How
ever, I am sure that you realize that present world conditions, particularly the continuous
threat to world peace by the Russian bloc of nations, make it absolutely essential that all
people and all nations sacrifice some of their local and intimate desires for the good of all
peace-loving people. To continue the agitation for reversion, with the implications of
displeasure to the United States Civil Administration and the attendant ill-will which will
be engendered increasingly among both Ryukyuans and occupationaires [5/c], will gain
nothing and only make both of our positions more difficult.” He asked the people to “be
patient and for the present work in close cooperation” with USCAR “for the fiilfillment
of stable world conditions and the rehabilitation of the Ryukyu Islands.”'*'
Many Okinawans would remember April 28, 1952—when the treaty went into ef
fect—as the day when the Japanese government and people, having gained their own
independence, abandoned them to a foreign military occupation. They also lost their legal
basis to press the United States for compensation for the use of their land prior to April
28, 1952, as a result of the treaty terms by which Japan waived all war claims of its na
tionals against the United States. If the government and people of what Okinawans called
“fatherland” and “homeland” had given adequate support to the integrity of their territory
and population, postwar Okinawa would have charted a very different path. But there was
no such will or support, and so the opportunity to hold the country and people together
was lost.
The peace treaty recognized Japan’s “right of individual and collective self-defense,”
to be exercised through a companion U.S.-Japan security pact, signed and put into effect
on the same day as the multilateral peace treaty. The security treaty permitted U.S. forces
in Japan to remain there until the country could “assume responsibility for its own de
fense.” This was to form part of what Acheson had termed the U.S. “security perimeter,”
reinforced through similar treaties with Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.
The United States contended that Article 3 was based on the Potsdam Declaration of
July 1945, which limited Japanese sovereignty to its four main islands and “such minor
islands as we [the parties to the surrender proclamation] determine.” In Article 2 of the
treaty, Japan recognized the independence of Korea and renounced all claims to Taiwan
and the Pescadores, the Kurils, southern Sakhalin and the Pacific islands formerly under
its mandate. However, the Ryukyus were not included among these former territories and
mandated islands.
The United States was not likely to formally propose to the United Nations that the is
lands be placed under “its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole adminis
trative authority.” The trusteeship system had been established “on the principle that co
lonial territories [and former mandate territories of the League of Nations] wrested from
defeated enemies should not be annexed by any victorious nation but should be adminis
tered by mandatory or trust power under international supervision in preparation for de
termining their own future status.”'*^ In fact, there have been only eleven such trustee
ships: Italian Somaliland, the British Cameroons, the French Cameroons, British Togoland, French Togoland, Tanganyika, Samoa, Ruanda-Urundi, New Guinea, Nauru, and
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Unlike these territories, however, Okinawa had
“"Beightler to Tatsuo Taira, chairman of the Central Committee, Social People’s Party [sic], 16
October 1951.
“'^“Trusteeship system,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 1995.

ni; “Yankee Go Home”

53

been a self-governing kingdom for centuries and then a full-fledged prefecture of Japan
well before the war. Article 76 held the trustee responsible for promoting “the political,
economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories
and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.” This provision, apparently, was not appli
cable to Okinawa.
In fact. State Department officials had questioned the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommen
dation for a trusteeship for Okinawa from the beginning. At a meeting on the “disposition
of Okinawa,” held on April 5, 1948, Dean Rusk of the Bureau of the United Nations Af
fairs, “referred to the probably legal doubts” which many states would have about trus
teeship arrangements “if sought prior to the peace conference.” W. Walton Butterworth
of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs argued that the JCS were “under some misapprehen
sions” about “the possible values of strategic trusteeship as opposed to ordinary trustee
ship.”''^ The Department of State and Dulles, on the other hand, believed that an ordinary
trusteeship would be “as satisfactory as a strategic trusteeship.”'’'*
The JST, too, recognized that U.S. trusteeship would be open to dispute at the United
Nations. They told the Secretary of Defense in August 1952 that it would be “subject to
challenge” under Article 78 of the Charter of the United Nations when Japan became a
member of the world organization. The Article states that “the trusteeship system shall
not apply to territories which have become members of the United Nations.”
There were other reasons for opposing the trusteeship proposal; possible veto or har
assment at the Security Council by the Soviet Union over “strategic use” of the islands
under a trusteeship and possible objections by the U.S. Congress to appropriation of
funds for the construction of base facilities where long-term tenure was not guaranteed.
Returning the Ryukyus to Japan “with base rights agreements or joint sovereignty with
Japan would be unsatisfactory, since the bases would be relatively useless in war if Japan
were hostile, and might involve difficulties even if Japan were neutral.” Annexing them
to the United States would be “politically unacceptable in view of the fundamental and
frequently expressed U.S. policy of “self-determination.” The United States apparently
used “trusteeship” as a semantic device to maintain its exclusive military control over the
Ryukyus, without formally expanding its territory.
Even more confusing was the term “residual sovereignty.”'*^ The Japanese govern
ment took it to mean that Japan “retained” sovereignty over the islands while the United

‘'^“Memorandum by William I. Cargo, of the Division of Depndent Area Affairs, to the Chief of the
Division,” 5 April 1948. FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, 721-22.
‘'‘'Memorandum of conversation, by John B. Howard, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 7
April 1950. FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, 1162.
'*^As Ambassador Sebald explained: “The term . . . has no exact equivalent in Japanese and has
become the subject of much querulous quibbling. This term would appear to be ambiguous in Eng
lish to the extent that it could refer either to legal title which would remain in Japan for the duration
of United States administration and would be entirely divorced from effective control, or to an in
terest which would come into being at the conclusion of United States administration, as a residual
right in property.” Sebald to the Department of State, 17 January 1952. FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 14,
1090. Historically, one might observe, the Emperor and the Ashikaga shoguns retained residual
sovereignty over Japan with what sovereignty they did not delegate to their vassals, but preserva
tion of their dignity apparently hindered coinage of so explicit a term as residual sovereignty.
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States “exercised” the executive, legislative and judicial powers over them.''® The United
States, for its part, recognized “ultimate” Japanese sovereignty over them. Acheson had
asserted in February 1952 that, according to Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, the Ryukyus
“would be considered as being imder the ‘protection’ of the United States within the
meaning of the Chicago Convention [on civil aviation], and thus would be considered a
‘territory’ of the United States.”''^ Although the Unites States, “at some point in the future
. . . may return the Ryukyus to Japan,” Acheson noted, it would be only after U.S. strate
gic interests in the islands were assured by a U.S.-Japan security arrangement. “This pos
sibility,” which would consider the Ryukyus as Japanese territory under the above con
vention, “should of course not... be discussed publicly,” the Secretary warned.
As U. Alexis Johnson, deputy under secretary of state (1961-64) and ambassador to
Japan (1966-71) later recalled, “retaining administrative control over Okinawa . . . had
been the price the Joint Chiefs of Staff extracted for going along with the Japanese Peace
Treaty.”''*

The Fukki or Reversion Movement
Consequences of the two treaties for the Okinawan people were that American occu
pation of their islands would persist for additional twenty years, with the unrestricted
freedom to maintain and deploy large armed forces from the islands.
On February 29, 1952, General Beightler issued Civil Administration Proclamation
No. 13, establishing a central Ryukyuan government to replace the Provisional Central
Government.''’ The Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) “may exercise all powers
of government” within the islands, but “subject... to the proclamations, ordinances, and
directives” of USCAR.” While the Legislature was to be popularly elected, the Chief
Executive (and the Deputy Chief Executive) would be appointed by the Deputy governor.
The chief executive’s appointments to administrative departments were also subject to
approval by the Deputy Governor. The judges of the Court of Appeals, the highest court,
would be appointed by the Governor (MacArthur) and those of the lower courts by the
Chief Executive “subject to the prior approval” of the deputy governor.
Like preceding U.S. administrators in the Ryukyus, the deputy governor held su
preme power: he reserved “the right... to veto, prohibit, or suspend the operation of any
laws, ordinances or regulations enacted by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or any
civil government or agency of any such government. He had the power to “review, ap
prove, remand, suspend, commute, remit or otherwise modify or set aside any decision,
judgment or sentence of any court.” He could “order the promulgation of any law, ordi
nance or regulation he may deem advisable; and to resume, in whole or in part, the exer
cise of full authority, in the Ryukyu Islands.”
At the same time, the proclamation guaranteed the “basic liberties of democratic
countries, including freedom of religion, speech, assembly, petition and the press, and
security from unreasonable search, seizure, and deprivation of life, liberty and property
‘'^Statement by Kumao Nishimura, director of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry, at the Special
Committee on the Peace and Security Treaties, House of Councilors, 25 October 1951.
^^“Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion,” 1325.
’*U. Alexis Johnson with Jef Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an
American Diplomat (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984), p. 447
''’civil Administration Proclamation No. 13, “Establishment of the Ryukyu Islands”, 29 February
1952.
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without due process of law ... as far as is consistent with the public welfare.”
Civil Administration Ordinance No. 68^“ set forth the geographical jurisdiction of the
GRI, “status, duties and rights of the people,” organization and operation of each of the
three branches of government, and its relationship with municipal government. The Dep
uty Chief Executive, like the U.S. Vice President in the Senate, was going to be the pre
siding officer of the Legislature, but a unanimous resolution in the opening session of the
body brought USCAR to amend the ordinance; the presiding officer was now to be
elected by and from among the Legislature’s members.
An Okinawan was defined as “a Ryukyuan,” a person “whose birth and name are reg
istered in a family register in the Ryukyu Islands.” The ordinance treated Japan as a “for
eign state” while at the same time applying an exception to that country: “no person who
is a national of any foreign state other than Japan,” it declared, “may be registered.” Nei
ther the United States nor the U.S. citizenship was mentioned in this regard. Travel
documents, issued by USCAR, were required of any Okinawan wishing to travel to Ja
pan.^' The Government of the Ryukyu Islands was prohibited from engaging in foreign
affairs except through USCAR.
The people were guaranteed the right to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness . . .
to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the public welfare.” Freedom of relig
ion was guaranteed, but not freedom of speech or of the press.
The double treaties, which had far-reaching implications for Okinawa, agitated its
people and put the fukki or reversion issue squarely on their political agenda. The Okinawa-gMW/o assembly passed a unanimous resolution calling on the U.S. and Japanese
governments to carry out “complete reversion” of the Ryukyus to Japanese administra
tion, and requesting that the U.S. administration under Article 3 would, among other mat
ters:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

permit the people to retain their Japanese nationality and raise the Japanese flag;
establish a publicly elected self-government;
transfer the criminal jurisdiction over Okinawan people from USCAR to Ryukyuan
courts;
permit the Japanese government to administer and aid in the cultural and educational
fields, as in the other prefectures;
permit the Okinawans to live, travel, study and work anywhere in Japan;
treat the Ryukyus as part of Japan in its treaties and agreements with foreign countries.”

In the March 1952 election for the soon-to-be established Legislature of the Govern
ment of the Ryukyus, Kamejiro Senaga of the leftist People’s Party which had advocated
Okinawa’s reversion to Japan since February 1951, received the largest number of votes.
The Socialist Masses Party, now also pro-reversion, received fourteen out of the thirtyone seats. The Socialist Party, which had campaigned for a U.N. trusteeship under the
United States, was left without a single seat. Most of the other members were elected as
independents. When the Legislature opened in April, its first business was to adopt a peti
tion asking the American president and the Japanese prime minister to expedite adminis^'’Civil Administration Ordinance No. 68, “Provisions of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands,”
29 February 1952.
^’CA Directive No. 12, “Proeedures and Regulations Governing Travel to Japan by Ryukyuans,”
17 June 1952.
’^Nakano, 73.
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trative reunification with Japan.’^
In a subsequent convention held a month later, the Socialist Masses Party adopted a
platform calling for, among other things, full administrative reversion to Japan and the
early popular election of the chief executive. In the same month, the Okinawa Teachers’
Association—which would subsequently play a vital role in the fukki movement—^was
formed. One of its resolutions pledged to promote an expedited administrative reunifica
tion with the homeland.^"*
Later in the year, the Legislature passed yet another resolution petitioning for the
“immediate and full reversion of the Ryukyus to the homeland” through the non-exercise
or rescission of Article 3 of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Even the pro-United States De
mocratic Party (formed by the independents and a splinter group of the Socialist Masses
Party around the U.S.-appointed chief executive) expressed a “fervent desire” for early
and full reunification with Japan. The Deputy Governor, however, refused to forward the
resolution to the U.S. President, the Japanese Prime Minister and other addressees—all of
whose governments from Argentina to Venezuela were members of the United Nations
—for “technical” reasons.^^
Six organizations in Okinawa, including the Mayors’ Association, the Teachers’ As
sociation, the Youth Council and the Women’s Association, re-established the Associa
tion for Promoting the Reversion of the Okinawa Islands to the Motherland {Okinawa
Shoto Sokoku Fukki Kiseikai; hereafter, the Association for Okinawan Reversion). De
scribing the present status of the people as “orphans placed under foreign administration
against their will,” the association pledged to realize “immediate and full [administrative]
reversion to the homeland” through the rescission of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, and
petitioned the United States and Japanese governments to implement their objectives.
Chief Executive Shuhei Higa “emphatically” told an American Journalist that Okinawans
yearned for autonomy under Japanese administration.^®
In mainland Japan, not only the Association for Promoting the Reversion of the Oki
nawa Islands to Japan (Okinawa Shoto Nihon Fukki Kisei-kai, formed in 1946) and the
Council for the Promotion of the Reversion of the Okinawa Islands to the Homeland
{Okinawa Shoto Sokoku Fukki Sokushin Kyogikai, established in 1953), but the National
Association of Mayors and a number of newspapers began to voice an “earnest desire”
for early return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan. The House of Representatives adopted
resolutions urging the Japanese government to negotiate the final disposition of the Ryu
kyus with the United States.
Such debates and activities in Okinawa and mainland Japan could have been respon
sible for “rumors” in the United States in 1952 “to the effect that consideration was being
given to the ultimate return of Okinawa to Japan.”” “In the event it [such a rumor] con
tains any element of fact,” the Special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee went on record as “being unalterably opposed to such a plan. . . . Any action
For the petition, dated 29 April 1952, see Nakano, 73.
®‘*Okinawa-ken Sokoku Fukki Toso-shi Hensan linkai, ed., Okinawa-ken Sokoku Fukki Toso-shi
^aha, Okinawa Jiji Shuppan, 1982), 14-25.
USCAR to the Legislature, dated 10 September and 8 November 1952, Nakano, ed., Sengo
Shiryo Okinawa, 113.
®®Demaree, Bess, “Okinawa—American Island,” The Saturday Evening Post, II July 1953, 84-86,
88.
®^Special Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives, “Report:
Military Public Works and Allied Matters in the Pacific and Far East” (1952), 13.
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which would compromise our continued defense activity on Okinawa should not receive
any consideration whatsoever.”
Ryoko Nakayoshi, former mayor of Shuri, sent a petition to Senator Robert A. Taft on
January 9, 1953 on behalf of the Okinawan residents of mainland Japan, asking him to
use his influence with the Eisenhower administration: “We desire that the Republican
Administration to [s/c] settle once for all. . . the question of return to Japan” of the Ryu
kyu Islands. “These islands, as you know, will be placed under . . . UN trusteeship ....
The one million inhabitants of the islands and the whole Japanese nation are intolerable
to [i/c] see the island area placed under the trusteeship system and they aspire after the
re-inclusion of the islands in the Japanese administrative system.”
As Secretary of State Dulles noted in 1953, “the administration of Okinawa still car
ried a heavy wartime flavor and character, with the result that 90 percent of the Okina
wans hated the United States. . . . [T]he extraordinary legal rights which had been se
cured to the United States in the peace treaty with Japan, would eventually prove quite
useless unless we exercised these rights in a manner designed to secure the support and
loyalty of the Japanese.”^*
Ralph Braibanti of Kenyon College wrote in 1953, after having served the previous
summer as political advisor to the civil administrator in the Ryukyus, that there were five
“alternative solutions” for the disposition of the islands.^* They were: annexation by the
United States, complete independence, U.N. trusteeship, immediate return to Japan, or
continuation of the present status. He rejected annexation as “immoral and unthinkable in
the face of our renunciation of territorial desires,” independence as “impossible because
of a deficit economy and the inexperience of the people,” and trusteeship and continua
tion of the present status as unacceptable to the people. “The most widely held view fa
vors immediate return of all of the islands to Japan,” he stated. “This is a solution which
has great appeal, but is likely to be unworkable in the face of the need for maintaining
military strength there.” Braibanti suggested that the United States abandon the idea of
U.N. trusteeship, return the Amami group to Japan immediately, “contemplate reversion
[of the other islands] to Japan in due course, contingent upon Japan’s ability to resume
responsibility for the islands,” and make it plain that it will “retain immediate control
until reversion to Japan is feasible.” After the declaration of such policies, he added, the
United States should allow the Ryukyus to be “re-identified culturally with Japan,”
preparations should be made for their “integration into the Japanese scheme of govern
ment,” financial and economic affairs should be “meshed” with those of mainland Japan,
and travel between the Ryukyus and Japan should be allowed without restrictions.
The United States, in December 1953, did return the Amami Islands which, lying
north of Okinawa, were considered to have little value to American military strategists.
Dulles quickly reaffirmed, however, that the United States would “continue to exercise its
present powers and rights in the remaining Ryukyu Islands so long as conditions of threat
and tension exist in the Far East” and “remain as custodian of these islands for the
foreseeable future.”*^
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Paraphrased in “Memorandum of Discussion of the 151st Meeting of he National Security Coun
cil,” 25 June 1953. FRVS, 1952-1954, vol. 14, 1440.
^^Ralph Braibanti, “The Outlook for the Ryukyus,” Far Eastern Survey, XXII (1953).
^'’Dulles made the statement on 24 December 1953, when the two governments signed an agree
ment concerning the Amami islands. Department of State Bulletin, 4 January 1954. The sentence
“The United States Government fully recognizes the long-established cultural, economic, and other
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The Okinawan people’s hopes were further dashed in November 1953 when Vice
President Richard Nixon visited Okinawa and told the press that “the United States will
control Okinawa so long as the communist threat exists.” President Dwight Eisenhower
in his 1954 State of the Union Address echoed Nixon’s remarks; “We shall maintain in
definitely our bases in Okinawa.” On behalf of the Japanese government, the Foreign
Ministry issued a statement asserting that “we wish the United States to remember that all
the Japanese people desire to see Okinawa restored to the status to which it is supposed to
return.” Their desire would not be fulfilled for another eighteen years.

Our Land
The fukki movement was inspired not only by the Japanese peace treaty which led to
the administrative isolation of the people in the Ryukyus from Japan but, increasingly, by
a number of other factors. Among the more invidious of these were high-handed Ameri
can regulations and attempts to suppress people’s political and social aspirations, and the
forceful acquisition of land for the military base buildup.
To begin with, USCAR overruled the January 1953 resolution of the elected legisla
ture calling for the popular election of the Chief Executive and setting the date for the
first such election; Major General David A. D. Ogden, the Deputy Governor, told the
Legislature in a letter that the United States would decide when to call such an election.
The Legislature adopted a petition a year later, and several others in subsequent years, for
early direct election of the chief executive; they would not enjoy success until 1967.
The reversion movement itself was suppressed by U.S. authorities who associated it
with communism inspired by outside forces. Four days after Eisenhower declared that the
United States would “maintain indefinitely our bases in Okinawa,” Ogden announced that
continuing the reversion movement was a “mere waste of labor” and that it would only
engender misunderstanding and confusion among the people.*' Chobyo Yara, president
of the Association for Okinawan Reversion, retorted in a letter to Ogden that the move
ment was based on the people’s “natural and intrinsic” desire to live as Japanese under
Japan’s constitution, which complied with the principles the United States subscribed to
through the U.N. Charter, the Atlantic Charter and its own constitution. The movement,
he said, requested a change in the U.S. policy toward Okinawa, but it was not inspired by
anti-American feelings. He even added that Washington could continue to maintain mili
tary bases in Okinawa after reversion because “Japan, our homeland, has a close coopera
tive relationship with the United States and keeps many large bases in the mainland under
the security treaty.”*^ Yara affirmed that the movement would have to continue “until we
return to Japan” unless it was proven “not rightful and natural.” General Charles Brom
ley, the civil administrator, replied on behalf of Ogden:
It is regretted that your continuation of reversion agitation in Okinawa can result only in
confusion for Ryukyuans and comfort to the communists. The policies of the United States
Civil Administration are based on the clear and unmistakable statements made by the
President of the United States and the Secretary of State concerning the status of the Ryu
kyu Islands. Reversion agitation, therefore, cannot be continued with the concurrence of the

ties between these and adjacent islands, and with Japan itself’ in proposed State Department drafts
was dropped from the final version. Department of State Central Files, 794C.0221/12-2253.
^'statement issued on 11 January 1954.
*^Yara to Ogden, 5 February 1954.
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civil administration, and your request for USCAR cooperation in reversion activities is illadvised.*^

In the same year (1954), USCAR refused to issue a passport to Yara and a colleague
who had applied to visit Japan to receive ¥60,000,000 collected in a national fund-raising
campaign for constructing school buildings.*^ Soon afterwards, he resigned as chairman
of both organizations, and the Association for Okinawan Reversion virtually ceased to
exist.
A particular target of the suppression was the leftist People’s Party. Its party organ.
The Popular Culture, had been suspended by U.S. authorities in 1950 for an article de
nouncing a director of the Okinawa Central Administration, a candidate in the Naha gu
bernatorial election, for taking advantage of his position in the association to usurp power
to allocate U.S. rehabilitation funds. Again in 1953, its application to publish another
party organ. People, was rejected by the Government of the Ryukyus under instructions
from USCAR. Choko Tengan, who with the support of the People’s Party and the Social
ist Masses Party, had won massively in a by-election for the Legislature held in the same
year, was disqualified by USCAR. It was contended that he had been convicted of em
bezzlement, an “infamous crime,” in a U.S. military court in 1946.®^ The Okinawan elec
tion administration commission ruled that this action could not be defined as an “infa
mous crime,” but its decision was overruled by the Deputy Governor. The commission
called two additional elections to fill the vacancy, but no party ran a candidate; only a
third election produced a wiimer, but without a vote being cast.
When two leftist Amamians active in the reversion movement refused to leave the
Ryukyus after receiving an expulsion order from USCAR, U.S. authorities arrested thirtyfour sympathizers including Kamejiro Senaga for hiding them or for possessing or put
ting up a bill appealing for help for Senaga. The leader of the People’s Party, which was
the most vocal in demanding fukki to Japan and “protection” of the land from military
use, Senaga was sentenced by an American judge to two years hard labor.
May Day celebrations were suppressed in 1954 because, a USCAR announcement
said, they were to mark Karl Marx’s birthday, the date on which Communists throughout
the world were instructed to conduct demonstrations and embarrass the governments of
the free world and their police. It warned non-Communists not to take part. In 1955, US
CAR issued an ordinance banning any labor organization unless it was determined that
the group’s leadership or activities would “not adversely affect the security” of the U.S.
forces in the Ryukyus.** The American civil administrator was authorized to terminate all
rights and privileges of a labor organization if he later found an elected or appointed offi
cial unacceptable and the official was not immediately removed. Vulnerable to USCAR
pressure and obsequiously sensitive to its policy, a number of major local corporations,
including the Bank of the Ryukyus, threatened to discharge anyone who participated in
May Day celebrations.

*^Bromley to Yara, 24 February 1954. The letter was signed “Charles V. Bromley, Brigadier Gen
eral, U.S. Army, Deputy Governor [sic].”
*^Chobyo Yara, Okinawa Kyoshokuinkai I6-Nen (Tokyo: Rodo Jumposha, 1968), 30.
**The evidence produced by USCAR said that Tengan, a head of a district, had allowed four gal
lons of sake to be produced illegally from three bags of spoiled rice rationed to his district, to cele
brate the inauguration of Governor Shikiya.
**CA Ordinance No. 145, “Approval of Labor Organizations,” 18 March 1955.
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The land issue®’ was explosive. Basically an agricultural people who had toiled on
their small plots in their tiny, crowded islands for centuries to grow sweet potatoes, rice,
vegetables and sugar, the Okinawans lost a great deal of their scarce land to U.S. naval
and air bases, storage facilities, munitions dumps, roads, and other military installations.
Base construction and expansion, while providing thousands of jobs and stimulating
the economy, created a number of serious problems. When the U.S. forces invaded the
island of Okinawa, they placed the whole area under their control, established stockades
and then camps behind the lines, largely in the central and northern parts, and collected
most of the civilian population into them. Some people were permitted to return to their
own villages as the fighting ended, but a majority were kept in the camps for many
months or allocated somebody else’s land for a dwelling and farming.
Take, for example, the township of Chatan on the west coast of south central Oki
nawa. Mostly flat along the coast, with hills in the interior, it had been one of the
principal agricultural areas in Okinawa before the war, growing sweet potatoes, rice and
sugar cane, with a railway linking the principal villages to Naha. It was on the beaches
along the western coast of the township where U.S. forces in amphibian tanks and
tractors and gunboats landed virtually unopposed on April 1, 1945, accompanied by tons
of ammunition and supplies. There was no sign of human beings; Japanese forces and the
15.000 or so villagers had all evacuated the area. The invading forces immediately
advanced to capture the airfield near the village of Kadena, which the Japanese forces
had just built and abandoned, and repaired it by nightfall for emergency landings. The
5,000-foot coral strip at the Kadena airfield was reinforced with an additional six inches
of coral; by August 1945, another runway had been built and the original strip, initially
intended for fighter planes, was extended and improved to accommodate B-29s.
By 1946, the village of Kadena was “now buried in the traffic circle at an important
intersection,” an American commander noted. “Rubble from the houses contributed to the
fill used in the roads. . . . Roads leading through inhabited localities have usually been
widened or straightened without regard to the necessity for cutting through existing ruins
or through damaged or intact buildings, though the process might wipe out an entire vil
lage, as was the case at Hija.”®*
The former residents of Chatan were for some time prohibited from returning from
their camps. When they were finally permitted to come back in February 1947, about
10.000 of them were squeezed into a remote hillside strip which fewer than 500 had in
habited before. Ryukyu Command (RYCOM) and other U.S. military facilities had taken
the place of the rice paddies and the rich agricultural plain spreading along the coast
around the villages of Kuwae and Chatan. The township was cut in two in 1948 when the
armed forces blocked off the airfield lying between the principal villages of Kadena and
Tobaru.
Base development inevitably affected the people of Goeku, another agricultural area
immediately west of, and adjacent to Kadena. When the former residents returned from
the camps after the war, they found barbed wire fences around their villages and farms.
They and others built temporary shelters, mostly lean-to shacks, close to the military
The history, nature and political implications of the dispute are succinctly summarized from an
American point of view by John M. Steeves, U.S. Consul General in Naha, in his memorandum of
21 June 1955, entitled “The Okinawa Land Problem,” Department of State, RG59 CDF 1955, Box
3978 F5.
®*Henry Stanley Bennett, “The Impact of Invasion and Occupation on the Civilians on Okinawa,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, No. 2 (February 1946), 267.
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base. The area, Goya, would rapidly expand to become a major commercial and service
center known as Koza, which depended mainly on the base for its development and pros
perity.
U.S. forces, of course, did not stop their base buildup with Chatan or Goeku. They
proceeded northward to Yomitan where they completed a 7,000-foot medium bomber
runway in mid-June at the former Japanese airfield, and southward to Ginowan where
they built a long-range strip at the village of Futenma. Like the people of Chatan, the
villagers, of whom there were about 16,000 in Yomitan and 13,000 in Ginowan, were
mostly farmers formerly growing sweet potatoes, sugar cane and rice. They were kept off
their land where military facilities now stood.
In 1949, the U.S. Army’s agricultural mission pointed out that the U.S. forces’ arbi
trary taking of farm land “with no regard to its economic value” increased population per
acre of cultivated land by more than 60 percent and sharply reduced food production.
About one-fifth of the arable land, it said, continued to be in the hands of military units.
The mission recommended, among other things, that the “one-mile rule” be immediately
modified. U.S. military units should reevaluate their need for agricultural land and keep
the areas of occupied arable land “to the barest minimum compatible with military neces
sity.”^® The “one-mile rule” referred to a military regulation prohibiting erection of any
building within one-mile of any area consisting of dependent housing or billets for 100 or
more troops in order “to reduce the hazards of insects, rodents and other menaces to sani
tation.”
After a series of powerful typhoons destroyed “temporary” Quonset huts and other fa
cilities, the Korean War reinforced the United States belief in the long-term strategic
importance of Okinawa. The United States undertook to build the island into what an
American magazine called “Our Gibraltar in the Pacific,”™ a permanent military fortress.
Major General Ogden would give it another, more lasting name: “Keystone of the Pacific,”®‘ words which were later to be embossed on every yellow license plate issued by
the United States provost marshal.
While the U.S.-occupied area had decreased to 30,500 acres by 1951 from its initial
holding of 45,500 acres, it bounced back to 42,000 acres by early 1953, accounting for 14
percent of the total land area of the main island of Okinawa and 41 percent of the farm
land. The Army was engaged in a construction program costing roughly $200,000,000
appropriated by May 1952. Colonel T. A. Lane of the Corps of Engineers described the
scene at the end of 1952:
The construction program . . . includes twenty miles of primary four-lane highway and 50
miles of paved two-lane secondary roads; the addition of 6-MGD [million gallons a day]
water treatment capacity to the existing 4.5-MGD system, and the installation of a perma
nent distribution system extending over twenty miles of the island’s length; construction of
a 46,000-kw steam turbine plant, and twenty-five miles of 69-kva overhead distribution
lines; the construction of a harbor to provide an LST basin, small ship berths, and ten large
ship berths and dredging for increased project depth; the construction of an island POL [pe
troleum, oil and lubricants] system with unloading pier, permanent storage, and pumping
stations; the constmction of permanent ammunition storage and rehabilitation facilities to
replace the temporary installation surviving World War II; construction of troop and family
Agricultural Mission to the Ryukyus, Agriculture and Economic Reconstruction in the Ryukyus:
A Report, 22-23.
™Peter Kalischer, “Our Gibraltar in the Pacific,” Collier's, 11 October 1952, 22-25.
^'Oavid D. Ogden, “Keystone of the Pacific,” Army Information Digest, 9:1 (January 1954), 42-47.
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housing, community centers, warehousing, and permanent utilities on two air bases, a ma
jor Army camp, an island depot... 2^

Similarly, the Air Force had been authorized $24,000,000 to build, among other facili
ties, “a radio communications station, telephone exchange, fuel storage, operations build
ing, warehousing, maintenance shops, barracks, bachelor officer and civilian quarters,
dependent housing, community and recreational facilities, and utilities,” all at Kadena air
force base. When the Korean War ended in 1953, the B-29s at Kadena were replaced
with F-86 Sabrejets from Korea. In March 1955, the 313th Air Division was activated at
Kadena, replacing the 20th Air Force and became the senior U.S. Air Force organization
in the Ryukyu Islands.
When, soon after the Korean War truce, tensions rose again in the Korean Peninsula,
over the Taiwan straits and in Indochina, the United States even started to deploy nuclear
weapons in Okinawa in December 1954. Then, starting in 1956, army, air force, and navy
nuclear weapons were deployed to Okinawa as well as to Guam and Hawaii. Of the ap
proximately 1,600 nuclear weapons deployed on shore in the Pacific during the Eisen
hower administration, “the lion’s share—nearly 800 weapons—were stored at Kadena air
base, Okinawa, a base for SAC’s [Strategic Air Command] strategic bombers.”’^ By
1956, the U.S. investment in the bases in Okinawa had reached nearly $600,000,000.^'*
The new situation required the United States to revise its directive for the administra
tion of the Ryukyu Islands. Approved on August 2, 1954, the presidential directive,’^
which reaffirmed the “critical importance [of the Ryukyus] to the security of the free
world” and kept the islands under the control of the Department of Defense. The Depart
ment of State would now be responsible for the Ryukyus’ relations with foreign govern
ments and international organizations.
As before, the United States would administer the islands through the U.S. Civil Ad
ministration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) under a military governor in Tokyo and, his
military representative in Okinawa with the title Deputy Governor. The governor would
be appointed by the President upon nomination by the Secretary of Defense and the Sec
retary of State (General John E. Hull, Commander-in-Chief, the Far East, was re-appointed as Governor). USCAR’s mission was defined as “to insure that this strategic area will
contribute effectively to the peace and security of the free world.”
USCAR would continue to govern through an indigenous Government of the Ryukyu
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Col. T. A. Lane, “Military Construction on Okinawa,” Military Engineer, 44: 302 (Nov.-Dec.,
1952), 418.
Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin and William Burr, “Where They Were,” The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 55:6 (November/December 1999), 26-35. http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues
/1999/nd99/ nd99norris.html. Another article in the magazine states that the United States stored
nuclear weapons in 1956 on two other Japanese islands under American occupation, Chichi-jima
and Iwo-jima, as well. See Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, William Burr, “How much Did
Japan Know?,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 56:1 (January/February 2000), 11-13, 78-79.
http://www. thebulletin.org/issues/2000/if00/ifD0norrisarkin.html.
^“’Robert Trumbull, “Base on Okinawa Is U.S. Keystone,” the New York Times, 14 April 1956.
^^Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense,” 28 July 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, 1684.
For a draft directive, see Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, 15 July 1954, in ibid.,
1763-1682. The new directive had been classified and had not been announced or implemented as
of February 1955, according to an internal Department of State memorandum (Footnote in ibid.,
1684). In any case, the directive would be replaced by an Executive Order Providing for Admini
stration of the Ryukyu Islands in 1957.
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Islands (GRI), made up of an elected legislative body, a chief executive appointed by the
Governor, and a system of courts. While given “basic objectives” to promote “democratic
tendencies in governmental, economic and social institutions” and “the development of
an effective and responsible government, based on democratic principles,” USCAR re
tained the power to “veto or suspend laws or any other acts” of the GRI, “promulgate
laws, ordinances or regulations; review or otherwise modify any decision. Judgment, or
sentence of the courts; [and] remove officials from office.” It could exercise, “in whole or
in part, full authority in the Ryukyus” if deemed necessary for security reasons.
Inevitably, the renewed U.S. interest in Okinawa as a strategic keystone in the Pacific
also required the United States to pay more attention to the land that it already held and
other land it sought to acquire in addition. But the land was so essential to an over
crowded people dependent on agriculture that United States forces and their commanders
would soon discover that they could not always have their way.
Although “most military government officials were sensitive to Okinawan attitudes
toward the land and to the inevitable feelings of rootlessness experienced by Okinawans
displaced by the base development program,” Arnold Fisch writes, the requirements of
military units remained the priority over civilian use. “Headquarters, Island Command,
had no intention of discussing compensation for such land usage since the American
point of view held that such land had been taken as an act of war and that under the Rules
of Land Warfare no compensation was required.”^® Public lands and unclaimed personal
property was the responsibility of the Office of the Ryukyuan Property Custodian at
Headquarters, Ryukyu Command.
The “Directive for United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands” from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, mentioned above, allowed the (military) Governor to “secure
title to any additional real estate or facilities required permanently by the United States
Government by purchase from the owners ... or [if the owners refuse to sell at reason
able terms or to negotiate] through condemnation.” The Governor was further authorized
to “requisition or rent such property as is required temporarily by the United States Gov
ernment or pending the purchase of property.”
The problem was that the people who (involuntarily) “leased” their lots to displaced
fellow Okinawans could claim rental payments as early as mid-1947, while those whose
land was occupied by U.S. forces, many of whom had to live on rented land, received no
compensation. Their claims developed into a political issue in 1950 when various parties
raised the question of compensation in the election campaign for the Okinawa-gM«to gov
ernor. Furthermore, the gunto legislative assembly in its first session adopted a resolution
calling for early payment of rentals for the occupied land.
The landowners organized themselves to negotiate such payment and the return of
unused areas. In August 1951, they expressed their plight in a petition to the U.S. Deputy
Governor, the Governor of the Okinawa-g««ro government and the speaker of the Legis
lative Assembly:

’Visch, 171, 173. Article 53, Section 111 (“Military Authority Over the Territory of the Hostile
State”) of the Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, one of the bases of authority (along with the
Geneva Convention of 1949) for the United States administration of the Ryukyus, however, pro
vided: “An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities
which are strictly the property of the state, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies,
and generally, all movable property belonging to the state which may be used for military opera
tions.” (Original underlined by the author.)
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With our land, which has been acquired through the strenuous efforts by our ancestors and
ourselves and which is our . . . only property, having been turned into military sites, we
have been forced to resettle in non-military areas. . . . But [ever since a USCAR directive
prohibited landowners from removing resettlers from their plots in April 1951], we have
been required to pay rental fees for the land for housing and farming, and we have been liv
ing with the fear that we might be asked to leave. . .. [On the other hand] our right to own
and use our land has been suspended.

The petition moved the Okmawa-gwn/o legislative assembly to urge USCAR to expe
dite compensation. USCAR agreed and, in May 1952, proposed a contract covering
53,699,036 tsubo or roughly 43,820 acres for twenty years starting from July 1, 1950.
The announcement dumbfounded and infuriated the landowners: the proposed rent per
tsubo^^ averaged only 1.08 B-yen, when a Coca Cola and a pack of cigarettes cost about
10 B-yen each, one pound of rice 35 B-yen and one pound of soybeans 40 B-yen. It also
revealed that forestland, wasteland and public land would be rented for 10 B-yen per
field, regardless of their sizes. Apart from the derisory rental payments offered by US
CAR, the twenty year lease period was too long for most landowners. A further an
nouncement a month later explaining that the annual rental for each individual tract
would be computed at 6 percent of the appraised value as of July 1, 1950, that the ap
praisals would be based on the going rate as of the time of initial U.S. acquisition and that
they would not be affected by subsequent rental changes, only intensified landowners’
grievances.
USCAR then took steps to try, post facto, to legalize its land holdings. It issued a se
ries of ordinances directing the Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyus (GRI)
to enter into individual leases for the United States and to receive rental payments for the
landowners. The ordinances also provided for an acquisition procedure, with “just com
pensation,” of such interests as required by Washington. The United States paid approxi
mately $1,060,000 to the Chief Executive as rentals for the 1950-1952 period, calculated
on prescribed terms; almost all landowners had received the payments by August 1955.
Military land issues, however, remained far from resolved. In 1953, the U.S. forces
began to use, when necessary, condemnation procedures to force out non-complying
landholders from their villages. Such action was based on the 1950 directive, prohibiting
new construction for housing, farming or commercial facilities in designated areas and
indicating possible future removal of the existing houses and farmers from these areas for
military purposes, and on the 1953 ordinance (Ordinance No. 109) specifying land acqui
sition procedures. For most of the farmers who had just returned to their villages from
refugee camps and begun to scratch a living, it was an outrageous blow.
First, acquisition orders were issued immediately after the proclamation of Ordinance
No. 109 for several, mostly farming, areas in the vicinity of Naha. Ten days later, bull
dozers were there to take over the land without due process. “On December 5, 1953,
troops of the United States army on Okinawa were called out to suppress what the army
termed a communist uprising on the island,” wrote the Reverend Otis Bell of the World
Conference of Christianity, a former resident of Okinawa.^* “The ‘trouble-makers’ were
an unarmed group of Okinawans who were protesting the use of their land by the occupa
tion forces without agreement and without payment. To the army this was a riot insti
gated by communists; to the Okinawans it was a stand for personal rights to land legally
^^One tsubo equals roughly 36 square feet; one acre totals 1,224 tsubo. In 1953, an average Okina
wan farm family owned less than 900 tsubo, compared with about 1,700 tsubo before the war.
^*Otis W. Bell, “Fair Play in Okinawa,” The Christian Century, 20 January 1954.
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registered in their name. . . . Less than 2 percent of the owners have agreed to the rent
offered by the army. Thus, according to the army’s own figures, 98 percent of the landowners do not feel that they are being given a square deal.. .. Now Okinawa is definitely
not a communist country. One would expect to find a small percentage of the people af
fected by communist propaganda, but in a country that has been occupied by the U.S.
army for eight years one would not expect to find 98 percent of the landowners commu
nists or sympathetic to communism.” In Toguchi, the site of the first U.S. landing, all 153
families were ordered to vacate their village and adjacent areas. The stunned villagers,
who had already been moved four times, put up some resistance, laid out terms for
evacuation, but were finally forced out.
Similar takeovers, mobilizing “bulldozers and bayonets,” occurred in Isahama in cen
tral Okinawa and on le-jima, the islet off the Motobu Peninsula in northern Okinawa on
which American war correspondent Ernie Pyle had been killed by a Japanese bullet in
1945. As Chojo Oyama, chairman of the special land committee of the GRI Legislature,
would later testify to a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee held in
Naha on October 24 and 25, 1955, of the Isahama land seizures:
In July 1954 an order prohibiting the planting of aquatic rice was given which affected
the 110 acres of the paddy fields around this settlement. The reason was that mosquitoes
would appear carrying encephalitis. But this land is the granary as well as the staff of life
not only of Isahama but of [the] neighboring [villages of] Kiyuna, Aragusuku and Aniya,
the total population of which is more than 2,300 with 500 households. If they lose their
land they will lose their means of living too. So they petitioned for the revocation of the or
der, insisting that they would prevent such mosquitoes from appearing. However, the mili
tary then gave another order asking them to evacuate the site. Presuming that this wellcultivated paddy field would be turned into land covered with sand and stone, the people
felt they could never leave their land no matter what the risk. Therefore, they desperately
petitioned that some measure be taken.
The military would not listen to them. Instead, [the military] hotly urged them to leave
whether they were willing to go or not, for the military plan could not be modified. At last
the people said they could move if they were compensated. After several rounds of negotia
tion, they were able to receive compensation, but the amount was too small for necessary
reconstruction. Well, they can live somehow, because they have received 50 percent of the
current price for compensation for their houses and old lumber supplied by the military. It
is also said that the military will furnish them with provisions for 200 days. But, how will
they maintain their living thereafter? . . . But the military rejected their appeal saying that
there was neither budget nor law covering the matter. Thus, compulsory land acquisition
came into practice. The sight of the compulsory acquisition was a fearful one, which did
not appear democratic. Bulldozers and cranes destroyed fields being guarded by armed sol
diers. In such a stormy atmosphere, the villagers were compelled to remove themselves

The situation on le-jima, he said, was even worse. “Houses were plowed up by bull
dozers or set afire,” he told the subcommittee. “The people were disappointed and ac
commodated in tents temporarily built. From March up to this date, they have lived mis
erably in those tents. Villagers whose water tanks were destroyed are so hard up for clean
drinking water that they have to find and use roadside puddles.”*®
^^“Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Armed Services, House of Represen
tatives,” 25-26.
*®For the land seizures in le-Jima, see the Ryukyu Shimpo, 9 October 1954 and the Okinawa Times,
16 October 1954. One farmer is quoted as having told members of the special land committee of
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The rice paddies in the Isahama area were transformed into part of Camp Zukeran
(Camp Foster), the site of the Marine Corps Base Headquarters. On le, U.S. forces built a
groimd firing range after evicting four families, and then demanded evacuation of an ad
ditional 152 families for expansion of the range. When negotiations with the villagers
failed, U.S. forces drove in stakes and bulldozed down thirteen houses despite farmers’
protests. The Government of the Ryukyus subsequently provided the thirteen families
with tents, food, water, and a daily allowance of twenty B-yen per person, the cost of two
bottles of Coca-Cola. When the government cancelled the allowance several months
later, the farmers entered the firing range to work the farms, only to be driven away by
American troops.
While these developments agitated and angered many Okinawans, the United States
further provoked the already uneasy islanders in December 1953 when it proclaimed its
intention of “indefinite” continued use and occupation of all existing military areas and
confirmed such use and occupation as an “implied” lease. Proclamation No. 26 provided
for the registration of “a certificate of confirmation and rental deposit” to complete acqui
sition of the land, noting that the certificate would remain effective indefinitely. Most of
the 57,000 owners of military land were resigned to the condemnation with compensation
policy but sought recourse with an appeal to the U.S. Land Acquisition Commission,
made up of representatives of the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and USCAR, for four to
thirteen-fold raises in rent.
As the appeals were awaiting public hearings, the Army again dismayed many Oki
nawans with an announcement that it would make lump-sum rental payment for land to
be used indefinitely. Deputy Governor Ogden reportedly stated in Washington that, with
the annual rental (computed at 6 percent of the estimated free market value) generating so
little capital, he proposed lump-sum payment in order to ease the discontent. The full
payment and additional appropriations for building roads and schools, he said, would
enable 3,500 families to move to two sparsely inhabited islands in the southern Ryukyus.
The presidential directive of August 1954 further made USCAR “responsible for the
acquisition of real estate and other facilities in the Ryukyu Islands required for the use of
United States Government agencies.” Such property would be “acquired by purchase or
lease,” the GRJ negotiating with its owners. In addition, “use of certain property for so
long as it may be needed by the United States may be procured by the acquisition of
easement interests,” with full compensation. If the owners refused to negotiate such pur
chases and easements, however, the GRI should acquire for the United States the neces
sary leasehold or easement interests in the property” by exercising “the right of eminent
domain in condemnation proceedings,” subject to compensation. USCAR was instructed
to “give full consideration to the effect [of the acquisition] on the economic and social
life of the Ryukyuan people and give adequate respect to the property rights of the indi
viduals concerned.”
As Chief Executive Higa told the above-mentioned subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee:
The US Army’s proposal of establishing long-term easements and making lump-sum pay
ments to the extent of the land value appraised by the US forces has caused much com-

the GRI Legislature: “Before we knew it, trucks had driven up and scattered sand on our land, and a
plane flew over our land and suddenly a bomb was dropped. Without knowing anything, we took
refuge in a cave for the sake of securing our lives. . . . This is the land we have received from our
ancestors, and we would rather die than to lose it.”
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plaint from the landowners. The landowners consider lump-sum payment of rental unfa
vorably because there is no distinct difference between . . . such payment and the sale of
their land. Furthermore, it is believed that the lump-sum payment received will not be util
ized or invested wisely. The dispossessed farmers who lack experience in non-agricultural
81
fields will face difficulties in starting new businesses among keen competition.

Chief Executive Higa noted that while agriculture constituted the basic industry in
Okinawa, the average farmer cultivated less than an acre after the United States forces
had acquired more than 40,000 acres of land, including farmland. “These farmers are not
only deprived of such valuable land, but they are also deprived of equitable compensation
for its use,” he argued. “Hence, the livelihood of the people who have been affected has
been reduced to one of extreme poverty.”*^
Another witness, Legislator Choko Kuwae, told the subcommittee of the Okinawan
farmer’s devotion to his land:
In Okinawa, land truly represents family inheritance—^the benefit of which should be
equally enjoyed by the descendants. Its loss in one generation in return for cash is consid
ered to be practically a gross betrayal of trust to the family land. . . . For Okinawans, land is
the resting-place of the soul and reflects a man’s character. Even those who have migrated
to North America and Hawaii do not want to sell their land [in Okinawa] but [want to] keep
it for their families.*^

Okinawan people, as Robert Trumbull of the New York Times reporting from Naha
would have it, displayed a “fanatical attachment to their land that is akin to religion.”
Land had been so central to their social organization as well as their livelihood that it was
rarely transferred from one person to another before the war. “No way has been found to
compensate for this love of land.” Americans, however, tried to turn the island, with a
“population density about twenty-two times that of the United States,” into a little Amer
ica, not only with huge military bases but with “an 18-hole golf course .. ., beach resorts
with cottages where families may spend leaves, a selection of 25-cent movies, and a
choice of luxurious clubs where meals are cheap and drinks are a quarter apiece and the
orchestra from Manila [played] rock ‘n’ roll.”
Besides, the article continued, many service families—^those of officers, higher-grade
enlisted men and civilian employees of the U.S. Government—lived in “attractive con
crete houses” and paid “one or more maids around $20 a month to do the cooking and
other housework.” In contrast, wrote Trumbull, the average Okinawan lived in a
“crowded cluster of thatched one-room shacks lacking running water and elementary
sanitation. Chickens wander among the littered huts, a pig squeals from an enclosure of
* W, 3.
*^Ibid., 2. U.S. officials were not unaware of the strength of feeling on the part of the landowners
against the appropriation of their ancestral lands. John M. Steeves, American Consul General in
Naha, said in a memorandum to the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo in June
1955: “The resistance [to land acquisition] is not based on economic considerations and is probably
not dictated by political considerations as often as some suppose. The reluctance to part with land
which has been passed on from father to son for untold generations is characteristic of people’s
attitudes in areas where the economic status is low and primarily agrarian. There is a sentimental
and emotional attachment to the small or large parcel of land which the average Asian looks upon
as the symbol not only of security but as assurance of a dignified place in society.” Department of
State, RG 59 CDF 1955, Box 3978 F5.
^hbid., 21.
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rushes.”*'*
A little over ten years later, another New York Times correspondent would write on
the same theme comparing “Okinawan Okinawa” and “an American Okinawa”: “Okina
wan Okinawa, [is] an area of farms and forests, with neat, moderately prosperous towns
and pockets of hamlets where life goes on almost as rhythmically as before World War II,
when all of Okinawa was a quiet, neglected backwater of Japan, the poorest of all the
empire’s 47 prefectures. . . . American Okinawa is much like United States military
establishments anywhere else in the world, with offices, schools, clubs, barracks and neat
bungalows surrounded by lawns—^the whole enclosed behind high wire fences patrolled
by sentry dogs.”*^
The reasons for the development of such unjust allocation of land were clear from
Kuwae’s later testimony to the subcommittee. The relocated households in one district
were paying an annual rental averaging 55 B-yen (equal to forty-five cents) per tsubo
(thirty-six square feet) while receiving only 5.4 B-yen annually for the land requisitioned
by the U.S. forces. The Okinawa Housing Corp. paid an equivalent of $612 per acre an
nually for the land it used to provide housing for military personnel while the farmers
received only one-twelfth of that amount for adjacent land where the Army had built a
hospital.
The rentals for the military lands had been determined arbitrarily by the district engi
neer without negotiating with the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or the landowners.
Meanwhile, dispossessed farmers were forced to live in destitute conditions and no effort
had been made to guarantee them employment or resettlement. The United States had
refused to compensate for losses on the lands and other properties incurred prior to April
28, 1952, when the Japanese peace treaty went into effect, despite the great losses that the
work of base construction had caused during the first seven years of U.S. occupation.
Kuwae also noted that, contrary to the old principle of “Kanchi-Minboku" (the land
belongs to the government, but the trees used for lumber, firewood or charcoal belong to
the people) on land formerly owned by the Japanese government, people in northern Oki
nawa were ordered not to go into the forest whenever the military conducted maneuvers,
which was 327 days per year in the case of the village of Kin.
Darley Downs of the National Council of the Church of Christ of America told the
subcommittee that all the Protestants, Roman Catholics and Jews in the United States
“desired a settlement of this vexed land problem on the basis of President Eisenhower’s
often reiterated principle of respect for human dignity.” “America,” the clergyman, long
time resident in Japan, declared, “stands for liberty, democracy, human dignity, and the
basic human rights set forth in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. I fear the handling
of the Okinawa land problem, so far, has done much to hinder the achievement of this
basic objective.”
The renewed and accelerating acquisition of land and the proposal for lump-sum
payment and, by implication, for indefinite U.S. military presence on Okinawa added a
new dimension to the land issue. It became a major irritant and stirred bitter anti-base,
anti-American sentiments. An island-wide protest movement was to ensue, with inevita
ble political implications.
Following an appeal from the newly formed Okinawa Military Landowners Federa
tion, the GRI legislature unanimously adopted a resolution calling for settlement of the
*‘*Robert Trumbull, “Okinawa: ‘Sometimes Painful’ Lesson for Us,” New York Times, 1 April
1957. U.S. forces built two golf courses on former arable land.
*^Takashi Oka, “Okinawa Mon Amour,” The New York Times Magazine, 6 April 1969, 30, 89-92.
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issue based on four principles. The “four principles” soon became a public cry: opposi
tion to lump-sum payment, just compensation for use of land, adequate and prompt in
demnity for loss or damages to land, property or the person caused by the U.S. forces or
their personnel, and release of unnecessary areas with no new acquisition of land.
In mainland Japan, the respectable Asahi Shimbun newspaper awakened the public to
the “reality” of the U.S. administration in Okinawa in January 1955 when it carried a
major article on the findings of the Japanese Civil Liberties Union (JCLU) made up of
3,000 lawyers and legal authorities.*® Acting on a request from Roger N. Baldwin,*’
chairman of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) the previous February, the
JCLU had interviewed Okinawans visiting mainland Japan and discovered serious prob
lems regarding military land rentals, wages of base employees, human rights, and the
authority of the U.S. Army over Okinawa.**
The U.S. Far East Command in Tokyo denied the union’s charges. It also rejected
Baldwin’s statement in his letter that the U.S. Army was using charges of communism to
divert attention fi"om the problems but, at the same time, said the landowner, hardship
was “being cleverly exploited by communist elements.”*’
Subsequently, Baldwin made inquiries of the Department of the Army concerning
JCLU’s allegations. Among the points he raised were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

Although Okinawa is held by the U.S. only while tension lasts in the Far East, any
advocacy of reunion with Japan is treated as Communist propaganda.
Mayors who favor reunion get little or no help from the United States.
The bank is not permitted to finance industries whose leaders favor union.
It takes three or four months for Okinawans in Japan to get a passport from U.S. se
curity officers to return to Okinawa, even in the case of death or illness of relatives.
Trade with Japan is treated as with a foreign country.
Although the Japanese flag was allowed to wave in the islands it was banned in the
schools in January 1955.
The full power of the government in Okinawa is in the hands of the U.S. The Okina
wans are puppets. The U.S. military has dissolved the legislature and refused en
forcement passed by it.
The discriminatory wage raises put Americans down first, Philipines [jjc] next, Japa-

^^Asahi Shimbun, 13 January 1955. Also see the editorial on 14 January and related articles on 17
January and 11 February.
*’a founding member of the American Union Against Military (1913) and, later, the National Civil
Liberties Bureau which would evolve into the American Civil Liberties Union in 1920. Baldwin
apparently first became interested in the Okinawan situation in February 1954 after he had a read a
“report based on some dispatch in an American periodical that U.S. authorities in Okinawa are
mistreating native land owners.” Baldwin to Shinkichi Unno, 23 February 1954, ACLU Records,
MC 001, Box 1173, Folder 32. The account probably referred to “Fair Play in Okinawa” by Otis
W. Bell in The Christian Century, 20 January 1954. The Japanese Civil Liberties Union sent the
ACLU a memorandum on American land seizures in June 1954. See “Human Rights Problems in
Okinawa,” attached to a letter from Baldwin to Alan Reitman, 28 June 1954, ACLU Records, Box
1173,F34.
**For the English translation of the report, see Japan Civil Liberties Union, “Human Rights Prob
lems in Okinawa,” 14 January 1955, ACLU Records, MC 001, Box 1173, F32.
*’Significantly, it was in March 1955 that the Office of the Deputy Governor, the U.S. Civil Ad
ministration of the Ryukyu Islands, promulgated Ordinance No. 144 (“Code of Penal Law and Pro
cedure”), with highly repressive and discriminatory provisions as will be discussed later with re
gard to its later version. Ordinance 116.
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nese next, and natives at the bottom.®“

In a memorandum rebutting Baldwin’s charges, Col. C. W. Nelson at CINCFE
pointed to Baldwin’s “misapprehension as to the international status of Okinawa” and his
arguments based on that misapprehension: contrary to the provision in Article 3 of the
Japanese Peace Treaty, he apparently assumed that Okinawa was “an undisclosed part of
Japan and should, for all practical purposes, be so treated.”^'
Ernest Angell, chairman of ACLU’s board of directors, and Baldwin, head of its in
ternational civil liberties committee, followed up with a letter to Major General William
F. Marquat of the Defense Department listing ten suggestions for the department’s con
sideration.®^ Among them were: to make the system of native administration as close as
possible to “what it would be when the islands are returned,” reduce military control over
local self-govermnent and extend to the Okinawans “the same rights and liberties which
they would enjoy under Japanese law,” permit the popularly elected legislature to name
the chief executive, “removable . . . [only] in the event that security considerations alone
should justify it,” and appoint “a civilian deputy” to the military governor. The letter also
urged that the Defense and State Departments exercise a “continuing check-up” on the
“control of policy” in the Ryukyus, instead of leaving it entirely in the field.
The Japanese Federation of Bar Associations conducted a similar survey in early
1955. It, too, pointed out a number of human rights violations: forcible leasing of land for
military purposes, discriminatory and unreasonably low wages paid Okinawans working
on bases, questionable trials of Americans in accidents and crimes involving Okinawans
as victims, and restriction of fi-eedom of speech, publication and collective bargaining.®^
Reflecting the general American sentiment at the time, U.S. authorities in Okinawa
tended to view everything in black and white terms through an overly simple ideological
prism. Ogden, in a farewell message to the Okinawan people, could thus warn them to
“recognize enemies of freedom for what they are.” In an obvious reference to the Oki
nawa People’s Party, he said: “They do not call themselves the Communist Party every
where; they generally take on a name which most disguises their true intent.”®'* At the
same time, he noted that the political, economic, social and cultural improvement had
been such during his two-year assignment that Okinawa “may be held up as a model to
countries all over the Free World.”
It was in this context that, in May 1955, a delegation of the Government of the Ryu
kyus, headed by Chief Executive Higa, visited Washington and appealed to the House
Armed Services Committee to settle the land issue according to the earlier established
four principles. The committee compromised by shelving the Army’s proposal for lump
sum payment and decided to send a congressional fact-finding mission to Okinawa later
in the year. With acquisition orders for land spreading to other villages, many Okinawan
leaders and farmers placed their hopes on this mission.
The special subcommittee, led by Congressman Melvin Price, visited Okinawa in Oc®®ACLU memorandum of 14 February 1955, ACLU Records, Box 1173, F32.
®'C. W. Nelson to Chief, Civil Affairs and Military Government, Department of the Army, 24
March 1955, “Allegations of Japan Civil Liberties Union Against United States Administration of
Okinawa,” AGJ 014.1 EJ-D, RG59 CDF 1955-, Box 3878 F5.
®^Angell and Baldwin to Maj. Gen. Marquat, 24 March 1955, ACLU Records, Box 1173, F34.
®^See translation of “Report of Investigation concerning Problems of Human Rights of the Okina
wan People” by the Japanese Embassy in Tokyo. RG59 CDF1955-, Box 3978 F5.
®^The Communist Party, prohibited in Okinawa, was legal in Japan.
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tober and spent three days inspecting several villages and holding public hearings, as
mentioned above. Its findings and recommendations were submitted to the House Armed
Services Committee, which approved them in June 1956.
A series of incidents, such as one in which a six-year-old girl was raped and murdered
by an American and another where the mother of three small children was shot dead on
entering a munitions dump to collect scrap,®^ had caused further outrage in Okinawa in
the interim. But they apparently had no impact on what became the “Price Report.”’®
The report took note that continued U.S. rule and the absence of any belligerent political
movement “allow us to plan for long-term use of a forward military base, subject to our
own national policy.” In Okinawa, “there are no restrictions imposed by a foreign gov
ernment on our rights to store or to employ atomic weapons.” Thus, it stated, in the event
of U.S. military withdrawal from Japan, “the importance of maintaining Okinawa as a
military base in peacetime increases.” The problem of acquiring land for military bases,
was “not only for the present alone and for the immediate future, but one with a relative
permanence which cannot be disregarded.”
And, describing the request of the Government of the Ryukyus for Just compensation
as “unreasonable” and the hitherto position of the U.S. government “unrealistic,” the
committee endorsed the lump-sum concept while suggesting payment of the “full fair
value of the property.” This was “the only way,” it said, “in which a landowner can re
ceive an amount of money truly adequate to make him whole, and sufficient for him to
move to another area—^perhaps another Ryukyuan island—^to support himself while ad
justing to another method of earning his livelihood, or to emigrate to other countries....”
The committee also recommended that land without any immediate military use be re
turned to its owners “expeditiously,” that the military continue to make as much arable
land under its control as possible available for farming, and that any additional land ac
quisition of land be “kept to an absolute minimum.”
The subcommittee called the earlier military decision to deploy two-thirds of a Marine
division in Okinawa “correct” and “well-justified,” and suggested that the use of two
airfields be further studied. The 1,800-acre Futenma airstrip was “used only in marginal
fashion by the Air Force today” although it had “a specific planned utilization for the
future.” The 630-acre Yonabaru naval airstrip was unused and could be utilized only with
the acquisition of additional land.
The recommendations of the “Price Report” so disappointed Okinawan leaders that
the director of the GUI’s executive branch responsible for military land issues immedi
ately handed in a letter of resignation in protest.” Representatives of the executive office

’^During the previous two years, eighteen Okinawans had been killed or wounded by gun fire for
entering forbidden areas, according to a resolution of May 1955 by the GRI Legislature calling on
the Army, Marine Corps, Air Force and Navy commanders on the island to enforce regulations on
use of weapons.
^^Report of a Special Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee House of Representatives
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956).
”Some American observers also considered its recommendations discriminatory and legally ques
tionable. Helen Mears, for example, analyzed the Price Report and concluded that, as a whole, it
“raises serious questions about our government’s policies and attitudes—and suggests that in con
sidering the problems of ‘backward’ peoples, and in confronting the basic problems of freedom,
democracy, and human dignity, our leaders have serious blind spots.” In “Our Blindspot in Asia,”
The Progressive, 18. Patrick Murphy Malin and Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties
Union told Congressman Price: “We had hoped that your committee might have taken into account
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of the GRI, its Legislature, the Council of Mayors and the Federation of Military Landowners Associations adopted a joint statement asking Major General James E. Moore, the
deputy governor, to inform Washington of the “grave determination” with which they
would deal with the issue in the event that the United States forced through the recom
mendations. Soon, Chief Executive Higa, Deputy Executive Kotaro Kamimura and nine
other senior executive officials, all fifty-three mayors, all twenty-nine legislators, and the
senior officials of the Federation of the Military Landowners’ Associations vowed to
resign if the United States did not reconsider the land acquisition question. The speakers
of the municipal assemblies followed suit.
Many organizations, such as those of teachers, women, social workers, businessmen,
parents, young people, labor unionists, students and wounded war veterans pledged to
fight for the “four principles” and against the Price Report and to mobilize public protests
against the report’s recommendations. Even the Police Department of the GRI announced
its alliance with the general public in support of the four principles. On June 20, 1956,
mass rallies and meetings were held throughout the island with a reported turnout of
200,000 to 300,000 people, or roughly a one-fifth to one-third of the whole population.
They were followed by massive meetings and demonstrations in Koza and Naha five
days later. In mainland Japan, the parliamentary vice-minister of foreign affairs told the
Nippon Times (subsequently renamed the Japan Times) that the land policy in Okinawa
was “unfair” and discriminatory. Kunio Morihisa said Japan should ask the United States
to correct the situation and also return administrative rights over the island. Several
newspapers criticized the land policy in their editorials.
U.S. officials were persistent. President Eisenhower sent Chief Executive Higa a letter
describing the Price subcommittee report as “both sympathetic and constructive in char
acter.”®* General Moore told representatives of protesting groups that the Price Report
was “the final position of the U.S. government.” He called it “reasonable” and advised
the delegation: “This is not a time to listen to men who for political reasons, subversive
reasons or reasons of personal gain, whip up agitation on the part of the people.”
The land issue, or people’s anger over it, reopened a can of worms: it rekindled their
desire for administrative reunification with Japan and removal of military bases, and
made the fukki and anti-base movement increasingly vocal and militant. The demonstra
tors pledged not only to push through the four principles but also to protect their right to
fight for self-determination. The defiant tone was echoed at similar rallies in mainland
Japan. Students of the University of the Ryukyus and several high schools went out on
the streets, chanting “Yankee, Go Home.” At the same time, incidents such as the one in
which the six-year-old girl was raped and murdered in September 1955 by a U.S. Marine
provided a constant reminder of some of the more extreme human rights implications of
military occupation.
U.S. authorities on the island countered such public grievances with oppressive meas
ures. They threatened to administer the population directly should the legislators and the
chief executive resign. They declared “camp towns” in central Okinawa “off-limits” to
American servicemen and dependents, ostensibly to prevent confrontation with Okina
wans; they refused to recognize the council of five organizations as a legitimate body.
The University of the Ryukyus was notified that its funding would be suspended, partly
American principles of due process and democratic consultation in recommending land policies.”
Malin and Baldwin to Melvin Price, 23 July 1956, ACLU Records, Box 1173, F34.
98
Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, 25 June 1956. FRUS,
I955-1957,Vo\. 23, 182-183.
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because some of its students had participated in “anti-American” demonstrations. The
people were expected to support the “free world’s” cause, and the reversion movement,
which undermined the U.S. mission, could not be tolerated.
The pressures worked, at least for the time being. In view of the fact that the Okina
wan economy depended heavily on the bases, Higa asked the people to calm down and
not to alarm USCAR and the U.S. forces by injecting the land issue into campaigns
against military bases, for administrative reversion and against cooperation with the Unit
ed States. The executive office withdrew from the alliance, forcing its disintegration.
University students were persuaded by operators of bars, nightclubs and restaurants cater
ing to military persoimel to call off a demonstration march which had been planned in
Koza, the “GI town” in central Okinawa. The mayor of Koza expressed regrets at having
inadvertently tripped off the off-limits regime, thereby causing trouble for Koza’s citi
zens. The municipal government also declared that it would not recognize two prominent
leaders of the People’s Party, Kamejiro Senaga and Saichi Kaneshi, as representatives of
its citizens.
Moore soon lifted the ban on Koza. The neighboring towns of Ishikawa, Gushikawa
and Kadena were also reopened to their American clientele after they publicly promised
not to authorize anti-U.S. activities.
Meanwhile, the foundation which funded scholarships and loans to smdents of the
University of the Ryukyus decided to cut off its financial assistance to 175 students. It
could not continue the assistance program so long as students participated in anti-U.S.
activities, the foundation told the university, because anti-communist American individu
als and organizations had provided the fond’s money. The university’s president and
board of directors “reaffirmed” their opposition to communism, “apologized” to “all
Americans” in Okinawa and elsewhere for the students’ anti-U.S. demonstrations, placed
several students on probation, and banned student participation in any activities unauthor
ized by the university. Civil Administrator Brigadier General Vonna F. Burger, however,
considered the pimishment too lenient, and even suggested that it might be better to abol
ish the university if it were to become a hotbed of individuals who aimed to promote un
desirable influences on Okinawa. A week later, the President and the Board of Directors
expelled six students.
As tempers cooled, the United States expropriated some 630 acres of land—forests,
uncultivated fields, and cultivated fields—in northern Okinawa in December 1956. As it
turned out, the landowners agreed to yield their property, almost worthless in a remote,
undeveloped area, on fee-simple (i.e., absolute possession), paid for in five-year lump
sum payments, with military construction of a reservoir, purchase of locally grown vege
tables, preferential employment of local workers, supply of surplus electric power and
drinking water, and other amenities. Several organizations protested against the new land
acquisition, but to no avail. The Henoko area on the Pacific coast became the Third Ma
rine Division’s maneuvering ground, complete with ferro-concrete barracks and ordnance
depots. A thriving entertainment district, nicknamed “Apple Town” after the USCAR
official who helped to establish it, soon emerged near its main gate to serve the marines.
General Lyman (Louis) Lemnitzer, visiting Okinawa in January 1957 as Governor of
the Ryukyu Islands, stated that Washington “has no desire to deprive a single citizen of
the Ryuk^s of the use of his land.”®’ Lemnitzer also announced that he had directed
making “a comprehensive review of all military requirements for land in the Ryukyus,
’’“Statement of General Lemnitzer, governor of the Ryukyu Islands, on the United States Land
Policy in the Ryukyu Islands,” 4 January 1957.
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with a view to reducing our existing requirements wherever possible and of limiting new
acquisition to the absolute minimum.” Yet, the findings of the review brought little com
fort. “We have found on one hand that it may be possible in the near future to release
substantial amounts of land,” Lemnitzer said, “but on the other hand we have also deter
mined that some additional land will have to be acquired for military purposes.”
The general outlined “principles of a comprehensive, just, and practical program for
the settlement of our land problems” in Okinawa which, he said, “provides a generous
and equitable method for satisfying the legitimate hopes and rights of all Ryukyuan landowners.”
•

•

•
•

The United States is prepared to give landowners, in lieu of annual rentals, a cash
payment a great many times more than the annual rent for the full use of their prop
erty ... as long as it may be needed.
In case of land of which the United States requires only partial use for an indefinite
period and which the owner is permitted to farm, [it] proposes to acquire appropriate
easements, for which suitable payments will be made.
Every landowner may use his payment as he wishes (for example, depositing it in a
government fund that is being developed).
For those who wish to continue farming or to return to farming . . . there are consid
erable areas of arable land on Okinawa and in Yaeyama Gunto [island-chain] which
are not under cultivation. . . . The United States Civil Administration is prepared to
assist in building roads and public facilities which will make it possible to use these
lands.

In mid-1957, the U.S. Civil Administrator filed “a notice of intent and declaration of
taking” to acquire determinable estate interest for the Naha military port area, the Kume
Island Air Base, Torishima air range, the Miyako Island Air Station, Camp Kue [Kuwae],
the Machinato service area and portions of Kadena Air Base. The areas covered 3,400
acres. A determinable estate interest was also acquired for portions of the site for special
anti-aircraft units, special storage areas, the Voice of America transmission area, and a
housing site at Kadena. An estimated 21,450 acres of Japanese government-owned forest
land in northern Okinawa was also allocated in November for use by the Marine Corps as
a training area. The Civil Administrator also issued an ordinance authorizing him to per
mit officials of the U.S. Army Engineer District to enter upon lands for investigation and
survey purposes where the owners or occupants had refused to give voluntary authority.
In addition, Washington announced in May 1957 a plan to build eight missile launch
ing sites in Okinawa. The announcement touched off a series of petitions and protests
from the Council of Municipalities, the GRI legislature, and other organizations against
the construction of nuclear weapons bases in Okinawa and the introduction of such
weapons into the island. Regardless, a leasehold interest was soon acquired for the
launching sites. The latest surface-to-air guided missile, the Nike Hercules, could carry a
high-explosive or a nuclear warhead at more than three times the speed of sound to tar
gets some 5,000 miles away.
As part of the Defense Department’s plan for world-wide changes in U.S. command
structures. General Lemnitzer declared that CINCUNC (Commander-in-Chief, U.N.
Command) would be moved to Seoul while CfNCFE would be absorbed by CfNCPAC
(Commander in Chief, Pacific), with a subordinate command structure in Tokyo.All
“Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 2 July 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol.
21,223-227.

Ill: “Yankee Go Home”

75

United States forces in the Far East, including the U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands
(USARYIS), were unified under CINCPAC, headquartered in Hawaii, in July 1957.
A Defense Department memorandum dated August 19, 1957 indicated that by early
1957, the estimate of total U.S. land requirements had been reduced from more than
56,000 acres to less than the 52,088 acres already authorized by Congress. More than 300
acres were returned to the owners; of the estimated 7,505 acres held by the United States
that remained arable; farming was permitted on 6,389 acres. The Yonabaru airfield site
would be used as a Marine helicopter installation instead of as a Naval airfield, thus mak
ing it unnecessary to acquire additional land at Yonabaru. As a result of reappraisals of
the land situation, the landowners were receiving “a cash payment a great many times
more than the aimual rent for the full use of their property.”'®’ These measures corre
sponded to the recommendations made in June 1956 by the special subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee.
This, however, hardly settled the land issue, with all its social, economic, political and
military implications. It would remain a major source of conflict for many years to come.

'“'Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of
State for F8ir Eastern Affairs, 15 August 1957. FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. 23, 442-443.

Chapter IV: A Facade or a Showcase of Democracy?
A New “Constitution” for the Ryukyus
Some high-ranking officials at the Department of State were becoming concerned
about possible international implications of the “Okinawa problem” and its effect on the
American conscience. Robert J. G. McClurkin, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian
Affairs, noted in 1953 in reference to the presidential directive under preparation:
If the proposed arrangement is not considered to be reasonably satisfactory to the Japa
nese and the Ryukyuans, the gravity of the political decision should not be minimized. So
far as our relations with the Japanese are concerned, the rapid rise of an irredentist issue
over the Ryukyus could seriously entangle U.S.-Japanese relations and undermine the secu
rity position of the United States in Japan itself. In the longer run, the attitude of Japan
would appear to be infinitely more important to us than our position in Okinawa. As for the
Ryukyuans, serious opposition to the arrangement would throw an issue of self-deter
mination before the American people and before the rest of the world in which the United
States would be cast in the role of imposing its rule upon several hundred thousand unwill
ing subjects of another race and culture. Such a situation would cut across the conscience
and long tradition of our people and would greatly weaken our influence and relationship
with the peoples of Asia, the Middle East and even Latin America. It would provide an is
sue easily exploitable by the Communists and deepen the impression that the Soviet Union
is the principal great power ally of anti-colonial peoples. That the issue would be a false
one does not remove its dangers.'

To address these issues, McClurkin proposed that a “joint U.S.-Japanese trusteeship
of the Ryukyus,” which would make Japan responsible for non-security matters and the
U.S. for security, should be submitted to the United Nations for approval. If trusteeship
was not acceptable to the United States, McClurkin wrote, the presidential directive
should make it clear that the United States would eventually return the islands to Japan,
perhaps upon the Soviet return of the Kuriles to Japan and satisfactory settlement of other
conflicts in Asia.
Secretary of State Dulles noted, in a letter of June 22, 1956, to the Secretary of De
fense, the “unfavorable reaction” in Okinawa and Japan to the Price Report. To allay such
opposition, he suggested that the government make a public statement that the United
States would only acquire leasehold or easement interests when landowners were unwill
ing to sell outright, that it would acquire long-term right of use rather than the fee simple
title, and that its long-term interests would be held in the name of the Government of the
Ryukyu Islands for temporary use by the United States.'^
On August 7, he sent another letter to the Secretary of Defense pointing to “an in
crease in concern [in Japan]” about the U.S. administration in Okinawa. “Our policies in
'McClurkin’s comments are attached to “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State,” 8 January 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, 1577-1584.
^Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense, 22 June 1956. FRUS. 1955-1957, Vol. 23, 180-181.
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the Ryukyus have clearly to be considered not only from the standpoint of sound local
administration in the Ryukyus but also from the standpoint of our long-term relations
with Japan,” he wrote. “At the same time it appears that although the agitation within the
Ryukyus on the land issue has somewhat subsided, there remain basic underlying dissat
isfactions that may rise to plague us again on other issues in the fiiture.”^
Dulles was not changing his basic position on Okinawa. When Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu visited Washington in August 1955, and argued for the restoration of
the Ryukyu and Bonin islands to Japan, Dulles said that the United States was not pre
pared at that time to consider changing the status of the islands. The United States was
making large defense expenditures there, he stated, and it would not be in the common
interest to “agitate” over their status."' Once a commitment was made, it must be kept.
But the Department of State was drafting an executive order that it thought necessary
to “formalize” the delegation of administrative responsibility over the Ryukyus to the
Department of Defense. This document was also expected to serve as a “bill of rights” for
the Okinawan people and as evidence of the U.S. exercise of its “stewardship.”^ The draft
cleared the Department of State by early 1956. In December, however, it was decided to
shelve the matter and to seek “a thorough review of the whole administration setup” in
the Ryukyus by the two departments. The Budget Bureau argued for an early announce
ment of the executive order; in its view, it was “irregular” to place the basis of U.S. au
thority for its control of the Ryukyus on the presidential Directive of August 1954 alone.^
Executive Order 10713, the de facto constitution for the Ryukyus, was finally issued
on June 5, 1957 by Eisenhower both as President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the United States. Like the presidential directive of 1954, it reaffirmed that “all
administrative, legislative and jurisdictional powers” over the Ryukyus rested with the
United States under Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan, and would be exercised by
the Secretary of Defense.
The role of the Department of State in the administration of the Ryukyu Islands was
reaffirmed and stated more clearly. The Secretary of State was made responsible for the
conduct of “foreign relations” of the islands with the United States and the Secretary of
Defense was required to keep the Secretary of State informed of activities affecting these
relations.
The order created a “high commissioner”^ to head the U.S. Administration of the
Ryukyu Islands (USCAR). To be “designated by the Secretary of Defense, after consulta
tion with the Secretary of State and with the approval of the President, from among the
^Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense, 7August 1956. Ibid., 197-198.
“'Memorandum of a Conversation [on Third Meeting with Shigemitsu] ,” 31 August 1955. Ibid,
111-114.
^Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, 8 January 1954.
FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, 1577-1984, and The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense, 11
January 1954. Ibid., 1585-1986.
^Memorandum of Conversation, 19 February 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, 264.
’This was the usual title for “the chief officer of a colonial territory or dependency” or “the head of
the British diplomatic mission (the High Commission) in a Commonwealth country” {Oxford Eng
lish Dictionary). It was adopted to designate the highest U.S. administrator of the Ryukyu Islands.
Gordon Warner writes that Dr. Harold Seidman of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget, during his visit
to Okinawa in March 1953, suggested changing the title of “Governor” to “High Commissioner.”
He reasoned that “Governor” was ordinarily used to mean “the highest official of a territory” and
the “Ryukyu Islands are not a U.S. territory.” The Okinawa Reversion Story: War, Peace, Occupa
tion, Reversion (Naha: The Executive Link, 1997), 93.
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active duty members” of the U.S. forces, the high commissioner would “have the powers
and perform the duties assigned to him” by this order. He could “delegate any function
vested in him” to USCAR officials of his choice. He would also “carry out any orders or
duties delegated or assigned to him by the Secretary of State” under the order. The high
commissioner’s exercise of power, particularly in areas that might have bearing on the
foreign relations of the United States, would be reported to the Secretary of Defense
“who shall inform the Secretary of State.”
The Commanding General of the newly-formed U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS), commanding the IX Corps and the Army troops in the Ryukyus, was appointed as
high commissioner. He would also be designated as the representative of the Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific (CfNCPACREP), responsible for interservice coordination
on the islands. The offices of Governor in Tokyo and of Deputy Governor in Okinawa
were abolished.
Major General James E. Moore, deputy governor and the commanding general of the
Ryukyu Command and the IX Corps, was appointed as the commanding general of the
USARYIS/IX Corps and high commissioner. Brigadier General Vonna F. Burger contin
ued as the civil administrator in the office of the high commissioner (HICOM).
Day-to-day administration would be carried out, as before, by the Government of the
Ryukyus under USCAR supervision and a number of other constraints. The elected legis
lature, for example, could exercise powers “which extend only to all subjects of legisla
tion of domestic application.” It would become the practice for the high commissioner to
address the first regular session of each legislature in person, review the past year and
propose new legislation.
The chief executive would be “appointed by the high commissioner after consultation
with representatives of the legislative body.” It was expected that the high commissioner
would only appoint someone acceptable and agreeable, if not totally subservient, to him.
Every bill passed by the legislature required the chief executive’s signature before it be
came law. The chief executive, therefore, had the power of veto, although this could be
overridden by the high commissioner.
The Ryukyuan courts, too, had only limited civil and criminal jurisdiction. Above all,
the courts were constrained by the high commissioner’s power to transfer a case from a
Ryukyuan court to a USCAR court when, in his judgment, it was “of particular impor
tance affecting the security, property and interests of the United States.”
The order gave extraterritorial privileges to members of the U.S. forces (including ci
vilians) and their American dependents, American nationals employed by Washington
and their compatriot dependents, over whom the Ryukyuan courts had no criminal juris
diction. Even civil jurisdiction in “cases and controversies” involving the above-men
tioned Americans could be transferred from a Ryukyuan to a USCAR court if the high
commissioner judged that they could affect “the security of the islands,” “foreign rela
tions” or “the security, property or interests of the United States” or its nationals. Fur
thermore, the highest USCAR appellate court could review “any case, civil or criminal,”
tried not only in lower USCAR courts but also in the highest court of the Government of
the Ryukyus: the highest USCAR appellate court was de facto the “supreme court” in
Okinawa, and also had jurisdiction to review “a question of United States, foreign or in
ternational law, including the interpretation of any treaty, act of Congress of the United
States, Executive Order of the President of the United States, or of a proclamation, ordi
nance or order of the high commissioner upon appeal by any party.”
The high commissioner had supreme power in other areas. He could, if he judged it
necessary in order to fulfill his mission, “promulgate laws, ordinances or regulations,”
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“veto any bill,” “annul any law,” “remove any public official from office,” exercise the
power of reprieve, commutation or pardon, and “assume, in whole or in part, the exercise
of full authority in the islands.”
The high commissioner was restrained only by the provisions requiring him to “pre
serve to persons in the Ryukyu Islands the basic liberties enjoyed by people in democratic
countries” and to report on his exercise of authority to the Secretary of Defense and,
through him, to the Secretary of State.
Okinawan leaders and the press were disappointed with the Executive Order. It ig
nored the Okinawan people’s desire for reunification with Japan, as periodically ex
pressed since 1952 by the popularly elected Ryukyuan legislature including members of
even the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party which was favored by the U.S. authorities.
The Executive Order kept Okinawa under the authority of the Department of Defense
instead of transferring the administration to the Department of State. The high commis
sioner’s powers were so extensive that they violated not only the fundamental principles
of the American Revolution and the American Constitution, but also contradicted the
very reason for the U.S. presence in Okinawa which was, paradoxically, to safeguard the
free world against the anti-democratic forces of communism. Good government was no
substitute for self-government, but there was not even a reference in the Executive Order
to “good government,” which at least required the colonial rulers of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries to restrict the excessive exercise of their powers.
“[The] time has come,” a local newspaper editorial stated, “when civilian judgment
might be better than that of the military in the settlement of problems connected with
civil administration.” Years later, the New York Post would agree: “The U.S. has no valid
claim to the administration of the Ryukyus and it is reasonable to think that they would
have been returned to Japan long ago if the Pentagon’s demands were not given such
weight in shaping Pacific priority.”*
The United States had claimed that its responsibilities toward the Okinawan people
“arise in the first instance from our tradition of fair play.” It was most ironic that the spe
cial subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee had stated in 1955 following
its visit to Okinawa: “Okinawa has become, in its most precise sense, a ‘showcase of de
mocracy.’ The eyes of the world and particularly the hooded eye of the Communist world
are fixed effectively on our actions in Okinawa, the latter in concentrated study to dis
cover what can be used as propaganda against us. These two considerations have been
placed in order of priority—morality first, practicality, second.”’
There were other Americans who disagreed. Edwin O. Reischauer, future U.S. Am
bassador to Japan (1961-66), who had written in 1950 that an American trusteeship
would make the Okinawans “economic and political wards of the United States, . .. rele
gating [them] indefinitely to the status of a colonial people,” would confirm in 1957: “the
Ryukyuans are assigned ... to the status of a colonial people.”'® In the same year, Walter
S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs would admit that “the
Ryukyus are the only place in the world where the United States can be charged with
colonialism. We should make the Ryukyus a showcase for American democracy in the

g

New York Post, reprinted in the Asahi Evening News, 2 May 1969.
'^Report ofa Special Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee No. 86, 1956, 7658.
’®Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Harvard University Press, 1950), 238-9, and
the revised edition (New York: The Viking Press, 1957), 239.
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Pacific”*'
In such circumstances, it was no wonder that a State Department official had warned
against publicizing the Executive Order on the grounds that it would “stimulate reversionist agitation in Japan, which in turn will heighten reversion sentiment in the Ryukyus,
thereby decreasing the possibility of achieving our chief objective [i.e., retaining fiill con
trol] in the Ryukyus.”*^
He said that the order gave “a fa?ade of democracy and self-government for the Ryu
kyus which, upon closer examination, becomes a chimera,” adding:
If the Ryukyuans are to develop a democratic form of government, they must be al
lowed sufficient leeway in which to experiment, develop and, as is unavoidable, make mis
takes. The system proposed under the Executive Order has the built-in temptation to substi
tute our judgment for Ryukyuan judgment at every point. To achieve our fundamental pur
poses it appears highly desirable that intervention take place only when essential to avoid
those consequences related to matters concerning United States security interests. Further
more, it is likely that the Executive Order may come under attack in Japan on the ground
that it is a hypothetical document which pretends to give democratic rights to the Ryu
kyuans, but in fact does not.

The preamble of an early draft saying that the United States controlled the Ryukyus
“pending the establishment of enduring conditions of peace and stability in the Far East”
had been changed, presumably in compliance with the request of Japanese Prime Minis
ter Nobusuke Kishi who wanted to prevent a “general impression of permanency” in
American control.*^ The words in the new preamble referring to “Japan’s residual sover
eignty” and reaffirming that the United States did not seek permanent possession of the
islands were also deleted.
When Kishi visited Washington in the middle of June 1957, therefore, he had little
room to negotiate. With respect to Okinawa, he only asked if the United States could “de
fer” additional land acquisition in Okinawa until a joint investigation by U.S. Congress
men and Japanese Diet members could be conducted, and if it could consider permitting
the Okinawans to fly the Japanese flag, and to express a semantic preference for the word
“ultimate [sovereignty]” to “residual” in the joint communique with President Eisen
hower. *'' On the first point. Secretary Dulles explained that the U.S. President could not
delegate foreign affairs responsibilities to Congress and that the military was already be
ing asked to limit its land requirements to the absolute minimum. As to the flag, the De
partments of Defense and State agreed that the United States should not concede to this
request as yet. On the third point, the President simply reaffirmed in the joint commu
nique that Japan retained “residual sovereignty” over the Ryukyus.
Instead of requesting the return of a seized territory, Kishi asked the United States
whether it “could assist in emigration” to other countries of the Okinawan farmers whose
land was requisitioned for military use, in view of the fact that they had no alternative
land in Okinawa.*^ The suggestion was new to Dulles who “jokingly remarked that he
' 'Assistant Secretary of State for East Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, 15 October 1957.
FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, 513-514.
12
Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastem Affairs, 24 May 1957, ibid, 318-320.
'^Ibid. Kishi was shown a summary of the order in May.
^*Ibid.
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would like to see some of the Okinawans settle in New Guinea.” Two months later, the
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs reported to Dulles that “[the] question
of allowing Ryukyuan emigration to the Trust Territories was under consideration” at the
department.'® These territories included the Marianas, the Carolines and the Marshalls.
Resettlement of Okinawans to other places had been a recurring subject. The U.S.
Army’s agricultural mission to the Ryukyus, for example, suggested in its report of No
vember 1949 “arrangements for the emigration of thousands of natives” in order to “re
lieve the economic burden on the United States.”'^ The presidential directive of 1954
gave “supplemental instructions” to USCAR to assist the GRI in “the development of a
program to resettle Ryukyuans, who have been deprived of land by the requirements of
U.S. military forces, within the Ryukyuan archipelago and other suitable areas.” General
Ogden, as mentioned above, supported lump-sum payments in order to facilitate the re
settlement of 3,500 families on sparsely inhabited islands in the southern Ryukyus.
Always short of arable land, Okinawa had been sending out emigrants since the nine
teenth century, first to Hawaii, then South America, Taiwan, various South Pacific is
lands and elsewhere. Pre-war Okinawan settlers in Bolivia had in 1950 established a re
settlement organization called “Uruma” and purchased 2,500 hectares of land north of
Santa Cruz. Washington dispatched James L. Tigner of the Hoover Institution, Stanford
University, to Latin America to explore the possibilities of shipping Okinawan emigrants
there; Tigner espoused Uruma’s plan to settle 3,000 families (or 12,000 individual set
tlers) within ten years and recommended that USCAR finance the settlers’ travel ex
penses. USCAR and the Government of the Ryukyus supported the project. In 1954, 400
people, screened from about 2,900 applicants, left for Bolivia aboard two ships.
Life in the colony—the Uruma settlement and the adjacent land secured by earlier
Okinawan settlers—^turned out to be miserable. “All but a few were shocked at and dis
appointed by the place they were going to make their home,” as Kozy Amemiya, who
interviewed some of these emigrants in Bolivia in 1997, wrote. “It was covered with thick
jungle, there were no adequate roads to the Uruma settlement from the railroad or any
where else, and no bridge over the Rio Grande for access to Santa Cruz. The housing was
not finished and, worst of all, there was no potable water nearby.”'* A mysterious afflic
tion, called “Uruma disease,” would soon kill fifteen of the emigrants and put more than
eighty others to their sickbeds. Several months later, the settlement was struck by a seri
ous flood, and then by a plague of rats. “Many of the Okinawans started to wonder aloud
whether emigration to Bolivia was a government policy to dump them in the jungle,”
Amemiya writes, quoting one of them as saying: "I have never been rid of that suspicion.
I believe it was indeed a ‘thinning policy’.”
Meanwhile, on Christmas Day 1956, the voters of Naha elected as their mayor
Kamejiro Senaga. To the Americans, Senaga was a dangerous Communist trying to un
dermine American interests. To many Okinawans, however, he was a folk hero fighting
for their cause defiantly and almost single-handedly against powerful foreign authorities.
USCAR immediately froze financial assistance from the Bank of the Ryukyus (51 per'®Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, 16 August 1957.
Ibid., 443-46.
'^Agricultural Mission to the Ryukyus, Agriculture and Economic Reconstruction in the Ryukyus:
A Report, 26.

'* Kozy K. Amemiya, “The Bolivian Connection: U.S. Bases and Okinawan Migration,”
Chalmers Johnson, ed., Okinawa: Cold War Island (Carfiff, Calif: Japan Policy Research
Institute, 1999), 60-61.
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cent of whose common stock was owned by the United States) to the municipal govern
ment’s city planning program. Some 300 local business leaders also declared non
cooperation with the new administration. U.S. government officials in Washington were
apparently embarrassed, while the Central Intelligence Agency, for its part, began funneling money to pro-U.S., anti-Senaga politicians.'’
Defeated in a no-confidence vote by twenty-four to six in the municipal assembly,
Senaga dissolved the assembly and, in the subsequent election, doubled his strength in
the assembly, with a majority sufficient to keep him in power for the next three years.
High Commissioner Moore took action. He amended an ordinance on local autonomy to
permit the Naha City Assembly to remove Senaga fi-om office through multiple votes and
other ordinances were drafted to disqualify him fi-om holding any public office.^’
The legitimacy and chance of success of General Moore’s action were questionable. A
study by the Air Force Inspector General’s Office of Special Investigation had found that
the People’s Party did not have the capacity to carry out sabotage operations.^’ Besides,
Moore had apparently acted without consultation with Washington.^^ Serious considera
tion, “given on at least two occasions since December 25, 1956” to Senaga’s removal.
Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson told his counterpart at
Defense, “had led to the decision by General Lemnitzer . . . that the Naha City Assembly
should be given the opportunity to solve the problem in accordance with their proce
dures.” But when the assembly proved unable “to solve the problem,” the high commis
sioner did not inform Washington of his plans. Robertson only learned from an intelli
gence source two days in advance, of the possibility that Moore would take action to oust
Senaga. He instructed the U.S. Consul General in Naha “to inform General Moore that
the Department of State considered it necessary for the action to be reviewed in full [be
forehand] by interested Washington agencies,” but this communication did not reach
General Moore in time.^^ The Assistant Secretary of the Army had “heard nothing about
the matter” either. Finally, General Lemnitzer telephoned Moore and persuaded him to
delay action for a few hours “to allow the Departments of State and Defense to read and
to evaluate his message [i.e., ordinance].”
The amendments to the city assembly’s powers were announced on November 24; the
city assembly followed the new rules and succeeded in voting the duly elected mayor out
of office so as to preserve the “eternal peace and prosperity” of the city.
Robertson protested that the high commissioner made it “difficult, if not impossible
for the Department of State to carry out its responsibilities” under Section 3 of the Execu
tive Order. Under that section, the Secretary of State was “responsible for the conduct of
relations with foreign countries and international organizations with respect to the Ryu
kyu Islands.” Accordingly, he said “we had thought that there was a clear understanding
in the Ryukyus of the Consul General’s responsibility for independent reporting to the
Department on development[s] in the Ryukyus and of his need to communicate on such
’’Sarantakes, 112.
^°The new ordinance made it easy to put a second vote of no-confidence through a municipal as
sembly if the first vote failed to win the support of three-quarters of the membership in a two-thirds
quorum. On any second vote, a simple majority would now be sufficient to oust a mayor.
^'Sarantakes, 114.
^^Assistant Under Secretary for Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 11 December
1957. FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, 544-546.
^^The above memorandum also stated that the Consul General was “under injunction not to trans
mit any separate communications to the Department on the subject.”

IV: Fa9ade or Showcase of Democracy?

83

matters to the Department of State.”
The American Civil Liberties Union publicly criticized the Department of Defense’s
“military interference.” A letter it had sent to General Charles K. Gailey, head of the De
partment’s civil affairs division, had noted that “it is undemocratic to change established
rules . . . just to accomplish a particular end desired by the military” and that “domination
by the military over the civilian government of the city of Naha constitutes a violation of
democratic principles.” It added that only by granting “full self-government” to the Oki
nawans, subject solely to restrictions by military security interests, can there be a “satis
factory arrangement according with American principles.” The system of partial selfgovernment under complete military control, it charged, “gives rise to confusion and
grievances.”^''
Many Okinawans, in Naha and elsewhere, also reacted angrily to Senaga’s removal.
One businessman was quoted as saying: “You say you are giving us the vote and if you
don’t like who we elect you change the laws—^this is your wonderful democracy?”^’ The
furor immediately spread from Okinawa to mainland Japan. “The expected public reac
tion, particularly in Japan, occurred. For two or three days stories about the United
States’ action in ousting Mayor Senaga crowded all other news off the front pages of all
newspapers in Tokyo,” Robertson stated in his memorandum. “The Japanese press uni
formly and vigorously protested the method of effecting the removal of Mayor Senaga. It
was called undemocratic and ‘dictatorial’ and was pointed out as an example of the lack
of practice of democracy by the United States.” Labor unions issued statements denounc
ing the U.S. government. The Japanese government, however, made no official comment.
Naha citizens gave United States administrators another slap in the face in the subse
quent mayoral election by electing Saichi Kaneshi, running on behalf of a coalition
dominated by the People’s Party, over Tatsuo Taira, a close friend of Jugo Thoma, the
U.S.-appointed chief executive. The results, according to Taira, reflected how outraged
the people were at the amended ordinances and how deep-rooted their anti-American
sentiments were; he announced his retirement from politics. High Commissioner Moore
made no comment other than to state that the voters had elected a mayor through a de
mocratic process and that it was also his own responsibility as high commissioner to car
ry out his duties based on the same democratic principles. Civil Administrator Burger
said the crisis would delay Naha’s economic reconstruction. Kaneshi served a full fouryear term as mayor.

State-Defense Discord
These political disturbances in Okinawa apparently so shocked Washington that the
Departments of State and Defense decided to review United States policies toward the
Ryukyu Islands. Maintaining a cooperative relationship with Japan, where a surge of na
tionalism had begun to threaten such relations, was another consideration. In the course
of discussions, differences of views between the two departments emerged once again.
The Department of State had proposed that the government issue a new National Se
curity Council policy paper on the Ryukyus. There was, it argued, “a clear need for coor
dinated United States Government agency actions” regarding the islands “where we are
confronted with a highly complex delicate situation” Besides, Eisenhower’s Executive

^'*ACLU news release, 23 January 1958.
^^Barton M. Biggs, “The Outraged Okinawans,” Harper’s Magazine, December 1958, 60.
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Order 10713 of 1957, a published document, was “no substitute for an NSC policy pa
per.”^® But the Defense Department rejected resort to an NSC policy paper. This split was
not resolved, with the two departments instead agreeing only to hold the question of a
separate NSC policy paper on the Ryukyus “in abeyance pending further study.”^’
The Department of State was “in full accord” with the Pentagon as to the policy of
occupying the islands for so long as “‘conditions of threat and tension persist in the Far
East’” and retained the view that “the United States’ stake is such as not to brook our
sharing administrative responsibilities with Japan.” The two departments differed
sharply, however, in responding to “reversionism,” or the movement for Okinawa’s
administrative reunification with Japan:
The Defense position ... is that only by taking every possible opportunity for actions
and statements to remind the Japanese of the exclusive United States administration and
control of the islands will the United States be able effectively to reduce reversionist activ
ity in the Ryukyus and Japan.... The Department of State [on the other hand] believes that
unnecessary ‘stirring’ of Japanese sentiments of this question will increase rather than de
crease Japanese agitation and lead to enhanced reversionist sentiment on the part of the
Ryukyuans. [It] views reversionism in the Ryukyus essentially as an expression of the de
sire of the Ryukyuan people to belong to a country. It is a basic sentiment that cannot be
suppressed. The United States has affirmed to Japan the United States policy that the Ryu
kyu Islands should be eventually returned to Japan.

“If this position were to be changed and if the Japanese were to be told that the islands
would be alienated from them for the foreseeable future,” the Department of State
thought, “the effects on United States relations with Japan would be unfortunate. Acts
performed to demonstrate the long-range character of the American presence in the is
lands can be expected to create anti-Americanism, uiu'est, and a sharp increase in Japa
nese agitation and in reversionist activity in the Ryukyus. ... A calculated policy of
‘snubbing’ Japan with respect to the Ryukyus could not only seriously impede currently
successful efforts to establish close working relationships with Japan but as a conse
quence might also hurt our military position in the Ryukyus as well as in Japan.”
In January 1958, Secretary of State Dulles instructed Ambassador Douglas MacArthur
in Tokyo to review U.S. policies toward Japan and the Ryukyus on the grounds that “our
present posture . . . cannot be continued safely.”^’ MacArthur replied that “a major ad
justment is required in Okinawa where time is miming swiftly and remorselessly against
[the] U.S.” and made a series of “specific recommendations for changes in our policy and
in present administration there.” As for Japan, security arrangements needed to be ad
justed so that they would become less one-sided and more mutual.^“
Dulles called President Eisenhower’s attention to the Okinawa question on April 1. “I
spoke of the situation in Okinawa and the difficulty we had there, particularly with the
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, 15 October 1957,
FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 23, 513-4.
27
“Memorandum of Discussion at the 340th Meeting of the National Security Council,” 17 October
1957, ibid., 516-517.
28
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State of
Defense for International Security Affairs, 17 October 1957, ibid., 514-516.
Department of State to Tokyo, 31 January 1958, Central Files, 611.94/1-3158.
^°U.S. Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, 12 February 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 18,
4-7.
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Military High Commissioner who operated on a ‘be tough’ basis,” Dulles recorded. “I
said I thought we should explore the possibilities of an enclave, of which we would have
permanent or semi-permanent possession, with the administration of the rest of the island
turned back to the Japanese.”^' The President noted that the United States should learn a
lesson from what had happened in Cyprus and Algiers, saying “our failure to make with
the Japanese an acceptable and mutually agreeable arrangement for the Okinawa base”
could “easily develop a situation that would create much embarrassment for us.”^^ He
agreed that Okinawa might be divided to establish “an American enclave of minimum
size to meet our [security] needs.”
The Japanese minister in Washington told a senior official of the Department of State
that he considered the continued United States control of the Ryukyus (and the Bonin
Islands) to be the “most important problem” in the relations between the two countries.
The Japanese government, in his judgment, would request the immediate return of admin
istrative rights “shortly after the [forthcoming] general election.”^^
A few days later, the Department asked the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to make “an
evaluation of the feasibility and desirability of returning administrative rights in the Ryu
kyus to Japan” or, more specifically, of seeking “a stable log-term political basis for safe
[unrestricted] use of our bases in the Ryukyus.”^'* Ambassador MacArthur wrote that he
“fully” agreed with the principle of the proposal, but he had reservations about carrying it
out immediately. First take “urgently necessary measures to arrest the unfavorable trend
in Okinawa,” he suggested, and then work out a longer-term solution; administrative
turnover to Japan “without impairing our basic security interests.””
MacArthur also suggested, among other things, a “new arrangement, preferably in the
form of a new Executive Order, “which would give the State Department full and equal
voice with Defense, including veto powers over all policies toward the Ryukyus and all
actions by the high commissioner.” He said he continued to believe that “it is basically
unsound to continue military government in Okinawa” because the Ryukyuan situation
was a political, not military problem, as he had noted in his February 1 and March 10
letters to Secretary Dulles.^®
The Ambassador had apparently been annoyed, as many in the Department of State
were, by Moore’s high-handed removal of Senaga from office and his controversial
statement on December 15, 1957, that “we will be here ‘indefinitely’ or ‘for the foresee
able future.’ ... I feel our fundamental need is for an authoritative statement of the
minimum number of years during which this subject will not even be discussed. This
^'“Memorandum of conversation with the President,” 1 April 1558, footnote, ibid., 16.
^^Eisenhower, “Memorandum for the Record,” 9 April 1958, ibid., 16-7. The “Cyprus” metaphor
would be repeated by Secretary of State Dulles who said in 1958 : “We were tempted to make
much of the Chinese Communists plowing up the graves of ancestors but many Okinawan graves
had been bulldozed into airplane runways on Okinawa and, if we were not careful, we could have a
Cyprus-type situation there on our hands.” (“Memorandum of a Conversation, US-UK talks on Far
Eastern Policy,” 17 November 1958, ibid., 61-68).
^^Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far East
ern Affairs, 12 April 1958, ibid, 17-18.
^“'Department of State to the U.S. Embassy in Japan, 11 April 1958. Central Files 794C0221/41158: Supplement, footnote, ibid., 19.
^^U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State, 15 April 1958, ibid., 19-21.
^^U.S. Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, 15 April 1958, ibid., 19-21, and footnote on
21.
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must also be accompanied by a basic law under which we can operate. The combination
of these acts would remove current doubts and confusion, make clear to Okinawans and
others what their status is, and permit them to act and plan on the basis of a more certain
future.””
Finally, a temporary solution on the futiue of Okinawa seems to have been reached on
April 18, 1958, at least between Eisenhower and Dulles. In a telephone conversation,
Dulles told the President that “the moment was not opportune” to propose an administra
tive reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan.^* In view of the fact that U.S. military disposi
tions in Okinawa were widely scattered, Dulles also rejected the idea of “limiting our
jurisdiction to one or two enclaves.” Dulles suggested that the Department of Defense
start on a three-to-five-year program “to facilitate subsequently a return to the Japanese
of most of the administrative responsibilities over the Okinawan people.” When the Sec
retary referred to a report recommending a “wider dispersal in the Pacific of some facili
ties now on Okinawa,” the President indicated that this was a “sound approach.” The
question of Okinawa’s reunification with Japan would, therefore, be held in suspension,
pending the discussion on the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.
The land issue was also finally resolved: the United States would abandon determin
able estate payments in favor of annual rental payments. Before that, however, Moore
incurred President Eisenhower’s wrath in early April following a report that he had asked
the Department of the Army for permission to announce a possible change in the lump
sum policy. He believed that the change would give the Government of the Ryukyus the
authority to handle acquisition of any payment for land. When Dulles discussed
Moore’s suggestion with Eisenhower over the phone, Eisenhower advised the Secretary
to “tell him to keep his damn mouth shut.”'"’ In Ambassador MacArthur’s view, Moore’s
policy “would compound [the land problem] by trying to get GRI to put into effect on our
behalf a plan which will seem substantially equivalent to a discredited lump-sum pay
ment system.”
Moore was replaced by General Booth as high commissioner the following month.
Soon thereafter, six Okinawan representatives visited Washington to conduct negotiations
with U.S. officials.
Subsequent discussions in Okinawa between local and American officials came up
with a mutually satisfactory formula. Rentals would be paid annually: there would be two
kinds of lease contracts, one indefinite and another for five years; and annual rentals for
farmland, residential areas, commercial areas, and forest land would be assessed every
five years by new methods. Lease negotiations would be conducted and concluded by the
GRI on behalf of the United States. Only when the landowner refused to conclude a ne
gotiated lease would the United States use the power of eminent domain to expropriate or
condemn the property. When the lease expired, the United States would be required to
restore the land to its original state.
At about this time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended deploying intermediate

^’Consulate General at Naha to the Department of State,” 15 Dec. 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol.
XXIII, 548-549.
38
Memorandum of telephone conversation between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State
Dulles, 17 April 1958, FRUS. 1958-1960, Vol. 18, 21-22.
^^Ibid., 19-21, and footnote, 20.
^^Ibid., footnote.
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range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) on Okinawa.'*' “A major consideration in the selection
of Okinawa,” they said, “was the fact that the IRBMs could be deployed and operated
from that location without requiring negotiations with any other government.” They
added: “Since it does not appear possible that the United States will be able to introduce
nuclear weapons into Japan in the foreseeable future, the importance of Okinawa as a
base for the IRBMs is increased.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff even rebuffed as “inadvis
able” a State Department request that the Japanese government be consulted beforehand
regarding any deployment of IRBMs or any other U.S. military activities in the islands.
The Hungarian uprising (1956), the Suez crisis (1956-57), and the Soviet launching of
a multistage intermediate-range ballistic missile as well as the first man-made satellite.
Sputnik (1957), renewed tension in the world and alerted the United States to a missile
gap. The U.S. had begun deploying nuclear weapons in Europe, Asia and Pacific islands
in the mid-1950s. IRBM numbers sharply increased in the decade and early in the 1960s.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists disclosed in 1999 that nuclear weapons and launch
ers such as the 280mm gxm, 8-inch howitzer. Matador, anti-submarine nuclear depth
bomb, guided air defense missile (ADM), Honest John and Nike Hercules were all de
ployed in Okinawa between 1954 and 1959.“'^ As for ADMs, supersonic air-intercept
missiles such as the AIM-4 Falcon, the AIM-9 Sidewinder and the AIM-7 Sparrow were
available in the 1950s for deployment. The radar-guided Nike Ajax could intercept high
flying aircraft at more than twice the speed of sound. A larger version of the same missile,
the Hercules, which began to replace the Ajax in 1958, could carry a high explosive or a
nuclear warhead at more than three times the speed of sound and hit targets at 150,000
feet. The Honest John, an unguided ballistic rocket, could also be nuclear-armed. The
Matador (subsequently Mace) was a ground-launched, subsonic cruise missile designed
to carry a 3,000-pound warhead over a distance of more than 600 miles.
Renewed tension, rising particularly in the wake of the Soviet development of a longrange missile, led some Department of Defense officials to suggest a new policy state
ment by the United States reaffirming its intention to retain Okinawa for a long time.
Prior to his replacement, Moore himself had told an AP correspondent that “we will be
here ‘indefinitely’ or ‘for the foreseeable future.’” He added: “I feel our fundamental
need is for an authoritative statement of the minimum number of years during which this
subject will not even be discussed. This must also be accompanied by a basic law under
which we can operate. The combination of these acts would remove current doubts and
confusion, make clear to Okinawans and others what their status is, and permit them to
act and plan on the basis of a more certain fiimre.”'*^
Moore hoped this statement “might remove the reversion issue” from an election
campaign for legislators to be held for the first time under Chief Executive Jugo
Thoma.'''* The ruling Democratic Party was fighting an uphill campaign battle against the
Minren, a political group dominated by the People’s Party which had won the hearts of
many Okinawan voters for its stands on the land and reversion issues. Moore’s comments
“"joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McElroy, 1 May 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 18,
29-31.
Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin and William Burr, “Where They Were,” The Bul
letin of the Atomic Scientists, 55:6 (November/December 1999), 26-35.

http://vyww.bullatom sci.org/issues/1999/nd99/nd99norris.html.
'’^Consulate General at Naha to the Department of State,”15 December 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957,
Vol. 23, 548-549.
^Ibid.
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upset the Department of State and the Japanese Government; Ambassador MacArthur felt
it necessary to request authorization to confirm to Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama
that there had been no change in U.S. policy. Nor did Moore’s statement help the proU.S. candidates in the Okinawan election held soon thereafter: the pro-American candi
dates’ strength fell to only seven from fifteen in 1956 and their share of the popular vote
to 22 percent from 52, while the People’s Party won five seats gaining 11 percent of the
total and the Okinawa Socialist Party nine seats and 21 percent.
The U.S. dollar was introduced into Okinawa to replace, first, MPC (military payment
certificates)'*^ in April 1958, and then the “B-yen” military currency in September 1958.
The currency conversion had apparently been under consideration at least since the spring
of 1957, when a financial management mission led by Edward W. O’Flaherty, chief of
the economic affairs division in the U.S. Army’s office of civil affairs, visited Okinawa
to evaluate USCAR’s currency and fiscal management operations and to develop proce
dures for fumre currency and fiscal management in the Ryukyus. Subsequently, the mis
sion recommended withdrawing the two military scrip currencies in circulation in Oki
nawa and adoption of the U.S. dollar as the single legal tender on the islands.
The Army proposed the conversion to the Department of State on the ground that it
would bring economic benefits to the Ryukyus and administrative advantages to the
United States.'** The conversion to the dollar was considered necessary in order to attract
outside investment and to vitalize the fragile Okinawan economy. Local capital, income
from military bases and GARIOA funds had proved insufficient to finance needed devel
opment. With the authority to issue money and regulate its value vested in Congress by
the Constitution, the Army also had no statutory authority to issue a military occupation
currency in peacetime.'*’ Apparently, however, this was not one of the Army’s primary
reasons for the conversion.
The Department of State was opposed to the conversion as a result of “political
considerations,” i.e., that it would be used by “agitators” in Japan “to demonstrate that the
United States intends to retain the islands in perpetuity.” It was feared that this could pro
voke repetition of the kind of angry reaction in Okinawa that followed the announcement
of the Price Report on new long-term land acquisition and that “political objections”
would “outweigh possible economic advantages.” The Department suggested retaining
the B-yen, supported “one hundred percent by United States dollars available in the Ryukyuan Foreign Exchange Fund” and replaced by new bills which would not bear the taint
of an occupation currency.
President Eisenhower, upon learning of the plan for the first time on May 23 from
Dulles in the course of a telephone conversation, was opposed to it and ordered a stop to
the move; the United States had never used its dollar in occupied territory."** On the same
day, local time. Booth called into his office Chief Executive Thoma, Tsumichiyo Asato,
^*Circulated on military bases, they were convertible with dollars.
'**Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of the Army, 2 Au
gust 1957, FRUS1955-1957, Vol. 23, 437-438, and footnotes thereof
'*’Xhe Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army had noted that the Army had no authority to issue
the B-yen script after the state of war with had ended legally. (Sarantakes, 118, quoting from “Ryu
kyu Island Fact Sheet, 4, Army,” vol. 1 (8), Box 2, Alphabetical Subseries, Subject Series, White
House Office; Office of the Staff Secretary.) Also see “Talking Paper: Introduction of U.S. Cur
rency in the Ryukyu Islands,” 12 August 1958. Japan vol. 1 of III (1), Box 8, International Series,
Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower Library.
‘**Sarantakes, 118, quoting from the memorandum of phone conversation.
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the speaker of the Legislature, and Moriyasu Tomihara, the president of the Bank of the
Ryukyus, and disclosed the plan to them.'” Hundreds of tons of dollar bills and coins, in
wooden boxes labeled “Toy Horse,” must have departed the United States by this time
aboard military vessels; they arrived at Naha Port at the end of May.
Japanese Prime Minister Kishi, who had heard of the plan from Ambassador MacArthur, one day ahead of Eisenhower, said he understood the economic reasons for the con
version but was concerned that the Japanese would consider it as the first step toward an
American annexation of the islands. He asked for a delay of the announcement. The retir
ing ambassador. Booth, also recommended a delay.*® Booth told Dulles that Okinawans
enthusiastically supported the plan, but also agreed to delay an announcement.*'
Dulles brought up the subject with Eisenhower again, but the President once more re
jected the idea as “one of doubtful wisdom,” for fear that “it would be interpreted in Ja
pan as an expected and nevertheless latent ambition of this country to annex those is
lands.” He would consider the conversion only if Prime Minister Kishi recommended it
because of its favorable effect on the Ryukyuan economy.*^ Under instructions from Dul
les, the Ambassador met Kishi immediately. This time, Kishi neither opposed nor sup
ported the move, only asking that the public announcement be delayed until after the Diet
went into recess, and repeated a request that the land issue be resolved.** Dulles talked to
the President again and, this time received his approval.
Booth finally announced the conversion plan on August 23. It would go into effect
from September 15. The conversion, he said, was designed to “unify” the currencies cir
culating in Okinawa. It would promote the Okinawan economy by streamlining the op
erations of local business activities, encouraging importation of foreign capital, technol
ogy and expertise, and enhancing native Okinawans’ ability to make external transac
tions. He denied that there were any political implications of the conversion. Immediately
following the announcement, the high commissioner issued ordinances on foreign in
vestment in the Ryukyus, imposing temporary price controls and making amendments to
the Bank Act.
Contrary to the high commissioner’s remarks to Dulles about enthusiastic local sup
port, many Okinawans had misgivings about the currency conversion to the U.S. dollar.
Even Thoma, who said he recognized the benefits of using the world currency, was con
cerned about possible “harmful effects” on the local economy such as inflation and loss
in earning power. In fact, the Economic Council of the Government of the Ryukyus had
advised the chief executive that conversion would invite “undesirable” foreign invest
ment and squeeze local industry, that it would make way for economic colonization of
the islands by foreign capital, and that it would adversely affect people who longed for
return to Japanese rule.
The president of the Democratic Party foresaw a substantial degree of confusion
among the general public and difficulties for local industry attempting to compete in the
world economy. The Ryukyu Chamber of Commerce, too, was opposed; it favored, as the
economic council did, a distinct Okinawan currency rather than the dollar which might
swallow up the island’s tiny economy. “It was regrettable,” a special committee on cur
rency of the GRI Legislature said, “that people were not asked their views. If the plan is
^^Okinawa Times, ed., Okinawa no Shogen, Vol. 2 (Naha: Okinawa Times, 1973), 258, 260.
*®MacArthur to Dulles, May 23, 1958, FRUS, 1958-60, vol. 17/18.
*'Booth to Dulles, May 26, 1958. Ibid.
**President Eisenhower to Secretary of State Dulles, June 4, 1958, FRUS, 1968-60, vol. 18, 31-32.
**MacArthur to Dulles, June 19, 1958, ibid.
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to be implemented [regardless of their wishes], the Government of the Ryukyus should be
given all authority on foreign investment and ... on trade control.” More critical ele
ments believed that the conversion was to intended lay the economic groundwork for the
United States to reinforce its political control of the islands.
Okinawa officially became a dollar zone market on September 16. Converted at the
rate of one dollar to 120 B-yen, a total of 4,316,107,000 B-yen was exchanged for
roughly $36,000,000 by November 29. The B-yen notes were carried off the coast,
weighed down in drums filled with concrete and committed to the deep some 3,000 feet
down. In spite of the price controls and contrary to the assurance that inflation would not
occur, the conversion drove commodity prices up by 10 percent within one month.
On the eve of the dollar conversion, Okinawans were treated to an event that briefly
united them, at least psychologically, with the people of mainland Japan. In August,
Shuri High School participated in the National Hi^ School Baseball Championships
held at Koshien Stadium in Kobe. It was the first Okinawan team to compete in the
“dream” games, an annual summer event that drew the attention of virtually the entire
nation. Much was made of the participation of this team from a former Japanese prefec
ture now under American military occupation. The sponsoring organization honored the
team by asking its captain to recite the pledge of allegiance to Japan at the opening cere
mony on behalf of the 660 players. National and local media enthusiastically welcomed
the team, and many Okinawans in the Kobe-Osaka area as well as Okinawan students on
school excursions went to cheer the Shuri nine while people in Okinawa listened to the
game on the radio. The team lost its first game by three-to-zero, but it captured the hearts
of many Okinawans and mainland Japanese when the young players began to put earth
from the ground into their bags. Many saw in this act a symbolic display of their attach
ment to the Japanese soil. The drama was not over yet. When the ship carrying them
home arrived in Naha, a quarantine officer confiscated the souvenir earth and threw it
into the sea. Japanese soil could not be brought onto the island. The incident aroused still
more sympathy both in Okinawa and mainland Japan.

Civil Rights under Military Rule
Since the primary reason for the presence of the United States in Okinawa is the impor
tance of its military bases there, any action which might seriously threaten the security of
the base ctmnot be approved. Therefore, all matters concerning civil and political liberties
must be considered in the light of basic military necessity.

The above was drawn from a confidential memorandum^'* prepared for the Civil Ad
ministrator, his deputy, the special assistant to the High Commissioner and other high
U.S. officials in Okinawa in anticipation of the visit to Okinawa in mid-August 1959 of
Roger Baldwin, chairman of both the American Civil Liberties Union and of the Interna
tional League for the Rights of Man.Baldwin’s visit, immediately following the prom-

^'*Memorandum by Irving Eisenstein, Legislative Legal Department, USCAR, 17 August 1959, on
“Issues Which May Be Raised during the Baldwin Visit.”
^^Baldwin was invited to visit Okinawa by the Civil Affairs Division of the Department of Defense
and High Commissioner Booth. Baldwin to Civil Affairs Division, 22 September 1959. Baldwin
Papers, Box 10, FI8.
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ulgation of a controversial penal code’® by the high commissioner, promised to be a very
important one. Baldwin had been alerted to the code by the Reverend David Reid of Mas
sachusetts during a round-the-world tour which would include Okinawa.”
By its own admission, the USCAR memorandum noted that the United States could
be charged in several areas with depriving the Okinawans of “civil rights enjoyed by
Americans and Japanese.” The first issue addressed in the memorandum was local auton
omy. The high commissioner was empowered to appoint the chief executive and override
any action of the Ryukyuan government. All Okinawan parties had been calling for popu
lar election of the chief executive. The memorandum said, however, that the chief execu
tive was to be appointed by the high commissioner after consultation with representatives
of the [Ryukyuan] legislature as required by Executive Order 10713. “To permit popular
election of the chief executive,” it stated, “may well result in a completely uncooperative
local government, which would require extensive legislative action by the high commis
sioner in order to carry out his military mission.” In other words, having a democratically
elected chief executive might be counterproductive to American interests.
The memorandum stated that the high commissioner’s legislative and veto powers
were limited by the Executive Order “to actions necessary to carry out [his] mission and
to the protection of U.S. interests.” It admitted, however, that questions had been raised
regarding the necessity of maintaining an unelected executive when U.S. authorities ex
ercised the right to veto legislation, and the relevance to U.S. security of the use of the
veto over such matters as the introduction of a tax on luxury goods. USCAR ordinances,
indeed, extended to everything fi'om the United States land acquisition program to a nurs
ing school and nurse licensing, whaling operations, education, municipal autonomy, ty
phoon disaster rehabilitation, banking, commodity taxation, workmen’s compensation
benefits, and control of narcotics and other drugs. USCAR vetoed GRI laws setting a date
for the election of the chief executive and high duties on foodstuffs (both in 1953); it re
vised six bills in 1952 and 1953 alone concerning income tax and “prevailed upon” the
chief executive to veto two labor bills.’*
The second issue concerned travel permits for Okinawans. External travel between
Okinawa was regulated by CA Ordinance No. 93 of 1953 (“Control of Entry and Exit of
Individuals into and from the Ryukyu Islands”), Ordinance No. 147 (“Control of Travel
’®HICOM Ordinance No. 23, “Code of Penal Law and Procedure for the Ryukyu Islands,” 13 May
1959. The ordinance was intended to rescind and supersede Civil Administration Ordinance No.
144 of 13 March 1955 entitled “Code of Penal Law and Procedure” (and all changes to it) which
itself had rescinded and superseded Military Government Ordinance No. 1, “Codified Penal Law
and Procedure of the Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands” of 5 July 1949 (and all changes
thereto).
’^Reid to ACLU, 5 August 1959, with an attached copy of the letter Reid had sent to Senator
Hubert Humphrey. ACLU Records, Box 1175, F9. Reid wrote that he based his information on an
article in Sekai (August 1959) by one Senaga. The Senaga referred to was Kamejiro Senaga.
’*Col. C. W. Nelson to Chief, Civil Affairs and Military Government, Department of the Army, 24
March 1955, on “Allegations of Japan Civil Liberties Union Against United States Administration
of Okinawa.” AGJ 014.1 EJ-D, RG 59 CDF 1955-, 3978 F5. When the education, welfare and labor
committee of the legislature discussed three labor bills governing labor unions, standards and rela
tions, General James Lewis, the civil administrator, sent its members a letter asking for deferral of
action pending further study. The bills were forwarded to the plenary session, which passed two of
the three bills and sent them to the chief executive for his signature. Asked by Lewis in a letter not
to sign them, the chief executive used a pocket veto. Okinawa Times, ed., Okinawa no Shogen,
Vol. 2, 85-93.
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to Japan by Residents of the Ryukyu Islands,” and their subsequent amendments. The
former ordinance defined “residents of the Ryukyus” as “Ryukyuans,” distinct from the
Japanese, and required USCAR authorization for Okinawans hoping to visit Japan or
returning from Japan, and for mainland Japanese nationals entering Okinawa. The latter
required “residents of the Ryukyu Islands” to obtain a Japan Travel Document issued by
the Government of the Ryukyus “by direction of the [U.S.] Deputy Governor” for au
thorization to travel to Japan or for re-entry into the Ryukyus.
Operational control over the immigration section of the Government of the Ryukyus,
a part of its Legal Affairs Department, was retained by the high commissioner and ad
ministered by the USCAR public safety department “for military security reasons.” The
Ryukyu Travel Unit (later Bureau) in Tokyo, a USCAR agency, processed applications
for travel from mainland Japan to the Ryukyus. The memorandum blamed Japanese bu
reaucracy as “a major delaying factor” for whatever difficulty people in Japan had in ob
taining visas to visit Okinawa.
Particularly controversial was a 1957 change in the regulations which required an ap
plicant for travel authorization not only to provide a fingerprint but submit additional
information when “deemed necessary” by the authority. Kamejiro Senaga, whom the
U.S. administration labeled as a communist,^® was repeatedly denied travel outside Oki
nawa; Chobyo Yara, president of the Teachers’ Association and the Association for Oki
nawan Reversion, had his passport suspended in 1953 while his deputy, Shinei Kyan, had
his application refused. A number of Okinawan students studying in mainland Japan
came home temporarily, but never returned to their classes after USCAR refused to per
mit their re-exit. Many others lived in the shadow of a “Big Brother” interfering with
their lives, kept their mouths shut, or risked their future and employment. Labor leaders,
academics and civil rights activists in mainland Japan were also barred from Okinawa,
ostensibly for security reasons.®”
The USCAR memorandum acknowledged that “the long form” travel permit asked
“more detailed questions on communist affiliations than normal U.S. or Japanese travel
applications.” Then it justified the “USCAR position,” stating that the long form required
“no more information than is customarily requested by most countries before issuance of
an immigrant visa.” Baldwin might assume that the long form was “an attempt to trap
perjurers rather than obtain necessary information for travel.” But, it continued, “merely
because the short form is more favorable to Ryukyuan travelers [it] does not establish this
form as a standard nor does it indicate any oppression as a result of use of the long form.”
Referring to a 1958 court decision that the U.S. Department of State could not deny
passports on ideological grounds, overruling the Department’s 1950 revocation of the
passport of Paul Robeson, an African-American actor, singer and pro-Soviet political
activist, the memorandum said that the ruling was used as a complaint against the long
form “despite the fact that no one who has filled out the long form has been denied a
travel document.” In a way, it was true. When Chairman Kamejiro Senaga of the Oki
nawa Peoples Party, then mayor of Naha, applied for a visa to travel to Japan in 1957 to
request Japanese government funding for the rehabilitation of Naha and the restoration of
compulsory education, USCAR required him to complete the long form. Essentially an
59

Senaga denied at the time that he was a communist, but in 1972, he was elected deputy chairman
of the Japan Communist Party.
®”Okinawa Jinken Kyokai (Okinawa Human Rights Association) “Jinken Kyokai 20-Nen no Ayumi
to Tembo (roundtable discussion),” Jinken Yogo no Ayumi, No. 11 (20th Year Anniversary Issue)
1981, 1-20.
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affidavit, it asked, among other things, whether the applicant had ever been a communist;
if so, why; and whom he planned to see while in Japan. The applicant was then required
to take an oath that he would have no objection to being arrested and jailed if any of his
answers was found to be false. Senaga refused to complete the form and take the oath. As
a result, he was to be denied a passport sixteen times altogether. He was finally allowed
to visit Japan in 1967, two years after he filed a complaint with the Okinawa Human
Rights Association, and the Okinawa Reversion Association decided to take legal action
in a Tokyo court.®'
In 1960, the GRI Legislature passed a resolution calling for immediate recission of
Ordinance 147, which it said ran contrary to the United Nations Charter and violated the
Executive Order. Since Okinawans were treated in Japan as Japanese people under its
constitution, the long form requirement for certain Okinawans was an infringement of
their fundamental constitutional rights.
The memorandum added: “The recent Supreme Court decision upholding [the]
State’s refusal to give newsman William Worthy a passport to Red China tends to down
grade this problem.” Worthy, a former correspondent in the Soviet Union for CBS News
and the Baltimore Afro-American, was denied a new passport after slipping into China in
1956-57 in defiance of the U.S. govermnent’s travel ban. Worthy was jailed after travel
ing to Cuba without a passport, but a federal appeals court ruled the travel restrictions
unconstitutional in 1964.
The memorandum admitted that it was a “frequent complaint” that most Okinawans
had to apply for a travel permit for each trip. This practice was often used to restrict
travel by those whom USCAR regarded as undesirable, as in the case of the aforemen
tioned university students who could not return to their campuses, and served to intimi
date people with the slightest resentment against United States administration of their
islands. The USCAR position, it said, was “that multiple entry permits are granted when
the need therefor is shown, e.g., for businessmen.”
Another complaint was that “Okinawans traveling overseas on a USCAR travel
document gained the protection of neither the U.S. nor Japanese consular services, and
that the validity of the document is questioned in many countries.” The memorandum
dismissed this complaint as “wrong.”®^
Third, the memorandum listed eight categories of Okinawan complaints about courts
and the legal system: extensive jurisdiction of USCAR courts, disparity of sentences be
tween Ryukyuan and USCAR courts, detention before trial, a dual legal system, the high
commissioner’s power to transfer cases from Ryukyuan to USCAR courts, the absence of
rights to counsel of choice and the right of appeal, and “automatic” conviction in USCAR
courts. With regard to the first point, USCAR courts during most of the 1950s had juris
diction over larceny, unauthorized possession and issuance of military base passes, deal
ing in stolen property, drunken or unlicensed driving, assault, prostitution, black-mar
keting, vehicle offenses, explosives and firearms, breaking and entering, interference with
utilities, trespass on U.S. government installations, illegal entry and departure, and con
spiracy. The memorandum asserted, however, that “the recent transfer of offenses to GRI
®'Kamejiro Senaga, Minzoku-no Ikari—Moeagaru Okinawa (Tokyo: Shin-Nihon Press, 1971), 153157.
®^CA Ordinance No. 147, “Control of Travel by Residents of the Ryukyu Islands,” 7 March 1960,
provided for a “certificate of identity” to be issued by direction of the high commissioner in lieu of
a passport for traveling to areas other than Japan.
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jurisdiction has eliminated this complaint.” Indeed, jurisdiction over all traffic offenses
committed by Okinawans was relinquished and transferred to the Ryukyuan courts in
1957-58; jurisdiction over other minor offenses affecting “the property, security and in
terests of the United States,” was also delegated to the Ryukjman courts in September
1958. The jurisdiction of USCAR courts was now limited to forty specific offenses
“deemed of particular importance” to the security, property, and interests of the United
States.” Larceny, assault, dealing in stolen property and breaking and entering could be
considered such offenses, as well as possession of counterfeit currency, illegal possession
of arms or explosives, unauthorized possession of military base passes, passport viola
tions, trespass on U.S. govenunent installations, espionage, and conspiracy.
The fourth area of concern related to restrictions of various labor rights. The memo
randum acknowledged the existence of wage differentials on military bases. Indeed, Fili
pinos earned five times as much as Okinawans, Japanese eight times, and Americans
twelve times. It argued, however, that these figures were not proof of racial discrimina
tion; critics had simply failed to consider the “technical capabilities” of the Okinawan
workers. It noted USCAR efforts to upgrade their skills and, hence, pay scales.
Furthermore, the memorandum acknowledged that Ordinance 116®^ governing labor
relations between U.S. government agencies, their civilian employees and contractors and
members of the U.S. forces, and their Okinawan employees had been criticized for re
stricting various labor rights. The ordinance set out to declare a “Bill of Rights of Labor,”
guaranteeing every worker “the right to associate himself with other workers in labor
organizations,” “the right to select representatives of his choosing,” and “the right to
work” regardless of race, nationality, creed, or social status, etc. At the same time, how
ever, it prohibited “Category 1” employees—^those directly paid by U.S. government ap
propriated funds—fi-om participating in any strike. No one “who engages in a strike
against the U.S. government or who is a member of an organization of government em
ployees that asserts the right to strike against the U.S. government, or who advocates, or
is a member of an organization that advocates the overthrow of the U.S. government by
force or violence” would be hired as a Category 1 employee. Anyone willfully violating
these provisions would be subject to punishment by fine or imprisonment, or discharged
immediately for joining a strike, although an affidavit could be used to absolve the person
of any such offenses. Likewise, strikes were made illegal in the case of employees in
such “essential industry or activity” as a public utility, transportation and communi
cations, with violations punishable by fine or imprisonment.
Every officer of a labor organization whose members work for the military was ex
pected to sign and submit an affidavit that “he is not a member of the Communist Party
or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member nor
supports any organization that believes in or teaches the overthrow of the United States
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods.”^ The labor organi
zation was also prohibited from making any political contributions.
In addition. Ordinance 145 (“Approval of Labor Organizations”)*^ provided that “no
organization or individual shall be recognized as a labor or trade union . . . unless it is
determined by the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands that such representation
will not adversely affect” the security of the U.S. forces in the Ryukyu Islands. USCAR
*^CA Ordinance No. 116, “Labor Relations and Labor Standards Concerning Ryukyuan Employ
ees,” issued on 18 August 1953.
*^The U.S. Constitution, of course, did not apply to the Okinawan people.
**The ordinance was promulgated on 18 March 1955.
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would approve or disapprove of the applicant labor organization on the basis of its lead
ership and activities; it would also determine whether officials elected or appointed in the
newly authorized organization were acceptable. The organization would lose all its rights
and privileges if USCAR found an elected or appointed representative unacceptable and
the organization did not immediately remove him from his leadership position.
The USCAR memorandum justified restrictions on military employees’ labor rights
on grounds of “military necessity, e.g., a strike against the government could not be toler
ated.” It acknowledged that Ordinance 116 required anti-communist statements and other
similar documents from union leaders and that it did not recognize collective bargaining
and the right to strike for Okinawan workers in military installations. “[T]he lack of these
rights plus an alleged fear of discrimination against union organizers,” it stated, “are cited
as an effective barrier” to the on-base workers organizing unions.
The memorandum then referred to the recent dismissal of an Okinawan employee by
the U.S. Air Force on the ground that he was a member of the Okinawa People’s Party
“whose aims were inimical to the interests of the U.S.” It noted that other political parties
regarded the action as “a potential threat to all political parties,” pointing out that the OPP
was a “recognized political party registered with USCAR, and with legally elected
[rejpresentation in the legislature.” It also recognized a frequent criticism that regulations
such as Ordinance 145 abused “‘security’ as a guise for USCAR intervention” while “the
organization of Okinawan labor in the private sector has no connection with the security
of militaiy bases.”
The fifth area involved Ordinance 23 (“Penal Code of the Ryukyu Islands”) and pre
treaty claims. This highly controversial ordinance made “any person”^ punishable “by
death or such other punishment as a Civil Administration court may order” if he or she:
1.
2.

3.

4.

“bears arms” against the United States or its armed forces;
“willfully and unlawfully kills, or ... in the course of committing a felony causes the
death of, any U.S. forces personnel*’ or security guard employed by the United States or
any agency or instrumentality thereof’;
“commits an act or acts of espionage, sabotage, or sedition in the employ or in the interest
of any foreign country, nation, or government, or any agent, agency or representative
thereof’; or
“rapes, or assaults with intent to rape, any female U.S. forces personnel.”

Other “offenses against public safety” also carried heavy punishments.** Any person:
1.

2.

who has unforced sexual intercourse with any female U.S. forces personnel under the
age of sixteen, other than his wife: a $5,000 fine or ten-year imprisonment at the
maximum;
who “assaults any U.S. forces personnel, and any person who assaults, resists, op-

**“A person” was defined as “any [Okinawan] individual, partnership, corporation, unincorporated
firm or association and/or responsible official or member thereof.” Americans were subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the USCAR Penal Code. Only in November 1960 was the
ordinance revised to broaden the term to include U.S. forces personnel.
*’They included members of the U.S. forces, American civilians employed by the U.S. government
or any of its agencies, American contractors with the U.S. government, non-Ryukyuan (and nonJapanese) employees of the American Red Cross, dependents of the above, non-Ryukyuan (and
non-Japanese) contractors with the U.S. government, and non-Ryukyuan (and non-Japanese) repre
sentatives of foreign governments.
**Per capita income in 1960 was $202.
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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

11.
12.
13.

14.

poses, impedes, intimidates or interferes with any security guard employed by the
U.S.” with a dangerous weapon; $2,500 or ten years in prison;
who “by spoken words makes a public statement,” or who “publishes, circulates,
broadcasts . . . any printed, written, filmed, recorded, taped or such matter,” which is
[opposed to the] Administration, or the Government of the Ryukyu Islands”: $1,250
or five years in prison;
who makes a public statement or disseminates any matter which is “designed and/or
intended to foment public unrest, disorder and/or hostility directed toward the United
States, or its Civil Administration, or the Government of the Ryukyu Islands”: $500
or two years in prison;
who “enters into or departs from ... the Ryukyu Islands without a [written] permit,”
any person who “violates any of the conditions placed upon an entry or departure
permit by direction of the high commissioner,” or any person who “knowingly gives
false information” to acquire or maintain such a permit: $500 or two years in prison;
who flies or displays any flag other than that of the United States from “government
buildings or premises,” or at “public gatherings or processions of an official or politi
cal nature” without the specific approval of the high commissioner: $125 or six
months in prison;
who “breaks and enters into a dwelling house of U.S. forces personnel in the night
time with intent to commit a felony”: $2,500 or ten years in prison;
who, as a member of “a company, association, group, party, club, union, or like or
ganization” not registered as a political party, “engages in political activity” in the
name of or on behalf of the organization: $500 or two years in prison;
who as a member of any of the above organizations, makes or intends to make false
statements that might be construed to be “derogatory to or contemptuous of the Unit
ed States or its Civil Administration, or the Government of the Ryukyu Islands”:
$500 or two years in prison;
who might “possess, or operate any radio, television, or wire broadcast (group broad
casting) transmitting apparatus without a valid license”: $1,250 or three years in
prison.
who “publishes or prints any newspaper, magazine, book, pamphlet, or circular”
without prior registration : $250 or one year in prison;
who “imports . . . any printed, written, filmed, recorded, taped” materials derogatory
to or contemptuous of the United States or its agents; $250 or one year in prison;
who “photographs, draws, sketches, maps or plots any land or sea area, object or
scene which is wholly or partially within any restricted United States government in
stallation or area” without authorization and anybody who possesses them: $500 or
two years in prison.
who “engages in unnatural carnal copulation with a member of the U.S. forces per
sonnel of the same or opposite sex”: $1,250 or five years in prison.

The ordinance also provided for somewhat puritanical action against “offenses against
morals.” Prostitution with U.S. forces personnel, for example, would be subject to $250
or one year in prison.®^ The same penalty would be imposed on anyone acting as a pimp
or a panderer between a prostitute and U.S. forces personnel, maintaining a house of
prostitution serving them, or preparing or participating in “any lewd, obscene, indecent,
or immoral show” intended for U.S. servicemen. Those who knowingly “persuade, in
duce, entice, or procure any girl under the age of eighteen years, with or without her con
sent, to engage in prostitution or debauchery or any other immoral practice” would be
fined $2,500 or less or imprisoned for a maximum of ten years.
“Offenses against economic and financial policy,” which included those relating to
*®There was no law prohibiting prostitution between Okinawans.
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currency, custody of property, commercial transactions, and fraudulent tax returns, failure
to file an income or corporate tax return punishable by a $500 or two years in prison at
the maximum.
The ordinance was criticized in mainland Japan by major newspapers, various civic
organizations, and the opposition parties. In their letter of protest to President Eisenhower
and USCAR, leaders of the Japan Committee for Peace said that the penal law, regarding
Japan as a foreign country, is “designed to suppress the Okinawan voice for reversion and
make the Japanese people’s demand for full independence of the country punishable by
death.” The Association of Okinawans in Tokyo sent a similar letter protesting that “es
pionage,” “sabotage” and obstruction of public security were so ambiguously defined that
they could be interpreted broadly, and that the reversion movement could possibly be
suppressed as a consequence. In his article in Sekai magazine, Kamijiro Senaga wrote
that capital punishment might be imposed on anyone who urged Okinawa’s reversion to
Japan, since anyone who “agitat[ed] for the benefit of a foreign country” might be pun
ished by death and a foreign country was defined as any country other than the United
States or the Ryukyus.™
Civic organizations such as the Okinawa Teachers’ Association and the Council of
Government Employees’ Unions protested that the ordinance violated Executive Order
10713, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the U.N. Charter. Section 12 of
the Executive Order required the high commissioner to “preserve [to the Ryukyuans]
basic liberties . . . including freedom of speech, assembly, petition, religion and press.”
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees everyone “the right to
life, liberty and security of person,” while Article 1 of the U.N. Charter requires member
states to promote and encourage “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”
In a petition for rescission or change, addressed to the high commissioner, USCAR
and the GRI Legislature, they questioned the definition and scope of words like “hostile
activities,” “assaults with intent to rape,” “espionage,” “unlawful assembly,” and “slan
der.” They asked why Okinawans—^who were outside the protection of the U.S. constitu
tion—should be subject to the death penalty for espionage, why simple participation in
demonstrations was to be punished so harshly, why the Japanese flag should be banned
from public buildings, and why the original text of the code was issued in English. They
asserted that adjudication of offenses against Okinawans should be transferred from US
CAR to GRI courts.
In essence, they complained that the ordinance retained many characteristics of Proc
lamation No. 2 (“War Crimes”) issued by Admiral Nimitz in 1945, in an attempt to pro
tect American interests arbitrarily in peacetime at the cost of the civil and political rights
of the Okinawans. The proclamation made provision for dealing with offenses subject to
punishment by the military government.
Any individual enemy who “bears arms” against the U.S. forces, “kills or assaults
with intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm” on any member of those forces, “rapes
or assaults with intent to rape” any nurse or other woman serving the forces, “serves the
enemy as a spy or harbors or aids the enemy,” “has in his possession” any unauthorized
weapons, ammunition, or explosives, or “incites” any Okinawan “to insurrection against
military authority” would be liable to a maximum penalty of death. Any person who “as
saults” any American serviceperson, “displays” the Japanese flag, who “publishes or cir
culates” any printed or written matter “hostile, detrimental or disrespectful” toward the
™Kamejiro Senaga, “Sokoku-ni Uttaeru,” Sekai (August, 1959), 65-70.
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military government, who “utters” any speech or word of that nature, or who “partici
pates” in any authorized public demonstration would be punished by fine or imprison
ment or both. These provisions were carried over to Militaiy Government Ordinance No.
1 (“Codified Penal Law and Procedure of the Military Government of the Ryukyu Is
lands”) of July 1949, the original penal law promulgated before the Japanese peace treaty
went into effect, CA Ordinance No. 144 ruled, and then Ordinance No. 23.
Like its predecessors. Ordinance No. 23 contained no provisions on offenses by U.S.
forces personnel—^members of the U.S. forces in the Ryukyus, civilian employees of the
U.S. government, or contractors of the U.S. government; the Government of the Ryukyus
could claim no criminal jurisdiction over them. By contrast, courts in mainland Japan
had, under the status of forces agreement which had been in effect since 1953, jurisdic
tion over American military persormel accused of crimes committed while off duty, al
though the Japanese government voluntarily relinquished jurisdiction in most instances.
The Government of the Ryukyus police, the USCAR memorandum stated, “had au
thority to arrest American offenders.” As it acknowledged, however, the Okinawan police
could arrest servicemen in 1959 only “if they [were] caught in the act.” The police had no
authority to question suspects and they had to turn them over to the military police im
mediately. Since military installations were strictly beyond the jurisdiction of the Ryukyuan government, local police had no power to pursue investigations involving U.S.
forces personnel.
The USCAR memorandum noted that Okinawans frequently complained that “U.S.
service personnel involved in acts of violence against [the] civilian population are
shipped off the island rather than punished by court martial.” This feeling had been rein
forced, the memorandum observed, by “the practice of not announcing court-martial sen
tences.” From this people could surmise the USCAR courts were giving “extremely light
sentences for serious crimes.”
The memorandum claimed that the Government of the Ryukyus, “at its request [was]
presently periodically advised of the results of courts-martial.” Besides, it added, “fre
quently, military sentences are more severe than those in GRI courts for similar of
fenses.” Few Okinawans, however, had cause to believe this. In February 1963, a military
truck carrying Marines ran over and killed a junior high school student crossing Highway
No. 1 at a designated crosswalk showing a green signal allowing pedestrians to cross. The
driver was charged with homicide, but a special court martial—made up of five jurors,
two prosecutors and two counsel, all fi’om the same battalion as the driver—found him
innocent on the grounds that he could not recognize the red traffic signal due to the re
flection of sunlight off the wall of a building. The accident, they concluded, was therefore
beyond his control. There was no building in the area which could have created such a
distraction, and eyewitnesses had testified that other vehicles had stopped for the red
light. The Marine finished his term of service in Okinawa soon after and returned to the
United States in spite of a demand by various Okinawan groups for a retrial. U.S. forces
paid $3,333 to the bereaved family as a token of condolence.
The observation in the USCAR memorandum that “[personal] assaults by Americans
are now an infi^equent occurrence and are severely punished” also ran contrary to the
general Okinawan perception. Criminal acts by military personnel against Okinawans did
occur more or less constantly. The Government of the Ryukyus listed 315 Okinawans
killed, 145 of them in traffic accidents, and 760 others injured by members of the forces
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or their dependents prior to April 28, 1952?' GRI statistics also showed that 115 women
had been raped, four of them later murdered, by Americans during this period. It is be
lieved that many more women were raped in the 1940s and 1950s,’^ but most of them
failed to report the incidents out of shame (as is often the case even in the U.S.), wellfounded belief that the criminal would not be appropriately punished or for other reasons.
USCAR reported 695 “known offenses against Ryukyuans by members of the U.S.
forces” between October 1958 and September 1959, including four rapes, two attempted
rapes, twenty-four robberies, eighty-nine assaults and eighty-four aggravated assaults,
and 199 cases of vandalism.’^
In virtually all of these cases, no token money,’'' much less compensation, was paid.
Morever, since Okinawan courts did not have criminal jurisdiction over offenses by
American military personnel, the victims or their bereaved next of kin often had no way
of knowing how or even whether justice was done. Many doubted that courts-martial
acted in the spirit of Ordinance 23 or Ordinance 144 (“Code of Penal Law and Proce
dure”) in judging offenses by “fellow members” of the U.S. forces. The sergeant who
raped and killed a six-year-old girl in 1955 was convicted of first-degree murder at a
court-martial and deported to the United States. Okinawans later learned in the newspa
per that he was condemned to death but the sentence was later commuted to forty-five
years in prison with hard labor. A serviceman charged with strangling a twenty-threeyear-old bar hostess in 1959 was sentenced to only three years in prison. In 1960, a fiftyfive-year-old woman collecting expended brass shell casing on a firing range was shot
dead by a serviceman from less than twenty yards, allegedly because he had mistaken her
for a wild boar. Yet another serviceman shot and killed a seventy-three-year-old man at
close range, allegedly mistaking him for a bird.’^
The USCAR memorandum acknowledged that “the potential threat [to] freedom of
speech in the articles on libel and slander, and specifically the article on sedition, the
seeming separation of Okinawans from other Japanese nationals, the array of death penal
ties, the seeming absence of penalties for American wrongdoers, and the feeling that most
offenses in the penal code should be covered by GRI law” had caused objections to the
ordinance. These, it said, “add up to the possibility that a detailed explanation of penal
’’For a detailed report on pre-peace treaty claims, see Okinawa-ken Taibei Seikyuken Jigyo Kyokai, ed., Okinawa Taibei Seikyuken Mondai no Kiroku (Naha: Naha Shuppansha, 1994. For a report
on crimes of violence involving members of the U.S. forces, see Okinawa ni okeru Beigun no Hanzai (Tokyo: Dojidaisha, 1995) by Hiroaki Fukuchi, chairman of the board of directors, Okinawa
Association for Human Rights.
^^Jinken Togo no Ayumi, No. 5 (October, 1972), 83. In Okinawa ni okeru Beigun no Hanzai (To
kyo: Dojidaisha, 1995), Hiroaki Fukuchi discusses three rape cases that occurred in 1946, 1947 and
1949.
’^USCAR, Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands, VII: II (1 October 1958 to 30 September
1959), 142.

’‘*It is important in Japan to express one’s sympathy or condolence regardless of whether
legal culpability could be proved.
’^When Army Specialist 3/C William S. Girard shot dead a Japanese woman collecting brass scrap
on an American firing range near Mt. Fuji in 1957, it caused such an uproar in Japtm and such a
controversy in the United States that it developed into a major diplomatic issue and even “spurred
Eisenhower to reexamine the security pact with Japan.” (Schaller, Altered States, 128). Girard was
tried in a Japanese court which gave him a three-year suspended sentence on the charge of “causing
bodily injury resulting in death,” and expelled him from Japan. The U.S. Army subsequently dis
charged him.
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code provisions may have to be provided” to Baldwin.
Confronted with protests from opposition parties and civic organizations both in
mainland Japan and Okinawa and the Government of the Ryukyus, USCAR put off the
effective date of the ordinance from June 5 to August 15, and then to “a date to be subse
quently announced by the Civil Administrator.” It was never implemented. In the mean
time, CA Ordinance No. 144 of March 1955 and subsequent amendments to it (the ordi
nance was amended twenty-five times), remained in force, complete with provisions on
“offenses against safety” “offenses against economic and financial policy,” and “offenses
against morals.”
“Pre-treaty claims” referred to demands for compensation for land used by the U.S.
forces prior to April 28, 1952, when the peace treaty with Japan went into effect. Article
19 of the treaty absolved the United States of any obligation to grant compensation for
occupied lands or for damage done to property during occupation. Neither would the
Japanese Government accept responsibility for those payments. General MacArthur or
dered Major General Robert B. McClure, his deputy in the Ryukyus, to pay rent for pri
vate property used by U.S. forces before July 1950 and to acquire a twenty-year lease on
land already occupied. The landowners refused the deal. The United States did in fact pay
the landowners through the Chief Executive of the Ryukyuan government. The rentals for
the period from July 1, 1950, to April 28, 1952, amounted to a little over $1,000,000 for
some 40,000 acres. The Ryukyuan Land Federation retained Noel Hemmendinger, a
Washington attorney, who pressed the Departments of State and Defense for early set
tlement of the claims.
In 1959, the issue concerned, in the words of the above memorandum, “rental prior to
1950, restoration rights on land used prior to the peace treaty, and torts.” The memoran
dum noted that “reference to Article 19 of the peace treaty” would not satisfy Baldwin,
“especially in the case of land restoration and tort claims.” It added: “this issue poses
many political questions which are being actively considered” by USCAR and the high
commissioner.
Actually, pre-treaty claims were not limited to property. They also involved compen
sation for Okinawans killed or injured prior to April 28, 1952, in accidents or crimes.
When bombs exploded on le in August 1948 while being loaded onto a military transport
ship, killing 106 Okinawans in the immediate area, injuring seventy-six others, destroy
ing or damaging fifteen private houses, four public buildings, one vessel and three wood
en fishing boats, the U.S. forces paid 7,000 B-yen (roughly $58) for the death of each of
the eleven Okinawan laborers employed by the military unit stationed on the island, but
none for the other casualties. In 1947, an American military guard shot and killed the
wrong man during a robbery, but no compensation was paid. In 1951, a fighter plane
dropped a gasoline tank on the doorstep of a house in Naha, burning it down and killing
six people. Military authorities expressed condolences, but again failed to offer compen
sation.
Coastal fisheries also suffered severe damage before the peace treaty, caused by
bombing, shooting, landing and other military exercises. Restrictions or prohibitions on
fishing operations and devastation of resources drove many fishermen into hardship, but
they received no compensation.
Sixth in the USCAR memorandum came education. As the USCAR memorandum
pointed out, “the passage [in 1958] of the basic educational law which included the
phrase ‘education as Japanese nationals’ has served to dispel most objections in the
field.” From the Okinawan perspective, it had taken years of frustrated efforts for them to
obtain an educational law of their own.
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The field of education, predictably, carried political overtones from the outset in
postwar Okinawa. Teachers began to organize themselves in 1946 and established, under
the auspices of the U.S. civil administration, an island-wide Okinawa Association for
Education in 1947 for the promotion of education, the improvement of their living condi
tions, and the cultivation of mutual aid and friendship. Some union members became
politically active, as well, being elected as mayors and municipal councillors. Chobyo
Yara, appointed the first director of the Department of Education in the Okinawa gunto
government in 1950, called a meeting of the principals of elementary, junior and senior
high schools and expressed a determination to enact laws and regulations on education.
The meeting adopted a petition calling on the United States Ambassador in Japan, the
Speaker of Japan’s House of Representatives, the President of its House of Councilors,
and the Ministers of Education and Foreign Affairs to align educational administration in
Okinawa with that in mainland Japan and place it under the Japanese Ministry of Educa
tion. Under Yara’s directorship, the government laid down three sets of provisional edu
cational regulations or guidelines.
Significantly, after having heard a report on a spectacular recovery in the mainland in
the field of education, the third meeting of the principals adopted in January 1952 a reso
lution calling for Okinawa’s reversion movement to campaign for incorporation of the
islands’ schools into Japan’s education system. Yara emphasized in his speech the belief
that education in Okinawa needed to be aligned closely with that of Japan “which held
residual sovereignty over us and to whose administration we would eventually return.”
Okinawan children must be educated as Japanese citizens, he said.
Ordinance No. 66 (on education), issued in February 1952, inspired the opposition of
education directors of the four gunto governments to several provisions such as those on
an appointive central education board and education taxes. Above all, the ordinance
lacked any constitutional support and any reference to “nation” or “nationality.”’^
When the Okinawa Association for Education changed its name to the Okinawa
Teachers’ Association (OTA) in April 1952, Yara was elected as its president. At its first
general rally in May, the association declared that it would seek, among other objectives,
administrative reversion to Japan. Yara—and the association—would henceforth act as
the main pillar of the fukki movement. The association was instrumental in establishing
the Council for the Reversion of Okinawa to the Fatherland in 1953 (with Yara as its first
president), held a fund-raising campaign across mainland Japan for reconstruction of
school buildings and a campaign to spread display of the Japanese flag to individual
homes and schools so as “to promote the education of children as Japanese nationals.””
These campaigns, inevitably carrying political implications, did not please the U.S.
administrators. E. Earl Diffenderfer, USCAR Director of Civil Information and Educa
tion, warned at a Central Board of Education meeting in January 1954 that “the mission
of educators is to teach children and not to engage in politics. I hope there will be no need
for the issuance of further ordinances for this control.” In February, General Bromley told
Yara that “there is no place for the teacher in reversion activities or in active politics. The
’^Yara, Okinawa Kyoshokuinkai 16-Nen, 30.
^^Ibid, 61. The Teachers’ Association asked the high commissioner in 1959 to permit public
schools to fly the Japanese flag on their buildings on New Year’s Day “in order to renew the school
children’s consciousness as Japanese nationals.” The Association received 11,500 flags from Japan
and distributed most of them to children and the remaining 500 to schools. But High Commissioner
Booth rejected the request, on the ground that school buildings were “government buildings” where
Ordinance No 144 prohibited the flying of a flag of any nation other than the United States.
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teacher is hired to teach the children of the people, not to create confusion in the minds of
the young, or to pit himself against the population and the established government.”’* He
was also critical of the OTA’s involvement in the USCAR school reconstruction pro
gram. In response to a letter from Yara expressing appreciation for the additional funding
to the program, Bromley described the objectives of the program and stated that “they
were formulated without consultation with your association” and that they would be pur
sued “with or without” its cooperation. In the same year, as mentioned earlier, USCAR
cancelled a passport already issued to Yara who had applied to visit mainland Japan to
accept donations for school reconstruction.
\^en the OTA, with a membership of about 4,000, tried to transform itself into a
teachers’ union in the wake of the GRI’s enactment of three labor laws establishing basic
worker rights for the first time in postwar Okinawa, Deputy Governor Ogden’s attacks on
the association’s reversion campaign and other political activities were so “vehement”’^
that Yara resigned from the post of OTA president in order to “save” the organization. He
also stepped down as the president of the reversion council. Several weeks later, the OTA
general meeting unanimously re-elected Yara.
In 1956, the GRI legislature adopted the fundamental provisions of the Education Bill
and three related educational bills, which were based on the principle of “education of
Okinawans as Japanese nationals.” Chief Executive Higa, however, vetoed all these bills
ostensibly on the grounds that the proposed board of education as an agency independent
of the Government of the Ryukyus would constitute a fourth branch of government and
thus violated Ordinance No. 68 (“Provisions of the Government of the Ryukyus”) which
had provided for three branches. The real reason, it was generally believed, lay in US
CAR’s refusal to approve the words “education as Japanese nationals” in the bills. The
bills were resubmitted more or less in their original form several months later after a gen
eral election, but were again vetoed under instructions from USCAR.*®
The USCAR memorandum noted that questions were being asked regarding how the
education of school children interfered with the security of the military base. It was the
USCAR’s policy, it stated, to “avoid political issues in this field and . . . continue the
improvement of an educational system of which everyone can be proud. Japanese
administration of the schools would be a long step toward reversion and would result in
serious political complications which might jeopardize the U.S. military mission.”
In an effort to ensure this agenda was followed, USCAR issued in 1957 its own Edu
cation Code (Ordinance No. 165). It upheld the principles of the basic equality of “all
human[s] . . . before the law” and parents’ “grave responsibilities ... to raise, nurture,
guide and educate” children properly, children’s “correlative duties of respect and obedi
ence,” and “the dignity of honest labor.” The ordinance then prohibited any political ac
tivity by teachers, principals and superintendents “in behalf of any party or political can
didate,” and introduced one-year hiring contracts for teachers until they achieved tenured
status. It required teachers to sign new employment contacts after the effective date of the
ordinance and limited the sizes of classes to a maximum of forty children at the elemen
tary level and thirty-five students at the senior high school level.
The ordinance immediately met opposition from the OTA. The one-year contracts, it
said, placed tremendous psychological pressure on teachers, and the number of available
qualified teachers and classrooms would not allow for reduction of class sizes. There
7R

Bromley to Yara, 24 February 1954.
’^Warner, The Okinawa Reversion Story: War, Peace, Occupation, Reversion, 171-72.
*®Yara, 142.
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should be references to “[good] citizenship,” “constitutional protection of educational
rights” and “education as [Japanese] nationals.” The goals of education should be to de
velop “students interested in world affairs and languages,” “adults fully competent to
understand and participate in the processes of government,” and “qualities necessary for
the individual to become a participating member of society,” instead of bringing up peo
ple subservient to the authorities.
Although the Director of Education warned that the prohibition of political activity
would apply to a public rally against Ordinance No. 165, the OTA proceeded to hold a
meeting calling for the director’s resignation, abolition of the ordinance and enactment of
a GRI educational law.
It was against this backdrop that the GRI Legislature reconsidered the four educa
tional bills in 1957 and passed them for a third time. This time. High Commissioner
Moore acquiesced and the new chief executive, Jugo Thoma, signed them.*' The Funda
mentals of Education Act declared: “As Japanese nationals and based on the universal
principle of mankind, we must build a democratic and cultured nation and society, and
contribute to the peace of the world and the welfare of mankind.” Three months later,
USCAR rescinded the controversial education code.
In addition, the USCAR memorandum conceded, there were “complaints [against] the
system of university approval of faculty publications and of the agenda of student meet
ings” at the University of the Ryukyus, “security clearance for textbooks” and “an educa
tion system inferior to what [Okinawans] would have under Japanese administration.”
Another popular complaint, the memorandum said, was that it was “difficult for an
Okinawan to proceed against an American in a personal grievance case. Because of these
difficulties, few court cases have been submitted and even fewer disposed of” The
memorandum argued, however, that “GRI courts are available for civil suits against
Americans. Claimants have been so advised. In addition, claims arising out of military
activities are now handled promptly and fairly” as exemplified, it said, by how the claims
resulting from “the Ishikawa disaster” had been processed.
Once again, the USCAR argument rang hollow with most Okinawans. The fact re
mained that the Okinawan court system—consisting of the magistrate courts, the circuit
courts and the court of appeals—^had been established by CA Proclamation No. 12, and
their civil and criminal jurisdiction was subject to high commissioner ordinances.*^ The
judges of the court of appeals or the highest Ryukyuan court were appointed by the high
commissioner “to serve at his pleasure,” and the judges of the other courts by the U.S.appointed Ryukyuan chief executive “with prior approval of the high commissioner.”
Furthermore, as mentioned elsewhere, Ae USCAR Appellate court could review “any
case, civil or criminal” decided by the court of appeals.*^ When the high commissioner
determined that a case or controversy had “particular importance affecting the security,
property or interests of the United States,” he could order such a case to be transferred
from a Ryukyuan to a USCAR court “at any time in the proceedings.” If the high com
missioner decided that a case involving a member of the U.S. forces, an American em**The ruling party regarded the political activities of the teachers to be so menacing, however, that
in 1963-64 it tried in vain to restrict them through legislation. This last attempt was again thwarted
in 1966-67 after bitter opposition by the Teachers’ Association left the legislature paralyzed for
three months.
*^CA Proclamation No. 12, “Ryukyuan Court System,” proclaimed 2 January 1952.
**CA Proclamation No. 6, “United States Civil Administration Appellate Court: Establishment,”
proclaimed 20 May 1958.
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ployee of the U.S. government or a dependent of either of them had an important “direct
or indirect” impact on the “security of the islands, on the foreign relations or the security,
property or interests of the United States or [its] nationals,” he could also transfer such a
case to a USCAR court.*'* Under these circumstances, many Okinawans chose to abandon
cases involving personal grievances against Americans.
Victims of rapes and other crimes, wives or common-law wives and children deserted
by U.S. servicemen, workers dismissed by the U.S. forces or their contractors often had
to swallow insults and injuries, leading them to believe that they had no possibility to
gain redress. It was not known how many “Amerasians” had been bom to men in military
service and Okinawan women in or out of wedlock. Frequently, the men returned to the
United States without their legal or common-law wives and their babies, leaving the chil
dren not only fatherless and subject to various prejudices but also stateless.
“The Ishikawa jet crash disaster,” cited in the memorandum as a good example of fair
and prompt handling of claims, occurred on June 30, 1959, when a jet fighter crashed into
Miyamori Elementary School in central Okinawa shortly after takeoff from Kadena AnBase, killing seventeen persons (eleven of them school children), injuring 210 (156 of
them school children) and causing extensive property damage in and near the school. The
pilot ejected to safety.
The U.S. forces promised early and satisfactory compensation, but an initial proposal
so disappointed the aggrieved victims and bereaved families that many of them appealed
to the wider community for help. Twenty organizations, including the Teachers’ Associa
tion, the Council of Government Employees’ Unions, the Federation of Women’s Asso
ciations and the Association of Mayors formed a joint council to support and promote the
demand for full compensation. A meeting of representatives of the U.S. Civil Administra
tion, the GRI Legislature, the GRI executive branch, and the victims and the bereaved
failed to make any progress. In February 1960, the fimstrated Legislature passed two reso
lutions, one calling on USCAR to settle the claims expeditiously and another asking the
Japanese government to press the United States for an early settlement.
On May 15, 1960, roughly a year after the crash, the U.S. Air Force Claims Commis
sion delivered the formal awards: $2,525 flat for the death of each school child. Although
USCAR emphasized “the fairness of the procedures” and the “generosity of the pay
ments,” the amounts were again considered far from satisfactory. Further campaigns and
appeals forced the claims commission to add $2,000 to each award and death claims were
finally settled in June. Claims for serious injuries were settled a few days later: the vic
tims were awarded $2,322 to $5,915 per person. Air Force representatives announced that
the amounts were in accordance with the wishes of the Secretary of the Air Force that the
awards be just and generous, and that the United States would provide medical treatment
to the injured, including plastic surgery. Two injured children received plastic surgery in
Japan, with the expenses reimbursed from donations by Okinawans. Settlement of claims
for minor injuries had to wait until a year later.
Before he left Okinawa, Baldwin told the press that he “sympathize[d] with the uni
versal desire of Okinawans for return to their motherland” and urged U.S. forces, while in
control of Okinawa, to “extend greater liberties” to the Okinawans and to “conform to the
laws and practices of a Japanese prefecture.” He continued:
The major problem in Okinawa is to reconcile democratic liberties with the needs of se*‘*CA Proclamation No. 9, “United States Civil Administration Civil Court: Establishment,” 21 July
1958.
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curity as interpreted by the military. A long experience shows that the military tend to in
terpret security broadly and liberty narrowly. But it is significant that in Okinawa, despite
stringent laws, not a single case has arisen of espionage, sabotage, sedition, libel or slander
of the authorities....
Despite the absence of prosecution under the security provisions, many measures have
been taken to restrict what are regarded as communist activities and associations. So far as
they are related to connections with the international communist movement directed from
the Soviet Union, they may affect security in cold war terms. But the tendency is to expand
the concept, and it apparently includes all members of the People’s Party which has five
representatives in the legislature. They are subject to restrictions in employment, licenses
for publication and travel. The party is legal, and whatever may be the political attachments
of some of its leaders, surely they are not shared by all its members. Guilt by association is
not an American doctrine. The Army, so unfairly attacked on just that ground by the late
Senator McCarthy, should know that. The present restrictions should be liberalized.

Nevertheless, Baldwin said he “urged the Okinawans to turn their attention to practical
issues, to expand their civil rights, rather than to insist upon an impossible change of
status. I repeated that to the Okinawans in Japan and to my Japanese friends.”
Two and a half months later, Baldwin sent a four-page memorandum to the Depart
ment of Defense, suggesting several changes in the U.S. administration of the Ryukyus.
These included:
1.

2.

3.

4.

Democratic government: Steps should be taken to realize public election of the chief
executive. Judges, now appointed by the high commissioner with some consultation
with local officials, should be appointed by the chief executive upon approval by the
legislature. It would be “preferable” to appoint a civil administrator who is a civilian
and speaks Japanese and “desirable” to appoint a civilian aide to the high commis
sioner or have closer liaison between the State Department and the high commis
sioner.
Law: The pre-1945 Japanese law in effect in the Ryukyus should be replaced by more
democratic postwar Japanese law as “this would enable the Ryukyuan courts to con
sider much more enlightened provisions, and also more effectively prepare the Ryu
kyus for later integration as a prefecture.” All offenses “not involving security”
should be transferred from the USCAR courts to the Ryukyuan courts. Americans
and Okinawans should be treated equally for offenses and penalties in ordinary
criminal cases. In view of the lack of a clear system of appeals from civil courts be
yond the high commissioner, a civilian advisory review board within the Department
of Defense, with the right “to review any appeal from an act of the high commis
sioner or from any final judgment of either the GRI or USCAR courts,” should be
considered. Provisions in the penal code affecting sedition, libel, slander of the U.S.
forces “go beyond anything in American law” and, thus, “should be all removed in
favor of the concept of ‘clear and present danger’.” The Japanese flag “should be
freely exhibited in private places, indoors or outdoors.” The designation “Ryukyuans” should be changed to “Japanese nationals (Ryukyuan).”
The right to travel: “Communist and other propaganda agents hostile to American in
terests in the base must be excluded along with their agents” but, otherwise, all con
tacts between Japan and the Ryukyus “which do not affect security” should be en
couraged.
Civil liberties: Penal code provisions violate the principle of freedom of speech, press

*^See ACLU press release, 25 August 1959. ACLU Records, Box 1175, F5. Also see Baldwin to
Booth, 21 August 1959, ACLU Records, Box 1175, F9, and Baldwin to Civil Affairs Division,
Department of Defense, 23 September 1959, Baldwin Papers, Box 10, FI 8.

106

Democracy Betrayed
and association guaranteed by the Executive Order. While membership of the Peo
ple’s Party, a legal political organization, now disqualifies members for employment
on U.S. bases and for travel documents, they “should be treated on a personal basis,
not by association.” The licensing system for associations, publications and public
meetings should be abolished.**

Predictably, the paper received harsh criticism from the Office of the High Commis
sioner. “To a great degree,” Colonel Eugene A. Salet, executive officer, wrote in a
lengthy memorandum prepared for the Department of the Army Office of Civil Affairs, it
“accepted almost without question a considerable portion of the statements and allega
tions made by those who would have the union [ACLU] take a lead in condemning the
United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands.”*’ At the same time, however, he
conceded that the report contained some valid points.
Salet acknowledged, for example, that a chief executive appointed by the high com
missioner “cannot be said to fully represent the inhabitants,” but rejected popular election
of the chief executive. “Subjected as they are to the continuous bombardment of commu
nist distortions and propaganda from internal as well as external sources. Radio Moscow
and Radio Peiping [^ic],” Salet stated, “the possibility exists that an intensified campaign
might result in an election victory for a pro-communist sympathizer or even a party
member as chief executive.” One might argue that this was unfounded alarmism in view
of the fact that the pro-U.S. Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party had won the 1960 general
election by 22 to 7 and it would continue to win majorities in 1962, 1965, 1966 and 1968.
Salet conceded that this subversion was not likely to happen immediately, but added that
there would be such a future possibility “so long as free elections are conducted.” Be
sides, he warned, a politician running in a public election would inevitably make rever
sion a major plank in his platform and make it a political issue of “unmanageable propor
tions” in both the Ryukyus and mainland Japan.
The ACLU contention that a civilian instead of a military civil administrator “would
carry more weight, and a weight more appropriate to his function” was brushed aside as
“a matter of individual judgment.” To Salet, it was the “personality and ability” of the
particular person that was “considerably” more important than whether or not he was in
the service. “Any change in the status of the civil administrator from military to civilian
must inevitably result in a local interpretation that the change is made in preparation for
the immediate return of administration to Japan,” he warned. “Such an understanding
may also result in far greater difficulty in long-range planning and implementation of
proper administrative processes than is presently the case.” Moreover, argued Salet, 92
percent of the civil administration staff already consisted of civilians.
On the most contentious issues of “offenses against safety,” Salet justified the Penal
Code provisions of the U.S. mission in Okinawa:
It is not believed that present provisions of the USCAR Penal Code concerning speech,
press and assembly violate the express provisions of Section 12 of the Executive Order but
**Roger Baldwin to the Department of Defense, “Memorandum on Democracy and Civil Rights in
Okinawa,” 10 November 1959. Baldwin Papers, Box 10, FI 8. For a detailed analysis of the penal
code by the ACLU, see “Commentary by the American Civil Liberties Union on the New and Old
Code of Penal Law and Procedure for the Ryukyu Islands,” December 1959. ACLU Records, Box
1176, F9.
*’“Comments on Memorandum on Democracy and Civil Rights in Okinawa,” 22 January 1960,
HCRl-LO 1-10060.
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it is submitted that these offenses must be read in the light of the latter provision which
constitutes the criteria for their enforcement. The subject provisions of the code are not and
never were intended to deny the basic democratic liberties but rather to provide a means of
punishing and deterring abuses which are of such gravity as to seriously hamper or under
mine the U.S. capability for accomplishment of objectives ....
It is asserted that the provisions contained in the code respecting sedition, libel and
slander go far beyond anything in the American law and that they should all be removed in
favor of the concept of “clear and present danger.” In this regard, it should be borne in
mind that it is basically fallacious to apply U.S. standards of peace-time legislation to the
USCAR Penal Code in the Ryukyus since the prevailing conditions, objectives and histori
cal background of the two are in no sense comparable ....

The Salet memorandum denied that the code demanded of Okinawans “loyalty to the
U.S.” or treated Japan as “a foreign country.” Such “misconceptions,” it claimed, “have
without notable exception been advanced for ulterior purposes by dissident elements
seeking to distort fact for political ends. ... No misconception with respect to such mat
ters exists among the literate, non-Communist elements of the local citizenry and . . .
such misconceptions as may exist among the illiterates have been deliberately instilled by
intentionally distorted propaganda emanating from hostile sources.”
At the same time, it acknowledged that “flying foreign flags including the Japanese
flag” is prohibited, justifying it as a “political rather than a legal question.” The name
“Ryukyuan,” it added, is “purely one of convenience adopted for the purpose of distin
guishing authorized residents of the Ryukyus from those of Japan proper.” The memo
randum blamed “a variety of anti-U.S. and communist elements and sympathizers both in
the Ryukyus and Japan”—who called for free travel between the two “since neither area
is foreign to the other”—for “much unwarranted irresponsible criticism.” But it conceded
that travel restrictions between the Ryukyu Islands and Japan did exist: “a small percent
age of the applicants have been denied travel or have themselves imposed a ban on travel
by refusal to fill out required application forms in order to secure travel documentation.”
As noted already, the regulations had placed a number of applicants in a no-win situa
tion. Some refused to complete the long form out of principle. Others knew that, since
they were persona non-grata to the U.S. authorities because of their past activities, the
authorities could hold them up so long as to force them to cancel their travel plans if they
had filled out the form truthfully, or they might risk a heavy penalty if found to have lied
in order to obtain the permit. The United States, the memorandum said, should not be “in
a position to force reluctant individuals into completing forms for travel documentation if
they do not desire to act voluntarily while at the same time complaining of travel restric
tions to the Union.” But the fact that the U.S. authorities refused a permit to the likes of
Chobyo Yara demonstrated the invalidity of USCAR’s arguments.
The memorandum confirmed that 225 applications for entry into the Ryukyus from
mainland Japan were rejected in 1957, the year when it said “a large number of anti-U.S.
and pro-Communist sympathizers sought to strengthen the Senaga regime in Naha City.”
It also had a ready answer to Baldwin’s criticism of the low wages paid to Okinawan
military base workers: their productivity was “far below that of Japanese workers.” It also
justified the low per capital income in Okinawa by noting that there were eight prefec
tures in Japan which had a lower income level than the Ryukyuan average.
Baldwin’s persistent interest in civil rights in Okinawa and his visit to the island in
1959 encouraged Okinawan people, gave an added impetus to their fukki movement and
apparently helped spur Washington to review its policy toward the island fortress. The
reversion movement also received support in influential segments of the United States,
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most notably the New York Times which had advocated in an editorial prior to Baldwin’s
visit that Washington “relinquish political control over the Ryukyus.”®* In November
1959, a study prepared by the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Af
fairs at Syracuse University for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations called for a
“balance between military desirability and political liability” and suggested an inquiry
“into the possibility of shifting limited war forces to Australia or to some other area
where they would be welcomed.”*’
The so-called Conlon Report, prepared by Conlon Associates, Ltd., at the request of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, further urged an “integration of political and
military requirements,” “civilianization” of the U.S. administration, and public election of
the chief executive.”” The report suggested the “gradual and ultimate reversion of Oki
nawa to Japan,” for “immediate reversion ... is neither necessary nor feasible” and “the
reversion issue can be delayed somewhat if American policies in Okinawa are progres
sive and successful.”

*®The
89

York Times, 10 January 1957.

The Operational Aspects of United States Foreign Policy, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 11 Novem
ber 1959, 27-28.
90
United States Foreign Policy in Asia, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1 November 1959, 104-109.

Chapter V: Japan, the U.S. and the High Commissioner
The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
The 1960s marked another turning point for Okinawa. If the 1950s had been a highly
restive period of conflicts between military requirements and Okinawan struggles for
justice, civil rights and self-government, the 1960s saw what seemed inevitable conces
sions by the Americans and the beginning of an era leading toward eventual reversion of
Okinawa to Japanese administration.
The decade opened, symbolically, with the signing of the revised Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States, and public demonstra
tions against President Eisenhower during his brief visit to Okinawa. The revised treaty,
signed in Washington on January 19, 1960, “marked the end of the postwar period as far
as Japan’s diplomacy was concerned,” according to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Aiichiro Fujiyama.’ The original treaty, drafted during the Korean War and signed in 1951
along with the peace treaty, contained many provisions that reflected the unequal relation
ship between the two countries at the time. The treaty granted the United States the right
to station its military forces in and around Japan, potentially including nuclear weapons in
their armories, and the complete freedom to deploy them in regional conflicts. Japan also
agreed not to grant similar rights to a third power without U.S. approval. Strictly speak
ing, the United States had no obligation to defend Japan from any foreign enemy. It was
nevertheless authorized to intervene to control domestic disturbances in Japan. U.S. assis
tance was extended to the Japanese defense forces while U.S. units, except for air de
tachments and naval bases, were gradually transferred to Okinawa.
In the 1950s, Japan achieved a spectacular economic recovery. Steady and then explo
sively rapid industrial growth brought not only full employment and such economic bene
fits as washing machines and TV sets in every home, but a renewed self-confidence. Rid
ing high on its economic and military partnership with the United States, Japan neverthe
less came to see the old security arrangements as too unequal for an independent country.
The 1957 joint communique by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi had
declared that the United States “welcomed” Japan’s plans for the buildup of its defense
forces and would “substantially reduce” the numbers of U.S. forces in Japan “within the
next year, including a prompt withdrawal of all [its] ground combat forces.” The United
States also promised that it would make “still further reductions as the Japanese defense
forces grow.”^
In the words of an Associated Press article, the new treaty “ended the last traces of Ja
pan’s occupation status as a defeated World War II enemy.” Nonetheless, it granted the
United States the use of land, sea and air bases and committed the United States to guar
anteeing Japan’s peace and security in case of attack on “territories under Japanese ad
ministration.” It committed both sides to “meet the common danger in accordance with
'Quoted
Japan Times, 1 January 1960.
^The Joint communique, issued by President Eisenhower emd Prime Minister Kishi, was released in
Washington on 21 June 1957.
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[their] constitutional provisions and processes.” In a separate exchange of notes between
Christian A. Herter, the Secretary of State, and Prime Minister Kishi, the United States
agreed to “prior consultation” with Japan^ whenever there were major changes in the de
ployment of forces to Japan, in their equipment (including the introduction of nuclear
weapons into the country), or in the use of Japanese bases for combat operations else
where in the Far East. Washington pledged that it “had no intention of acting ... in a
manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese government.” The provision on “prior con
sultation,” it was believed, was added to allay the fear among some Japanese that the
bases might embroil Japan in a war, in particular a war against China.
Officially, the question of the status of Okinawa “was not made a subject of discus
sion in the course of treaty negotiations.”"' The treaty applied only to areas currently under
Japan’s administration. The Ryukyu Islands were not included, although they would
automatically come under the treaty’s provisions upon their return to Japanese sover
eignty.^
The Okinawa issue was discussed. An initial draft prepared in February 1958 at the
U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, for example, defined the treaty area as “all territory under the
administrative control of Japan and the island territories in the Western Pacific which are
referred to in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan and which are under the admin
istrative control of the United States.”®
Though the term “island territories” referred to the Ryukyus and the Bonins, Foreign
Minister Fujiyama told Ambassador MacArthur that he and Prime Minister Kishi had
decided to limit the treaty area to Japan’s home islands. The reasons were that Japanese
socialists argued against the inclusion of the Ryukyus and the Bonins since that would
bring Japan into multilateral treaties with the Republic of China, South Korea and the
Philippines, and commit it to hostilities with China. Some influential members within the
ruling party, too, were opposed for their own reasons, he said. Fujiyama told the ambas
sador that inclusion of the Ryukyus would raise constitutional questions and would be
approved by neither public opinion nor the Diet.’
On the U.S. side. Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander-in-Chief for the Pacific, sup
ported exclusion of the Ryukyus. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that the United States,
which in any event retained administrative and other controls over these islands, “would
gain nothing” by their inclusion while inclusion would be “useful to the Japanese as a

^The United States agreed in 1955 to have prior consultation with Japan to gain its approval on
such occasions. See R. Sneider, U.S.-Japanese Security Relations: A Historical Perspective (Co
lumbia University Press, 1982), 25.
"'“Agreed Minutes to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,” 19 January 1960.
®In Okinawa, Chief Executive Thoma and his Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party called for the
inclusion of Okinawa in the treaty to insure its eventual reversion to Japan, while opposition parties
were either against the security treaty itself as a potential threat to world peace or in favor of rever
sion ahead of the conclusion of the new treaty. The Association for Reunion of the Okinawan Is
lands with Japan, an organization of Okinawans living in mainland Japan, petitioned the U.S. Am
bassador in Tokyo for inclusion, on the grounds that Okinawa was “a part of the inherent territory
of Japan” and that it would pave the way for the administrative reunion.
®MacArthur to Secretary of State Dulles, 18 February 1959. Department of State, Central Files,
794.5/2-1258, published in FRUS1958-1960, Vol. 18, 8-10.
’MacArthur to the Department of State, 28 November 1958. Department of State, Central Files,
794.5/11-2858 published in ibid., 100-104.
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political lever toward reestablishment of Japanese administrative control” over them.*
By April, U.S. Ambassador MacArthur could report to the Department of State that
“the Japanese have withdrawn all ‘tentative’ suggestions . . . and have in fact agreed to
every point of substance in the U.S. position.” The treaty area would now be limited to
the main Japanese islands. He added, cunningly: “However, [I] have maneuvered this so
it is Japanese who propose exclusion of these islands, which should help [high commis
sioner] Gen. Booth in Okinawa.”® Secretary of State Dulles noted that “objections men
tioned by Japanese appear [to] be most appropriate arguments for us to use against [the]
inclusion of Article III islands.”’”
Remarkably, it appears that neither Kishi nor Fujiyama ever discussed the administra
tive return of Okinawa as a possibility or a subject to be negotiated with the United States.
“[Fujiyama] said neither he nor Kishi wished to raise return to Japan of administrative
control,” Ambassador MacArthur told the Department of State. “Neither Kishi nor Fuji
yama wishes to handle this matter [treaty area] in a way which would oblige GOJ [Gov
ernment of Japan] publicly to request return of administration of Okinawa.” " A commu
nity of interests of sorts seemed to exist between the leaders of the two governments.
Okinawa was thus referred to only in an agreed minute to the treaty, in which the
Japanese representative “emphasize[d] the strong concern of the government and people
of Japan for the safety of the people of these islands since Japan possesses residual sover
eignty” and both governments promised to consult each other in the event of an attack
against Okinawa and to take measures to promote the welfare of the people.
Consequently, the new treaty made Japan more independent of the United States at
the cost of excluding Okinawa from Japan’s territorial and, therefore, constitutional
jurisdiction and keeping it under U.S. control. The United States required such control so
long as tensions and threats remained in the Far East, while Japan needed U.S. bases there
to protect its own security and maintain good defense and economic relations with
AmMiBa. of the ground troops were pulled out of Japan before the revised treaty was
signed; still remaining were some logistical and support units destined for the Korea gar
rison, as well as a number of air bases and two naval repair depots. The size of the
American bases in mainland Japan decreased from 33,400 acres in 1952 to only 8,300
acres by 1960. The number of troops dropped from 260,000 to about 45,000 during the
same period. The Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) took over many of the functions
previously performed by the U.S. forces and occupied their installations. The SDF, cre
ated in 1954, increased to around 240,000 personnel in the 1960s, a level it has since
maintained.
Many of the units in mainland Japan, including the Third Marine Division, were re
moved to Okinawa, from Tachikawa (Tokyo), Ashiya (Fukuoka), Itatsuke (Fukuoka),
Asagaya (Saitama) and other places. In August 1959, F. A. Bantz, Acting Secretary of the
Navy, had to request an increase in appropriations for the construction of an additional
electric power station in Okinawa because, he said, “the Navy and Marine [electric
*Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of State McElroy, 1 December 1958. NARA, RG 218, JCS Re
cords, CCS .92 Japan (12-12-50), in ibid. 104-105.
® MacArthur to the Department of State, 29 April 1959. Department of State, Central Files,
611.94/4-2595. Ibid., 126-127.
’”Dulles to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, 24 January 1959. Department of State, Central Files,
794.5/112-2458.119-121.
"See, for example, MacArthur’s telegrams to the Department of State on 7 December 1958, FRUS,
ibid., 108-110), and 1 May 1959, ibid., 161-162
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power] requirements . . . will continue to grow directly as these forces are withdrawn
from Japan [to Okinawa] in accordance with the spirit of the Eisenhower-Kishi commu
nique . . .
While Navy and Marine installations in 1959 consumed only 10.5 percent
of the power generated by the integrated power system operated by the Army, he pre
dicted the share would rise to 12 percent in 1960 and 16.5 percent in 1961 “as construc
tion of important Marine facilities is completed.”
As a result, military installations in the Ryukyus, which had expanded from 30,500
acres in 1951 to 42,000 acres by early 1953, further grew in size to more than 75,000
acres (including 16,500 on arable land) by 1960. The U.S. forces numbered more than
30,000 by 1960, with an additional 15,000 dependents. Virtually all bases were concen
trated on the main island of Okinawa where the United States occupied roughly 20 per
cent of the land space. The bases and the civilian areas became so contiguous with each
other that General Paul W. Caraway would write in 1969: “The United States does not
have bases on Okinawa. Okinawa is the base. It is not possible to sieve out the military
areas of functions . . . and separate them from the civilian areas or functions. The roads,
the water system, and other utilities, and ports and harbors, the labor force, the business
enterprises, the air fields, and the areas designed and used for the purely military purposes
are all integrated into a single net.”'^ By 1970, American bases made up nearly 90,000
acres, or 14.8 percent of the entire area of the island chain under U.S. control; military
bases had by this time come to occupy a little over 27 percent of the island of Okinawa.
The prefecture, comprising 0.6 percent of the total land space of Japan, was burdened
with 75 percent of the military installations used exclusively by the U.S. forces in Japan.
It was not the size of the bases alone, however, that made Okinawa uniquely impor
tant after the new security treaty. The United States maintained complete freedom of ac
tion in Okinawa, unlike mainland Japan where it now faced severe restrictions and a
highly vigilant and powerful public opinion. As U. Alexis Johnson, former U.S. ambassa
dor to Japan, noted:
Because we controlled Okinawa we could use our bases for storing nuclear weapons
and mounting operations outside Japan .... These were rights denied to our bases in Japan
proper, under the 1960 Security Treaty, without “prior consultation” with the Japanese
government. The Pentagon did not want to give up these very useful rights, the likely price
of having Tokyo regain control.''*

Unrestricted by the security treaty, the United States could store not only nuclear
weapons but chemical weapons in Okinawa as well. Okinawa was now also home to the
313th Air Division based at Kadena, complete with B52 Stratofortresses, FI05 Thunderchief fighters, FI01 recoimaissance planes, KC135 Stratotankers and C141 Starlifters; the
30th Artillery Brigade with Mace, Hercules and Hawk missiles; the Second Logistic
Command; units of the U.S. Seventh Fleet comprising more than 120 warships and 600
planes; the Seventh Psychological Operations Group; and the Third Marine Corps station
ing an estimated 20,000 members in Okinawa with extensive mountainous training areas
'^Letter to Senator Carl Hayden, chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, “Mutual
Security Appropriations for 1960 (and Related Agencies): Hearings before the Committee on Ap
propriations, United States Senate, 24 August 1959, 86th Congress, 1st Session on H.R. 8355
(Washington: United States Government Printer, 1959), 746-47.
'^Paul W. Caraway, “Okinawa, an Overview from the United States of America,” Kokusai Jihyo,
December 1969, 18.
'“^Johnson, The Right Hand ofPower, 447-48.
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in northern Okinawa. The commander of the U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, not only com
manded the USARYIS (the 9th Army) but acted as “coordinator” among the Army, Air
Force, Navy and Marine Corps units on the island, all of which belonged to the U.S. Pa
cific Command.
Okinawa would be so vital a logistic support, training and staging base for the United
States during the war in Vietnam, that Admiral Grant Sharp, commander of Pacific
forces, was quoted as having declared in December 1965, that “without Okinawa we
couldn’t continue fighting the Vietnam war.”'^
Eisenhower visited Okinawa on June 19, 1960, the day the new security treaty went
into effect. The National Security Council, under his direction, had just settled the differ
ences of views on Okinawa between the Department of State and the Department of De
fense (i.e., the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and adopted a statement of new U.S. policy toward
Japan.
The inter-agency disagreements over Okinawa, as of May 20, concerned two para
graphs in National Security Council draft paper (NSC 6008), titled “U.S. Policy Toward
Japan.”'^
In Paragraph 51, the majority position was to “maintain the present degree of control
over the islands ... so long as it is essential to our vital security interests.” The DefenseJCS position was to “maintain the present degree of control over the islands” while “the
international tensions in the Far East created by the Communist threat” continued, “in
view of their essentiality to our vital security interests.”
In Paragraph 52, the Department of State and the JCS agreed that the United States
should “take those steps best designed to limit reversionist pressures in Japan and the
Ryukyus, recognizing that . . administration of the Ryukyus is a continuing politically
sensitive issue in U.S.-Japanese relations.” The Department of State wanted the next sen
tence to read “Japanese requests for closer relations with the Ryukyus in such areas as
trade, cultural relations, provision of economic assistance and the interchange of nationals
should be acceded to” as long as they were reasonable and consistent with “U.S. security
interests in the area.” The JCS, on the other hand, took a position saying that such Japa
nese requests “should be considered sympathetically consistent with U.S. security inter
ests in the area.”
In the words of J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Af
fairs, the majority position on paragraph 51 left “the door open” for the return of the Ryu
kyu Islands to Japan “when they are no longer required from a security viewpoint,” while
the position of the JCS was “to foreclose [the remrn] indefinitely.” Regarding paragraph
52, he pointed to “a basic difference of viewpoint” between the two departments, in spite
of the similar language. “Defense,” he said, “has only reluctantly agreed to Japanese re
quests for closer relations with the Ryukyus. For example, this year they have refused to
continue a program of sending a few Japanese teacher-consultants to the Ryukyus al
though such assistance is needed and is desired by the Ryukyuans. We feel that failure to
permit the Japanese to assist the Ryukyus in this very limited manner, which will not
affect our security interests, will only lead to increased reversionist pressures and serious
strains in United States-Japanese relations.”'’
'^Quoted in Thomas R. H. Havens, Fire across the Sea: the Vietnam War and Japan, 1965-1975
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 85.
'^“Editorial Note,” FRt/5, I958-I960,Wo\. 18,310-12.
'’Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, 27 May 1960. De
partment of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6008 Series. FRUS, ibid., 312-14.
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In the end, however, the views of the JCS more or less prevailed after the National
Security Council consulted President Eisenhower at its meeting on May 31.’* Paragraph
51 in the final version now read: “Maintain the degree of control over the islands . . .
deemed by the President to be essential to our vital security interests,” while “taking into
account the Communist threat in the Far East and the new security arrangements with
Japan.” Paragraph 52 was changed to read: “Take those steps best designed to limit reversionist pressures .... To this end Japanese requests for closer relations with the Ryukyus
. . . should be considered sympathetically . . . .” At the President’s suggestion, a footnote
was added to the text, explaining that the term “considered sympathetically” should be
interpreted to mean that “a positive attitude will be taken toward Japanese requests.”’®
Paragraph 53 directed that the United States “conduct [its] administration of the Ryukyus
so as to promote political stability, economic advancement, and reasonable satisfaction
with U.S. retention, and so as to enhance our prestige in the eyes of the local population
and other Asian peoples.”
Eisenhower’s visit, the first by a U.S. president to the island, took place amid confu
sion. Chief Executive Seisaku Ota had extended an invitation to him in February to visit
Okinawa in the course of his Asian tour scheduled for June. In the same month. Assistant
Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin had raised the possibility of the President visiting
Okinawa or meeting Ota in Tokyo. Having learned of this possibility. Ambassador
MacArthur cabled a message to Irwin, saying that he thought a visit by the president to
Okinawa “would be unwise in extreme” because it “would be construed by both friendly
and unfi-iendly elements in Japan as [a] move to emphasize [the] point that Okinawa to all
intents and purposes is and will remain U.S. territory.”^’ The ambassador’s request was
overruled. In the meantime, the U-2 incident on May 1 forced the President to call off his
visit to the Soviet Union and Japan’s domestic turmoil over the new security treaty threat
ened to force him to cancel his historic visit to Tokyo. As a result, MacArthur again
stated that the visit to Okinawa would be unwise and even offensive to the Japanese if the
visit to the mainland failed to materialize. But Washington prevailed. “If Communist
minority demonstrations in Tokyo achieve their purpose in dealing us one really devastat
ing blow,” Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon told him, “there is no reason why we
should give the impression that they can impose their will upon us with respect to an area
in which we retain legitimate rights.”^^ It was thus agreed that the President should make
a stopover—for two hours—in Okinawa on his way from the Philippines and Taiwan to
South Korea.
Okinawans had been waiting for him. Twenty-seven individuals and organizations
had presented USCAR twenty-nine petitions listing some sixty requests. They ranged
from an invitation to visit Koza, a “GI town” adjacent to Kadena Air base, to a series of
questions in an open letter from the People’s Party demanding answers on Okinawa’s
political status, the people’s civil and democratic rights, and the high commissioner’s
18

Memorandum of Discussion at the 446th Meeting of the National Security Council, 31 May 1960.
Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. FRUS, ibid., 314-324.
19
NSC 6008/1, “National Security Council Report: United States Policy Toward Japan,” 11 June
1960. Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6008 Series. Ibid., 335-349.
20
Ambassador MacArthur to the Secretary of State (Dispatch No. 2561), n.d. (circa February 1960);
MacArthur to the Department of State, 11 June 1960, FRUS, 1958-70, Vol. 18, 350-53.
^'ibid.

^^Dillon to the Embassy in Tokyo, 12 June 1960. Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/61260. FRUS, ibid, 354.
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appointment of the chief executive and judges.
The Okinawa Trade Association asked that the United States treat its imports from the
Ryukyus as domestic trade, or at least reduce its duties on Ryukyuan goods. The Ryukyu
Chamber of Commerce requested that Post Exchange (PX) activities of the U.S. forces be
limited in view of the fact that they “[had] expanded a little too much covering not only
daily necessary items but also such items usually left for private stores in the United
States,” and that this adversely affected local economic development and Job creation.
The Federation Of Military Land Owners’ Associations pointed to the unsettled
claims for compensation for damaged property (204,526 persons involved, $42,000,000
claimed) and people killed or injured (552 persons, $750,000) by U.S. forces between the
end of the war and the day before the peace treaty went into effect and for the restoration
of the land formerly used for military purposes but now released ($2,400,000). A similar
petition was filed by the Association of the Chairmen of Municipal Assemblies and the
Association of Municipal Mayors. The Okinawa Social Welfare Council urged the United
States to establish social assistance programs; it pointed out that Japan’s national treasury
covered 80 percent of the public assistance expenditures of prefectural governments while
the programs in the Ryukyus were entirely supported by taxes collected from the people.
The All-Okinawa Military Employees Labor Federation demanded the repeal of USCAR Ordinance No. 116, an end to arbitrary dismissal of local employees and investiga
tions of their views and ideology, and requested a two-fold increase in wages to bridge
the wide difference in earnings between themselves and non-Ryukyuan military workers
and the introduction of retirement allowances.
The Okinawa Teachers’ Association filed a six-page petition, asking for the earliest
possible administrative reversion to Japan, permission to fly the Japanese flag on school
buildings, removal of travel restrictions to Japan, increased financial aid for the promo
tion of education, abolition of the approval system for publications, and popular election
of the chief executive. The Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council, a united front which
the Teachers’ Association and sixteen other bodies had organized on April 28, the eighth
anniversary of the Japanese peace treaty, “to campaign actively for reversion until the day
when our long-cherished desire will be realized,” filed a similar petition of its own.
Chief Executive Ota welcomed the President and petitioned for a solution to the pre
peace treaty claims, “extension of foreign trade and immigration to overseas areas,” “in
creased economic assistance,” and expanded political autonomy. He also noted that “in
order to maintain peace and security in the Far East, it is our firm determination to . . .
seek the early return of the Ryukyuan people to their natural status.” The GRI Legislature
requested “speedy recovery of the natural status” of Okinawa and expressed “strong op
position to strengthening military bases” on Okinawa.
Eisenhower arrived at Kadena Air Base, made a brief speech emphasizing the “vital
role” that the Ryukyu Islands played “for the free world in the circumstances of this era”
and the “friendship” existing between the Okinawans and the Americans stationed there.
He then headed for Naha in an open sedan. As a USCAR report described it: “[A] uni
formly friendly crowd estimated around 200,000, waving thousands of U.S. [flags] and
hundreds of Japanese flags, greeted [the] President along the entire route to Naha. Most
signs (several strung over Highway One) [and] placards carried ‘Welcome President Ike’
or equivalent messages while some stated [a] desire for reversion.”^^
But the scene changed as the motorcade approached the executive building of the
^^“USCAR Preliminary Appraisal of President’s Visit,” prepared by E. O. Freimuth, Director, US
CAR Legal Office, 20 June 1960. HICOMRY, Okinawa, HC-LO 6-13610.
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Government of the Ryukyus which the United States had “dedicated” to the Okinawan
people in 1953. The motorcade was besieged by hundreds of demonstrators (estimated at
anywhere between 2,000 and 10,000) carrying small Japanese flags or red labor union
flags and placards reading “We Want to Return to Our Fatherland” or “Take All H&A
Bombs out of Okinawa” in both Japanese and English and occasionally shouting “Yan
kee, Go Home.” In spite of government efforts “to fill critical areas with moderate or
cooperative groups,”^"* angry crowds of people had gathered since 9:45 a.m. for a “meet
ing to demand reversion to the fatherland” and adopted a declaration calling on the Presi
dent to return Okinawa to Japan expeditiously and on “the democracy and peace loving
people of the world” to support “our ardent desire.” University students and young teach
ers, zigzagging from one side of the street to the other, clashed with 700 policemen and
almost overwhelmed them. Only the reinforcement of some 1,500 helmet-wearing U.S.
marines, armed with carbines and fixed bayonets could hold the crowd back and permit
the motorcade to pass through the hecklers to the government building.
Eisenhower finally reached the building, greeted twenty-four legislators (five others
had boycotted the meeting) waiting outside, made a two-minute speech and conferred
with the Chief Executive inside for about twenty minutes. Behind the building, with tear
gas at the ready, was one reinforced marine rifle company held in reserve. With the angry
demonstrators still around, the President departed from the building via a pre-planned
alternative route to Naha Air Base where he and his party were air-lifted by helicopter to
Kadena to depart for Korea.
The New York Times commented that “most of the people [in Okinawa] were friendly
[to Eisenhower], though a small group of juvenile delinquents were not.” But the esti
mated figures, both 200,000 in the welcoming crowds and 2,000-3,000 in the opposing
forces, were misleading; they hardly represented the underlying sentiments that most
Okinawan people harbored against the U.S. occupation. U.S. officials never scrutinized
claims relating to the numbers of well-wishers or how they had been organized and sup
plied with U.S. flags.
For all its symbolism, the presidential visit had little substantive impact on the subse
quent course of events relating to Okinawa. During their brief meeting, Chief Executive
Ota did not even press for a solution to the fukki question or related issues raised in a
number of petitions, nor did the President volunteer any new policy initiative.
Ota read his petition and requested the President’s cooperation in restoring the
$1,500,000 cut from the annual appropriation for economic support to the Ryukyus, and
asked him to help get the Price bill and the Judd immigration bill passed.^^ The first re
ferred to a decision by the subcommittee of the House Committee On Appropriations.
The second concerned a bill introduced early in 1959 by Congressman Melvin Price pro
posing annual appropriations of up to $6,000,000 to the high commissioner for economic
development, reimbursement for government services and disaster relief in Okinawa,
from federal income taxes withheld at the source from Americans stationed or employed
in the Ryukyu Islands. The Judd bill provided for the immigration of up to 100 Ryukyuans to the United States annually. The President told his aide to phone General B.
Persons, his assistant at the White House, “and ask him to mobilize such support as he
could for restoration of the cut” and bring Ota’s request concerning the Price bill to Per
sons’ attention. The immigration bill was unlikely to be passed in the current session;

^^“President’s Far Eastern Trip: Memorandum of Conversation,” 19 June 1960. FRUS, 1958-1960,
Vol. 18, 371-374.
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Eisenhower mentioned a need for preparations for the next session.
The other petitions to the President were subsequently answered by George R.
Roderick, Assistant Secretary of the Army. He told Chobyo Yara, president of the Rever
sion Council, that the United States had “no territorial ambitions” over the Ryukyus, that
it recognized “the honest desire” of the Okinawan people to return to Japanese
administration, but that the present status “must be continued, so long as threats and
tensions exist in the Fast East.”^® He explained: “The world is faced today with a threat—
a threat that has been stated by communist nations, time and again, as being the
submission of all [the] free world’s peoples to communist domination.” Roderick was not
receptive to Yara’s plea for travel liberalization. “Your request appears to be predicated
upon the concept that the Ryukyus and Japan have the same administrative status,” he
wrote. “This premise ignores the fact that, under duly constituted international
agreements, the administration of the Ryukyus is vested in the United States.”
The Price Bill was signed into law on July 12, 1960, as Public Law 86-629. The U.S.
economic assistance under official appropriations—’’Government and Relief in Occupied
Areas and Administration” (GARIOA), “Administration, Ryukyu Islands” (ARI) and later
“Ryukyu Islands, Army” (RIA)—^had been declining since 1950, when it had peaked at
$50,400,000, falling to $1,000,000 in 1957, $1,100,000 in 1958 and $1,300,000 in 1959.^’
Only when appropriations for the construction of power and water utilities, resettlement
and disaster (typhoon) relief were included, did the amount reach $6,900,000 in 1957,
$4,000,000 in 1958, and $2,400,000 in 1959. A rise in appropriated funds toward
$6,000,000,^* minus non-appropriated funds, was expected to boost the people’s standard
of living, which lagged far behind the fast-rising standard in Japan.
As a result, the Congress authorized $3,300,000 in fiscal 1960 for the Ryukyus in di
rect grants and for technical training and education. That figure did not include some
$18,000,000 the United States was providing for a water system and $2,700,000 for an
electric power system, with an aggregate total of $24,000,000.
To Senator John Sparkman, however, even a $6,000,000 appropriation was not
enough to maintain what he called “the most strategic and most useful of America’s Far
Eastern bases.” A member of the Senate Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Sparkman, who visited Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines between July
29 and August 13, told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in November: “[The
present system]... is far from satisfactory to most Ryul^uans. Even among conservative
[i.e., pro-American] Ryukyuans there is a sentiment that the United States has assumed
the responsibility for governing their people but not adequate care of them. Ryukyuans
inevitably compare their economic situation with Japan’s booming economy. The com
parison, of course, is unfavorable .... In all sectors, Okinawa’s economy is far below
Japan’s.”^® He noted that the people’s strong desire for reversion to Japanese administra
tion was motivated in part by economic concerns. “It is argued that, if Okinawa were a
^^Roderick to Yara, 28 December 1960. NARA, RG 260, Box 91 of HCRI-LN (“President Eisen
hower’s Visit, 19 June 1960”).
^^House Armed Services Committeee, “Full Committee Consideration of H.R.1157, H.R.6479m
H.R.8713, H.R.10068, and Report of Real Estate and Construction Subcommittee,” 13 April 1960,
3994.
28
Federal income taxes withheld from the U.S. citizens (both military and civilian) in the Ryukyus
totaled about $9,000,000 annually. Ibid., 3994.
^^U.S. Senate, “The Far East and the Middle East: Report of Sen. John Sparkman to the Committee
on Foreign Relations” (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 10.
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Japanese prefecture, it would receive more assistance,” he said, continuing: “And that is
quite true. Okinawa receives less assistance from the United States than Japan budgets for
its seven poorest prefectures.”
The Senator urged that the United States “should provide economic aid” to the Ryukyus “that is at least consonant with modest growth requirements,” particularly in the face
of the call for reversion—an “economic and emotional issue”—which was “supported by
all seven political parties, including the ruling conservative party.”
At the same, he noted that Japan was accepting Okinawan teachers and students into
its universities and that American and Japanese officials were “discussing the possibility
of sending Japanese doctors to Okinawa and establishing a model Japanese-style farm.”
He said the United States should “encourage” Japan to be involved in more such “non
political activity” in Okinawa and that the United States “should seek and welcome
greater Japanese participation” in the promotion of the Okinawan people’s welfare.^®
In Japan, Prime Minister Kishi was forced to resign in July 1960 after massive public
demonstrations protesting both against the revised mutual security treaty and the way he
bulldozed it through the Diet. The demonstrations, in which a university student was
killed, forced President Eisenhower to cancel his scheduled visit to Tokyo. Kishi’s
successor, Hayato Ikeda, found himself free from the burning security treaty (Ampo) issue
and thus able to chart a new political course.
The new Japanese administration demonstrated a keen interest in Okinawan affairs.
Various departments were receptive to GRI pleas for budget increases. The special Oki
nawa committee of the ruling Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party pledged to work for
Okinawa’s “substantial integration” with Japan as a step toward the earliest possible ad
ministrative reversion. The government established a liaison office in Naha, and Sensuke
Fujieda, director general of the Prime Minister’s Office, became the highest Japanese
official to visit Okinawa since the war. While in Okinawa, he announced that the gov
ernment’s policy would be directed towards increasing economic assistance and looking
for ways to solve various problems.
On December 2, 1960, the Defense Department announced the appointment of Major
General Paul W. Caraway (soon to be promoted to lieutenant general) as the new high
commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands as successor to General Booth. The new high com
missioner stressed the strategic importance of Okinawa in his inaugural address, given on
Feb. 16, 1961.^' “It is well known that the reason for the presence of U.S. military forces
here is to maintain an essential link in the chain of free-world defenses against potential
aggression,” he stated. “Our presence here helps to protect free peoples of the western
Pacific islands and of Asia from being overrun by forces hostile to the security and wel
fare of the people of the area, including you, the people of Okinawa and your brothers on
the other islands.” He then promised to pursue the basic missions prescribed in the Execu
tive Order such as “continued development of an effective and responsible government,”
“expansion and balancing the economy,” “steady advancement of individual welfare,”
and preservation of “basic liberties.” Never once did he mention the Okinawan people’s
paramount aspiration for reversion or problems resulting from long-term military occupa
tion.
The U.S. Embassy in Tokyo reported on December 16, however, that although the
Okinawan people’s desire for reversion was now “within manageable proportions,” “we
^°Ibid, 12.
31

Office of the High Commissioner, Ryukyu Islands, Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands,
IX: I (for 1 October 1960 to 31 March 1961), 8-10.
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must recognize that until administration is eventually returned to Japan, [the] problem of
reversion will be a constant irritant in Japanese-American relations.” It cautioned: “We
must frankly recognize that we waited dangerously long to modify certain of our policies
in Okinawa re[garding] land acquisition, Japanese participation in certain Ryukyuan mat
ters, and almost had an incipient ‘Cyprus’-type situation on oin hands three years ago.”^^
The Embassy suggested that U.S. authorities on the islands “keep Okinawans reasonably
satisfied [and] have [a] flexible outlook as political or economic problems arise” and that
the United States continue “to bring Japan into [the] picture to [the] maximum extent
possible.”

“I recognize the Ryukyus to be part of Japan”
After fifteen years of American occupation, the stage seemed set for lifting the Oki
nawan people out of the quagmire. They could now expect the beginning of an end to
their long plight, a light at the end of the tunnel of military occupation.
On January 1, 1961, Ikeda sent an unusual New Year’s message to the “900,000 fel
low countrymen of Okinawa,” expressing “sympathy and a grave responsibility” for the
people who had not only suffered “the torments of the war’s disaster” but had been “sepa
rated from the fatherland for sixteen long years.” He said that “not only our Okinawan
fellow countrymen, but also the Japanese people eagerly await the day Okinawa will be
returned to Japan,” adding;
The Japanese government thus far has taken every opportunity to negotiate the matter
with the American government. The Ikeda cabinet is of the policy to continue making
utmost efforts for the return of Okinawa to the fatherland through Japan-U.S. diplomatic
channels, and will not grudge giving a variety of assistance to Okinawa until the day
Okinawa is reverted to Japan. The basic attitude of the Japanese government as well as that
of the Japan Liberal Democratic Party ... is that “Okinawa is Japanese territory and must
eventually be returned to Japan.””

The cabinet followed the statement with a decision to increase its economic aid to
Okinawa eight-fold in the new fiscal year starting in April 1961, from ¥59,600,000 to
¥485,000,000 (roughly $1,350,000). Even so, the amount fell far below the $6,230,000
appropriated for the Ryukyus by the U.S. Congress for fiscal 1961, including $4,570,000
in economic assistance (i.e., for GRI services and projects; construction of electric power
and water facilities; technical assistance, education and technical training) and $1,630,000
in the general fund (for the administration of the U.S. civil government). Washington also
spent additional millions of dollars for the construction of military facilities in Okinawa.
Japanese aid, limited to technical assistance and scholarships until fiscal 1960, was
now extended to a variety of programs. A majority of the funds were allotted in 1961 to
WWII civil service and military survivor pensions, solatia to the families bereaved in that
war, and compensatory payments to wartime repatriates and government employees. Ap
proximately half of the support went to economic assistance for, among other things, the
construction of a microwave system linking the Ryukyus to Japan and a high altitude
weather station, scholarships to educate Okinawan students and teachers at Japanese uni^^U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to the Department of State, 16 December 1960. Department of State,
Central Files, 611.94/12-1660. FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 18, 412-423.
Okinawa Times, 1 January 1961.
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versities, and programs to train government specialists in a number of fields and to pro
vide doctors and university professors.
In the United States, the administration changed in January 1961 from the Republican
Eisenhower to the Democrat John F. Kennedy. The new president, who had campaigned
for “a new fi-ontier,” called upon Americans in his inaugural address “to bear the burden
of a long twilight struggle . . . against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty,
disease, and war itself,” and surrounded himself with liberal Harvard advisors.
Kennedy appointed the eminent Japanologist Edwin O. Reischauer as ambassador to
Japan at the suggestion of Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles. Bom in Tokyo to
missionary parents, fluent in Japanese, married to the granddaughter of a two-time prime
minister of Japan, the new ambassador was highly respected in Japan for his intimate
knowledge of its history, culture and customs, and for his liberal views. Reischauer was
also known to have strong views on Okinawa. He had called Okinawa an American col
ony, the Okinawans a “colonial people,” and the Okinawa issue a “stumbling block” in
U.S. relations with Japan.
When Ikeda and Kennedy met in Washington in June 1961, they apparently agreed to
put off the discussion of political issues in favor of the promotion of people’s welfare. In
fact, Ikeda told Kennedy that he had “no intention” of seeking Okinawa’s administrative
return to Japan or “interfering in any way with U.S. administration.” His main interest
was to ensure that the Okinawan people would receive “[economic] treatment at least
equivalent to that accorded Japanese nationals in the poorer prefectures of Japan.” The
President “affirmed” further U.S. efforts “to enhance the welfare and well-being” of the
Okinawans and “welcomed Japanese cooperation in these efforts.” The Prime Minister
“affirmed that Japan would continue to cooperate with the United States to this end.” The
joint communique was silent on how the anomalous status of Okinawa and the Okinawan
people would or could be resolved, focusing instead on the improvement of their eco
nomic condition. It fell disappointingly short of the Okinawans’ expectation that the two
leaders might place on their agenda reversion of the islands to Japan.
The new U.S. administration appeared little different at first from the previous one. In
response to a letter to the Secretary of Defense from Lawrence Speiser of the American
Civil Liberties Union, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army flatly rejected the conten
tion of the ACLU that the “Ryukyus should be prepared for their eventual return to Ja
pan.”” “In view of Okinawa’s great strategic importance and the lack of any other base
over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction in the Western Pacific,” he stated,
“it would appear that the U.S. security interests will require retention of the Ryukyus for a
period of indefinitely long duration.” As such, he said, it would be both “premature” and
“potentially harmful to U.S. security interests” to launch a program for reversion, for it
would further increase demands for reversion and limit the United States in the exercise
of its authority over the islands. Based on this premise, the under secretary disagreed that
the Ryukyuan legislature should appoint the chief executive pending future popular elec
tion, that the Ryukyuan people should be represented in the Japanese diet, or that they
should be recognized as Japanese citizens.
As it turned out, however, the Kennedy/Ikeda communique initiated a series of highly
significant changes in the U.S. administration and moved the reversion issue forward after
^^FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 22, 699.
^^Howard E. Haugerud to Lawrence Speiser, Director, Washington Office, American Civil Liber
ties Union, 31 July 1961, with an enclosed memorandum on “Civil and Political Rights in the Ryu
kyus,” 14 February 1961. Baldwin Papers, Box 10, F18.
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all. Shortly after it was issued, High Commissioner Caraway made public an agreement
between the two leaders to permit Okinawans to fly the Japanese flag on Japanese build
ings, including government facilities and schools, “during all Japanese holidays . . ., plus
the first three days of the Japanese New Year, plus Ryukyuan holidays.” The Japanese
flag in Okinawa, the display of which had been thus far permitted only on private houses,
would soon become a political symbol of the fukki movement.
To implement its commitment expressed in the communique, Washington sent Am
bassador Reischauer to Okinawa in August 1961. In October, Carl Kaysen, a Harvard
University economist who was then on the White House National Security Council staff,
led an Interdepartmental survey team to Okinawa to “review the major economic and
social welfare problems” there for the development of new U.S. “policies and programs
which would more effectively improve the islands’ living conditions.”^® The decision to
send the mission to Okinawa resulted fl'om a suggestion by George Ball, Special Assistant
To The President For National Security Affairs, who had visited Okinawa briefly three
months earlier.^’ “Until then,” Ball wrote, “I had thought of Okinawa as a major World
War battleground. Now, observing our vast stores of supplies and the proprietary manner
in which our military administered the island, I thought it “preposterous that fifteen years
after the war we should still be treating [Okinawa] as our colony.” He depicted the situa
tion as “tailor-made to generate trouble between Tokyo and Washington,” and sent the
President “a telegram describing the dangers implicit in our position.” The Kaysen mis
sion’s mandate, nevertheless, did not extend to an investigation of political issues or of
the ways to solve them.
The so-called “Kaysen report”^* made a number of significant recommendations,
however, such as an economic cooperation agreement between Washington and Tokyo as
a basis for a future U.S.-Japan relationship in Okinawa, a possible announcement of even
tual reversion of the islands to Japan, and greater autonomy for the Government of the
Ryukyus. Revealingly, an undated copy of the recommendations noted that the Japanese
government had “no desire to push us [the Americans] out of Okinawa.”^’ On the con
trary, the government welcomed the American bases on the island, as they contributed to
Japan’s own security “without creating the political problems which would follow if the
base were situated in [mainland] Japan.” It would “continue to speak publicly” in favor of
restoring its administration over the islands while recognizing that the United States
would not return them in the “foreseeable future.”
Based on the recommendations in the report and perhaps on those made by George
Ball and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who discussed Okinawa with a variety of

^®White House press release, 30 September 1961. In April 1958, U.S. Ambassador to Japan MacArthur had suggested several “minimum measures” to “stabiliz[e] the situation in Okinawa.” These
included “assurance to Ryukyuans of substantially greater economic and financial assistance,” “a
decision to send a competent civilian economic mission” to Okinawa, “giving [the] Ryukyuan peo
ple a substantially greater voice in their own administration,” withdrawing USCAR’s responsibility
in local government matters to the maximum extent, and providing the Department of State with
“full and equal voice” as the Department of Defense. (Embassy in Japan to the Department of State,
1 April 1958. Department of State, Central Files, 794C.00/4-158.)
^^George Ball, Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: Norton, 1982), 196.
^*“Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on the Ryukyus” was submitted to a special
committee in the White House on 14 December 1961 and to the President on 11 January 1962.
^^FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 22, 719, footnote, attributed to Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files,
Countries Series, Ryukyu, Task Force Report, 11/61-12/61.
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people during his visit to Japan around the same time. President Kennedy signed on
March 19, 1962, Executive Order 11010, an amendment to Executive Order 10713 of
1957.'“’ In his statement, the President said:
I recognize the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and look forward to the
day when the security interests of the free world will permit their restoration to full Japa
nese sovereignty.

The statement had no legal significance nor did it contain anything spectacularly new,
for the Ryukyus had always been recognized as a part of Japan to which the United States
would eventually return the islands when “threats and tension” ceased to exist in the Far
East. But it made a symbolic departure fi'om previous U.S. policies toward Okinawa; it
was the first time Washington declared the islands to be officially Japan’s and expressed a
hope for the eventual restoration of full Japanese sovereignty over them.
Admittedly, the new policy represented a compromise between two conflicting priori
ties.'" Kennedy himself emphasized the importance of the U.S. military bases in the Ryu
kyus as a “deterrent power in the face of threats to the peace in the Far East”'*^ and
pointed to a need for “reconciling the military imperative for continued United States
administration with the desires of the Ryukyuan people to assert their Japanese identity,
and to have a greater voice in the management of their own affairs.” Many Okinawans,
including Chief Executive Ota, were disappointed that the President pegged their return to
Japanese administration to “the security interests of the fi-ee world” and did not make
clear the approximate date for the reversion, although they nevertheless regarded the
statement as a major step forward.
Under the new executive order, the chief executive would now be nominated by the
Ryukyuan legislature—he needed the support of a majority of the popularly elected legis
lative representatives—before being appointed by the high commissioner. The high com
missioner was required to “give all proper weight to the rights” of the people and respect
democratic principles. The civil administrator would now be a civilian. Inevitably, how
ever, the changes were all qualified. The chief executive would still have to be “accept
able” to the high commissioner, and the high commissioner could appoint a chief execu
tive without a nomination in the event that the legislature failed to make an acceptable
nomination. The high commissioner retained his power to veto “any bill.” The civil ad
ministrator would be appointed by the Secretary of Defense “after consultation with the
Secretary of State and with the approval of the President” and “have such powers and
perform such duties as may be assigned to him by the high commissioner.”
Curiously, there was no reference to an amendment to Section Six of Executive Order
10713 in which the Secretary of the Army had anticipated the problem of division of

'*®The President had authorized rescission of NSC 6008/1 (“U.S. Policy Toward Japan”) on 9 Janu
ary, 1962.
'"'The American Civil Liberties Union “commended” the measures taken by President Kennedy to
extend civil rights and local autonomy to the Okinawans, but commented that the new executive
order failed to “contribute to solving the conflict of security with freedom.” ACLU news release,
23 April 1962. Baldwin Papers, Box 10, FI7.
'*^When the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 February 1963 emphasized to Kennedy the continued strate
gic essentiality of Okinawa to the United States, the President also indicated “that he had no inten
tion to giving up the island.” FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 22, 773.
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powers.'*^ In a letter to the GRI Legislature dated October 30, 1959, he had noted that,
with the amendment, the U.S. Civil Administration would “consult with the Government
of the Ryukyus with a view to establishing a mutually agreeable balance, following the
practice of democratic nations, between those aspects of the electoral process which
should remain as provisions of the Executive Order and those which may be appropriately
left to the discretion of your legislature.”
The President also ordered a number of actions “to give expression” to the “spirit of
forbearance and mutual understanding” by the United States, “to discharge more effec
tively our responsibilities toward the Ryukyus, and to minimize the stresses that will ac
company the anticipated eventual restoration of the Ryukyu Islands to Japanese admini
stration.” Among these measures were:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Asking the Congress to amend the Price Act to remove the $6,000,000 ceiling on
U.S. economic assistance to the Ryukyu Islands;
Preparing plans for the support of new programs in the Ryukyus to raise the wages of
Ryukyuan employees of the U.S. forces and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands,
and the levels of public health, educational and welfare services to those comparable
areas in Japan over a period;
Preparing proposals for the Congress to increase loan funds for the development of
the Ryukyuan economy;
Initiating discussions with the Government of Japan to develop arrangements for a
cooperative relationship between the two countries for the promotion of the Ryu
kyuan people’s welfare and well-being and the development of their economy; and
Continuing to review governmental functions in the Ryukyus to determine when and
under what circumstances the United States could delegate additional functions to
the Government of the Ryukyus.

The new Japanese and U.S. policies set off a series of dramatic developments. Oki
nawans were now allowed to fly the Japanese flag, thus far generally restricted to private
houses, on public buildings such as government office buildings, city halls and schools,
on all Japanese national holidays. The White House replaced General John G. Ondrick
with Shannon B. McCune, former provost and vice president of the University of Massa
chusetts, as Civil Administrator, the first civilian to occupy the post. A bill to amend the
so-called Price Act (the Act Providing for Economic and Social Development in the Ryu
kyu Islands) was submitted to Congress, proposing that the $6,000,000-ceiling on U.S.
assistance to the Ryukyus be raised to $25,000,000, with another proposing an increase to
$12,000,000 in fiscal year 1963.'*“
Two members of the Japanese Diet, including the chairman of the Okinawa Measures
Committee of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party formed the first of a series of Japanese
government survey teams and visited Okinawa in July 1961. And in June 1962, the Japa
nese government sent its own version of the Kaysen mission to Okinawa based on an
agreement between its foreign minister and Ambassador Reischauer. Headed by Hisao
Kodaira, director general of the Prime Minister’s Office, the nine-member team was to
collect comprehensive data as a basis for developing the Okinawan economy and promot'*^High Commissioner Booth’s message to the 18th Session of the GRI Legislature, 1 February
1961.
‘’‘'Kennedy signed Public Law 87-746, which raised the annual authorization ceiling on U.S. aid to
the Ryukyus, on 4 October 1962.
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ing the welfare of the Okinawan people in cooperation with the United States. In Septem
ber, the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation, the Ryukyu Telegraph and
Telephone Public Corporation and the Government of Japan signed an agreement on op
eration of the microwave system.

Stumbling Blocks
Kennedy’s new policy, however, faced two stumbling blocks: Congress and the Pen
tagon. The bill to amend the Price Act met such opposition in the Senate that the Con
gress slashed the presidential request to a $12,000,000 ceiling in September 1962 in spite
of statements by senior officials of the Departments of Defense and State and High
Commissioner Caraway emphasizing the strategic importance of Okinawan bases and the
concomitant necessity of appeasing the Okinawans economically. The Congress author
ized only $7,000,000 for fiscal 1963 against a $12,000,000 request by the President. The
ceiling was raised to $17,500,000 in November 1967, but never to the $25,000,000
originally requested by Kennedy.
The military was not about to jeopardize its unrestricted hold on the Ryukyus for the
sake of a “cooperative” relationship with Japan. In December 1961, for example, the
Army assured High Commissioner Caraway that it continued to be U.S. policy “to remain
in the Ryukyus as long as threats and tension exist in the Far East,” to be “responsible for
the administration of the Ryukyus,” and “to keep Japanese economic assistance in reason
able balance with U.S. economic assistance.”'*^
Caraway, known as a self-righteous rigorist,'*^ was well suited to implement such a
mission. Over the next few years, his “arbitrary” exercise of powers would bring him into
conflict with the Ryukyuan government, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo under Ambassador
Reischauer, and the Japanese government, and draw charges that he turned whatever
dream the Okinawan people may have conjured fi-om President Kennedy’s policy into a
nightmare. The various complaints of the U.S. Embassy in 1963 illustrated what many
people criticized as Caraway’s “direct mle,” “paternalism”'*’ and “[Japan-Ryukyus] sepa
ratist policy.”"**
'*^Department of State to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, 13 December 1961. 811.0094C/11.3061
XR894.0094C. RG 59 Central Decimal File 1960-1963 Box 2176 F3
'*®His language aide described him as one who believed himself to be a god. George K. Sankey,
“Senryosha no Kao,” Etsujiro Miyagi, ed., Okinawa Senryo: Mirai-e Mukete (Naha: Hirugisha,
1993), 246.
^’Caraway, of course, was not the first American administrator to be known for his paternalism.
David Ogden, Deputy Governor of the Ryukyus in the early 1950s, compared the United States to
the demigods that an Okinawan legend says created the islands and produced the first inhabitants.
The Americans were even better than the legendary demigods as they introduced a “new democ
ratic form of government,” taught the Okinawans “new skills and new ways of life,” built highways
and water treatment facilities, and were training “thousands of unskilled Okinawan laborers.'"{‘'Keystone of the Pacific,” 42-43.)
‘**Caraway described the Ambassador as “useless” and “a menace.” Reischauer, he said, “thinks he
knows everything. He had a lot of information, and he knows nothing.” (Caraway oral history,
quoted in Sarantakes, 131). Reischauer called Caraway “a serious irritant in Japanese-American
contacts” who threatened “a vastly important overall relationship by his highhanded rule in his little
bailiwick.” {My Life Between Japan and America (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 249). Also
see Masahide Ota, Okinawa no Teio: Koto Benmukan (Tokyo: Kume Shobo, 1984), 183-252, and
Etsujiro Miyagi, Senryo 27-Nen: Iseisha-tachi no Shogen (Naha: Hirugisha, 1993), 93-120.
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“As we have begun to implement the policy announced by the President,” the Em
bassy charged, “we have faced disagreements with the High Commissioner’s Office in
Okinawa on various problems. . . . The U.S. military authorities in Naha appear to feel
that every effort must be made to limit Japanese activities in the Ryukyus; that Japanese
interests are contrary to ours; that, in fact, the Japanese constitute a subversive element
which should be treated as such.”
Specifically, the Embassy complained about the High Commissioner’s attitudes to
ward the proposed U.S.-Japan-Ryukyus consultative committee, free textbooks for Oki
nawa, Japanese aid programs in Okinawa, and entry of Japanese government officials and
opposition party members into Okinawa.^® The Embassy envisaged “a forum for friendly
and useful discussion of technical problems,” composed of the head of the Japanese gov
ernment liaison office in Naha, a senior official of the Government of the Ryukyus, and
the deputy civil administrator from the Office of the High Commissioner (HICOMRY).
The high commissioner’s office, however, objected to the liaison office having any role in
connection with the Japanese aid program or its chiefjoining the committee. It suggested
that the Japanese govermnent send a group of technicians annually to consult representa
tives of the high commissioner concerning the U.S. proposal for Japanese aid, an affront
to Tokyo in the Embassy’s view.
Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira and Ambassador Reischauer agreed in
November 1962 to establish a U.S.-Japan consultative committee in Tokyo and a U.S.Japan-Ryukyus technical committee in Naha in order to seek the means by which to im
prove Japanese economic and social assistance to the Ryukyus. But such measures were
not inaugurated until April 1964. The microwave system linking Japan and Okinawa,
completed in November 1963, would be opened only the following September. Members
of the Japan Socialist Party were not allowed to visit Okinawa until the high commis
sioner left.
The free issue of textbooks for Okinawan public school children in grades one
through six was started in 1963 at the suggestion of the Japanese government which pro
vided $100,500 (the Government of the Ryukyus covered the remaining two-thirds of the
cost). Tokyo had originally offered $30,000 for provision of free textbooks to first-grade
children only, but the High Commissioner made a counter-proposal that the program be
expanded to include all elementary school children. In the Embassy’s opinion, the out
come turned out to be a “happy” one, but the way it was handled ran contrary to the
“Kaysen report” which had warned against evoking competition between Japan and the
United States to win the “affections” of the people. “A genuinely cooperative approach to
the textbook question would have been substantially different from that which the United
States actually took,” the Embassy pointed out. “This type of competition on our side is
likely to spur a similarly competitive approach on the Japanese side and is a game ... in
which the Japanese enjoy many advantages.”
With regard to Japanese aid programs for Okinawa, the Embassy criticized the High
Commissioner’s policy, stating that, seemingly, it was trying to limit Japanese aid to the
minimum and channel it into “the most inconspicuous areas.” This, the Embassy stated,
“can prejudice our whole policy” if carried too far. In 1963, the Embassy continued, the
United States “refused to accept any increase in the Japanese technical assistance program
49

U.S. Embassy in Japan, “Talking Paper,” n.d., apparently prepared for the visit of Stephen Ailes,
Under Secretary of the Army, to Tokyo and Okinawa in February 1963.

Members of the Japan Socialist Party were not allowed to visit Okinawa until after
Caraway left Okinawa.
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for training Okinawans in Japan or for sending Japanese technicians to Okinawa; ... re
fused to authorize the construction by Japan of additional hospital facilities in Okinawa;.
. . insisted that Japanese doctors must be assigned to Okinawa for a minimum of two
years, though it is apparent that the GOJ will have much difficulty in recruiting doctors
for this period.” In order to take a more cooperative approach, the Embassy declared it
“took a strong position on the need to accept the $5,100,000 [sic] aid program proposed
for the next fiscal year by the Japanese government.”
The fourth complaint concerned entry of Japanese officials into Okinawa. On this is
sue, the Embassy noted: “We tend to quibble over the entry of minor Japanese represen
tatives and to delay issuance of permits even in the case of senior Japanese officials such
as Mr. Tokuyasu [director general. Prime Minister’s Office]. To limit severely entry per
mit authorization or to delay the issuance of permits conveys a most negative impression
of U.S. intentions.”
In response, the Office of the High Commissioner asserted that Caraway’s approach
toward the U.S. administration of the Ryukyus was, basically, that he and his staff “must
look beyond policy,” that is, the U.S. policy declared by President Kennedy in March
1962, to the “U.S. objectives” that this policy sought to achieve.^’ These objectives were
defined by “the military situation in the Far East [which] alone dictates that the United
States must have complete administrative control in the Ryukyu Islands and freedom of
action as to deployment, entry and exit of military units, weapons and individual person
nel. Further, the internal security of Okinawa as a base demands certain restrictions with
respect to travel of individuals. Moreover, the military situation demands that the Ryukyuan populace remain generally content with U.S. administration and the U.S. not divert
troop strength on Okinawa to internal policing or other duties alien to their primary mis
sion.”
In another document, H. N. Simmons, the director of USCAR’s Public Safety De
partment, rebuked a U.S. embassy official for his “implications that we should ‘knuckle
under’ to Japanese public opinion in regards to denial of travel of individuals other than
those posing strictly a security risk.”^^ Simmons justified entry denials from Japan and
elsewhere for “security or other reasons” under “SOP [standard operating procedure]
established at the direction of the High Commissioner [Caraway].” USCAR travel re
quirements, he noted, “are geared to protect not only U.S. security but also ... the Ryukyuan labor market and economic enterprises.” If the activities of a Japanese person while
in Okinawa “are detrimental to U.S. interests either for security, economical or political
reasons,” USCAR would “expeditiously” deport them in order to prevent “business
‘grabs’ and adverse political influences.” Simmons believed that, in any case, it was “a
good policy to have an indirect reminder to Japan through control of travel, that Okinawa
is in fact administered by the U.S. and separated from Japan under current treaties.”
In other words, the High Commissioner “is not receptive to any program sponsored by
the Government of Japan unless it is carefully thought out, adequate, and meets a real
need which does not undercut U.S. administration in the Ryukyu Islands.”^^ In order for
the United States to achieve its overall objective in Okinawa, the High Commissioner
pointed out that it should “provide more aid than the government of Japan,” hopefully, “in

^'“Critique of American Embassy Tokyo Paper for Under Secretary Ailes and Party (draft),” pre
pared by the Office of the High Commissioner, n.d. (1963).
^^H[arriman]. N. Simmons, “SOP re Notification of Entry Denials,” 18 October 1962.
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the order of magnitude of 2 to
And, in order to ensure the security of the base, the High Commissioner “must exer
cise care in screening requests for entry into the Ryukyu Islands of all Government of
Japan officials .... It would be inconceivable, for example, for the high commissioner to
authorize entry of Diet members from the governing and opposition parties at the time of
a weapons demonstration or the annual Nike service practice. Such an action would pro
vide a built-in platform for the opposition party.” The High Commissioner would not
compromise the U.S. occupation of the islands.
The High Commissioner stated he objected to the head of the Japanese Liaison Office
in Naha participating in the tripartite consultations “in his capacity as the Liaison Office
Chief’; he would not object if fte official were to participate “as an individual” or to wear
another official title. He noted that competition in the free textbook case had been started
by the Japanese government and that “in any other area in which the Government of Ja
pan offers competition, the high commissioner can counter with as much success as was
met in this case.” The high commissioner “can see no need to authorize consfruction of
additional hospital facilities without the medical personnel to maintain those facilities”
and he “sees no sense in dispatching doctors to isolated areas for [a] period less than two
years.”
It was Caraway’s basic belief that “for U.S. administration to be effective, it must be
substantive and not the mere holding of a right of administration.” If Japan was allowed
to enhance its role in Okinawa, that right would become “increasingly meaningless” and
the United States would eventually find itself holding “a hollow shell of administrative
rights .. . while the substance of administrative control is exercised by Japan.”
In his messages to the Legislature, Caraway rarely referred to “Japan,” “Japanese as
sistance” to Okinawa, U.S-Japanese cooperation for Okinawa, or the possibility of ulti
mate reversion to Japanese administration. In fact, he was known for his rinichi or “sepa
ratist” policy of alienating Okinawa from Japan contrary to the increasing efforts of the
Ryukyuan and Japanese governments to “integrate” their institutions in various fields.
When the GRI enacted a law, authorized by Booth, to provide its Liaison Office in Tokyo
with the power to promote integration, for example, the high commissioner amended it to
place the office under his supervision. During his administration, the United States estab
lished a museum of Ryukyuan historical documents and artifacts in the ancient capital of
Shuri and sponsored other programs to promote the Okinawan people’s awareness of their
history and culture and their “Ryukyuan” identity.
Travel between Okinawa and Japan was more severely restricted than ever before.
Applications for travel to the mainland withheld or disproved in 1963 numbered forty but
were 110 for the first four months of 1964, compared with a total of 201 over the preced
ing ten years.^^ Those refused exit permits included students, doctors, patients and house
wives. Reasons for refusal were not disclosed.
Caraway also angered many Okinawans and stunned officials in Washington and To^‘*Tokuji Tokonami, a member of the Japanese House of Representatives and vice-chairman of the
Special Okinawa Problems Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party confirmed in December
1963 that the ratio of Japanese and U.S. assistance to Okinawa was “established at 1 to 3,” noting
that this limited Japanese aid to ¥2,000,000,000 in fiscal 1963 when “a distribution tax and many
other grant-in-aid funds in the amount of ¥20,000,000,000 to ¥30,000,000,0000 would naturally be
delivered to Okinawa” if it were a prefecture of Japan. “Review of the Okinawa Problem,” Decem
ber 1963. Department of State RG 59 Central Department Files 1964-1966, Box 2625, F4.
Okinawa-ken Fukki Toso-shi, 176.
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kyo with a speech he gave on March 5, 1963. His statements so “appalled” Adlai E. Ste
venson, in fact, that the then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations sent a telegram to
Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, and personally called the attention of Robert A.
McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, to Caraway’s remarks. “Viewed from our perspec
tive,” he told Rusk, “it [Caraway’s speech] has [a] general tone of paternalism and indefi
nite extension of external control easily susceptible to anti-U.S. exploitation in UN, where
prevailing statement is strongly and emotionally in [the] direction of [an] ‘inalienable’
right [of] all people to self-determination. . . . Even if special problems confront our ad
ministration in Ryukyus, [this] speech contradicts repeatedly proclaimed US policies to
ward dependent people in refusing even ‘autonomy’ or ‘self-government’ and in interpret
ing them also to mean only independence.”^^
In a letter to McNamara, with a copy to President Johnson, Stevenson added: “I can
not believe . . . that the policy of the United States in that area, as represented in the
speech, can be so inconsistent with our general policy in regard to politically dependent
peoples. If it is, a general review is in order. I hope, therefore, that you can look into this
yourself so that any future pronouncements regarding the political status of the Ryukyuan
people will be in harmony with our general principles and with our broader interests and
obligations.” He called Caraway’s speech “patronizing and even dictatorial.”
What upset Stevenson—and many others in Okinawa, Japan and the United States—
were Caraway’s attacks on the Government of the Ryukyus as irresponsible and ineffec
tive. The theme of his speech,^’ to members of the Golden Gate Club, an elite group of
Okinawans who had studied at American universities under GARIOA or U.S. Army
scholarships, was “autonomy.” He described the autonomy pursued by Okinawans as
“self-government without any outside control” or “sovereignty,” and declared: “If we are
to face reality, we must conclude that autonomy for the Ryukyus, or any area that is a
political subdivision, is impossible. It is no more possible with a state, or a province, or a
prefectural govermnent than it is under the United States Civil Administration as provided
by Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Autonomy at the present time is a myth;
it does not exist. And it won’t exist unless you Ryukyuans determine of your own free
wills that you wish once again to become an independent nation-state.”
The High Commissioner was apparently fi^istrated by what he called the “failures” of
the three branches of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands to carry out their duties re
sponsibly or effectively. Although the United States was continuously reviewing what
additional functions it could transfer to the Ryukyuan government, he said, the transfer
was contingent upon the “degree of ‘responsibility’ and of ‘capability’ (as measured by
achievement) rather than the hue and cry after ‘autonomy’” by the Ryukan govemment.He accused the executive branch of having failed to benefit the general public in
stead of special interest groups or privileged segments of society; the legislative branch
failed to enact “all the legislation” needed for the welfare of the people, and the judiciary
branch failed to carry out speedy justice.
He pointed to such examples of bad government as:
1.

The executive branch of the GRI only held the unemployment insurance fund in

^®Stevenson to Rusk. NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1963, Box 4029, F2. Stevenson
to McNamara, 20 March 1963. Ibid.
^^United States Civil Administration News release, “Text of Remarks of High Commissioner Paul
W. Caraway at a Dinner Meeting of the Golden Gate Club, at Harborview Club, Naha,” 5 March
1963.
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trust for the workers. Yet, the GRI had tried a number of times to divert it to
purposes other than for the benefit of the workers.
The GRI had tended to regard all actions during a labor dispute, be they criminal
acts or not, as part of the dispute. From a legal point of view, this was a fraud
committed upon the entire community by the authorities and an irresponsible
act.
The government had licensed two sugar mills across the street from one another,
when that could not be justified economically.
Directors of a bank were permitted to make unsecured loans to commercial cor
porations they headed, which would have constituted a felony elsewhere. GRI
refused to act and sought to evade its responsibilities and shift the blame to the
United States Administration.
The Legislature drafted a medical services bill which failed to provide the an
nual inspections necessary for the protection of the public and a workmen’s ac
cident compensation bill which made the taxpayers, instead of the employer, li
able for on-the-job injuries suffered by workers.

Under such circumstances. Caraway asserted, the cry for “autonomy” was a “rabblerousing, excousing [excusing] alibi for failures” and the cry for “complete freedom from
all restraints, for power to rule without responsibility or demonstrated competence is a
false ‘aspiration of the people’. It is, unwittingly or wantonly, a screen to hide incompe
tence; irresponsibility; disloyalty to the community which vested authority in it; or it is a
shield for special interest and special privilege battening on the remainder of the commu
nity.”
Caraway’s allegations were not all unfounded. Indeed, he had done all he could to put
the house in order. He personally reviewed the bills that had been worked out between
GRI and USCAR officials, sometimes forcing the executive branch to delay or even can
cel its submission to the Legislature. When the ruling party passed a bill in a committee
of the Legislature to reduce income tax, the High Commissioner pressured it to withdraw
the bill out of concern for its possible adverse effect on Senate deliberations on U.S. ap
propriations for Okinawa. After GRI warnings against inappropriate practices at certain
banks failed to be effective, the High Commissioner issued an ordinance empowering the
Chief Executive to supervise and regulate operations of the GRI-licensed banks more
tightly; this led to the establishment of a GRI board of bank inspectors. The High Com
missioner later revised the ordinance, promoting the board to make it an independent
organ and permitting the high commissioner to interfere directly in its work if necessary.
Subsequently, directors of five banks and two insurance companies resigned from their
posts or were charged with corruption. At the Bank of the Ryukyus, owned 51 percent by
the United States, the president and directors resigned after the high commissioner criti
cized its inefficiency.
The High Commissioner undoubtedly took these and other actions with the best of
motivations and intentions to carry out his duties as defined by the Executive Order.^*
Here was the man who had originally suggested the dispatch of a high-powered survey
mission to Okinawa and who appealed to congressional committees for increased U.S. aid
to Okinawa. Caraway raised the minimum wages of Okinawan employees of the U.S. and
government contractors from twelve cents to fourteen cents an hour, repealed Civil
Administration Ordinance 145 which required a labor union to be non-threatening to the
^*Ota, Okinawa no Teio, 207-08.
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security of the U.S. forces in Okinawa in order to be recognized as a bona-fide organiza
tion, and extended three-year multiple trip travel documents to Okinawan students study
ing in Japan. Many Okinawans applauded his anti-corruption measures, although they
were annoyed by other ordinances such as the one which regulated not only cultivation,
distribution and use of narcotics and sedatives but the distribution and use of regular tran
quilizers, painkillers and cold cures as well.
His tight rein on local self-government and his autonomy-as-a-myth speech, however,
betrayed not only the spirit of the possible amendment to Section 6 of Executive Order
10713, but his own words to a congressional subcommittee:
Under the U.S. administration, the Ryukyuans possess the right to elect their own legis
lature, to maintain their own court system, to levy taxes and budget their revenues. The ba
sic liberties enjoyed by people in democratic countries are preserved to them. In all major
respects the rights guaranteed to citizens of the United States under its constitution apply
with equal effect to Ryukyuans.

His style also contrasted with the conciliatory approach of his predecessor. General
Booth. In his last message to the Legislature, Booth had suggested that the “development
of an effective and responsible government. . . with the highest degree of autonomy con
sistent with the legal status and with the minimum degree of reliance on outside assis
tance” should be one of the objectives of the Ryukyuan government and people while
under U.S. administration. Booth emphasized that the Government of the Ryukyu Islands
should make close cooperation with the United States its basic policy and that both the
USCAR and the GRI should welcome the cooperation of the Japanese government in the
development of the economy and welfare.
Caraway instead offended and alienated even the ruling Okinawa Liberal Democratic
Party which had Just won a majority. The party, led by Chief Executive Ota, had incurred
Caraway’s wrath in March 1963 when it published a document criticizing the High
Commissioner’s “direct rule” for negating the principle of President Kennedy’s new pol
icy toward Okinawa. Specifically, the pro-American party pointed to the U.S. failure to
implement fully President Kennedy’s statement and called for an end to the practice of
“prior adjustment” of legislative draft bills, for a greater delegation of authority to Oki
nawans, for their right to elect their own chief executive, and rescission of high commis
sion ordinances governing the economy and financial institutions. USCAR ridiculed the
document as an attempt “to demonstrate that [the party] had more backbone when stand
ing against the United States than the party had received credit for.”®“ Akio Nagamine,
speaker of the Legislature and a former LDP member, made an unusual public statement
calling both on the Chief Executive to deal with bills at his own volition and on the high
commissioner to refi-ain from interfering with autonomy. The High Commissioner was
alleged to have undertaken too personal a control of the details of civil administration,
sometimes directly approaching individual legislators over the heads of the USCAR and
the Chief Executive.
Shannon B. McCune, the first civilian civil administrator, had apparently been so fi"ustrated working under Caraway—who reportedly considered the former scholar as a mere
^'^Testimony at the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, House Appropriations
Committee, 2 May 1963.
^'’High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1963-64,
Vol. XU, 29.
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“errand boy” without any authority—that he left the post in February 1964, barely two
years after his appointment, to return to academic life. He would be replaced by Gerald
Warner, political adviser to the High Commissioner.
Never before had a High Commissioner himself become such a political issue. Amid
the confusion. President Lyndon Johnson announced Caraway’s retirement from service,
effective August 1, and appointed Lieutenant General Albert Watson as his successor.
Caraway was undeterred by Johnson’s announcement, and maintained his “iron rule”
until his departure.
“From Chief Executive on down,” Rafael Steinberg of the Washington Post reported
from Naha, the people believed that “democracy in the Ryukyus was a sham”; for, in their
view, “only one man’s opinion really counts. And that is Caraway[‘s].”
“When an administrator holds the power to rule by decree, can veto laws or adminis
ter them, and controls the economy and the courts, then public opinion may not seem very
important,” Steinberg observed in another article.®^ “But in the view of many responsible
and influential Okinawan leaders, including some of those most friendly to the U.S.,
many of the problems faced by the American rulers on Okinawa, and much of the grum
bling and dissatisfaction, might fade away if the high commissioner paid as much atten
tion to local desires as he does to pure efficiency.”
Seisaku Ota, who had often been criticized as being too subservient to Caraway even
by members of his own Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party (OLDP), retorted that the
Chief Executive’s political responsibility was necessarily limited in Okinawa where, he
said, sovereignty lay with the United States, not with the people.^^ Deputy Chief Execu
tive Hiroshi Senaga, who had also been appointed by the High Commissioner, publicly
acknowledged that autonomy had been “shelved,” or at leist had lost too much ground.
On June 10, 1964, the OLDP joined the other parties in adopting a resolution in the
Legislature requesting public election of the Chief Executive and expansion of political
autonomy. A few days later, Ota was denounced by the secretary general of his party for
his “responsibility in connection with the past direct administration of the High Commis
sioner, and the recent random issuance of ordinances.” When he pledged to abide by a
party decision seeking his resignation as the Chief Executive, but failed to provide the
exact date he would step down from the post, eleven legislators and Mayor Junji Nishime
of Naha left the party in protest. In its public statement, the dissident group enumerated a
series of “unacceptable political phenomena” under the High Commissioner’s direct rule:
among them, “the myth of autonomy and the High Commissioner’s manipulation of the
Government of the Ryukyu Islands; the pre- and post-adjustment of bills; direct investiga
tion by the High Commissioner into the execution of the budget and into Noren (Federa
tion of Agricultural Cooperative Associations) and financial institutions; direct inspection
of the construction of schools and vessels; and delay in the establishment of the Joint Tax
Council.”
Ota tendered his resignation to Caraway a few days later, to be joined by the Deputy
Chief Executive and all departmental directors. The High Commissioner, however, would
neither accept nor reject Ota’s resignation immediately. Caraway was bound by Executive
^'Rafael Steinberg, “Our Unhappy Asia Bastion,” the Washington Post, 3 May 1964.
®^Rafael Stenberg, “America’s Unhappy Bastion III: High-Handedness of U.S. Authorities Causes
Friction Among Okinawans,” Washington Post, 5 May 1964.
^^Ota later wrote that Caraway was “self-righteous like Hitler,” believing that “the end justifies the
means.” Seisaku Ota, Omoide-o Zuihitsu-ni Nosete (private publication, 1970), 310. Also see Ota,
Rekishi no Shogen (Tokyo: Rikitomi Shobo, 1980), 311-20.
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Order 10713 requiring him to nominate a chief executive on the basis of an acceptable
nomination made by the Legislature, but the legislature was not in a position to nominate
Ota’s successor and all parties were advocating public election of the chief executive.
In Japan, the director general of the Prime Minister’s Office called on the U.S. Em
bassy and said that “the successive promulgation of ordinances . . . runs counter” to the
spirit of President Kennedy’s statement and lamented the so-called “direct rule” of the
High Commissioner.®'' Prime Minister Eisaku Sato himself later told Ambassador Reischauer that the presidential statement was not being implemented in Okinawa. He said
that Caraway had not shown proper understanding of the situation, which had “retro
gressed rather than progressed.”®® It was interesting that the Prime Minister was not con
cerned about the Okinawan people’s autonomy alone. Sato was also worried that the un
rest might adversely affect Japan’s own security.®®
Caraway left Okinawa on August 1, 1965, and Watson finally accepted Ota’s resigna
tion in October when the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party and its dissident group
reached a compromise and agreed to support Seiho Matsuoka’s nomination as the next
chief executive.
Five years later. Caraway spoke his mind about Okinawa and Japan in a Japanese
magazine.®’ He called the Japanese government’s repeated inquiries since the Korean
War about the American right to station its forces on Okinawa “dreary reiteration of the
same question.” Washington’s answer, he stated, should have been that its forces were
there because Japan invited them by its attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The Okinawans,
he said, were “free to leave [their island] at any time they desire[d],” but, in spite of their
“complaints and cries of spurious distress,” they remained on the island “rather than to go
back to their home islands where there are no military installations, or to seek employ
ment in Japan, a country that has no military forces and is now facing a perennial labor
shortage.” His only conclusion—or, rather, “the only conclusion that, we, the people of
the United States”—could draw from these and other factors, was either that “Japan is
seeking to gratuitously embarrass the United States” or that Japan’s ruling Liberal De
mocratic Party was trying to divert the attention of the Japanese people away from its
failure to solve domestic problems.”
Watson took a decisively different approach to the administration of the Ryukyus. Six
months after he assumed his position. He told the Legislature that he was not recommend
ing any specific acts of legislation—a total departure from his predecessors—’’because. . .
I recognize it to be the responsibility of the Legislature to enact such laws on matters of
domestic application as will contribute to the welfare and well-being of the people.”®* The
U.S. Civil Administration, he said, had “moved significantly and rapidly toward its goal
of providing advisory services to the GRI rather than engaging in direct administration.”
USCAR transferred so many functions to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands that,
by February 1966, only 96 ordinances remained in effect, down from 145 in August 1964
®^U.S. Embassy to the Department of State, 9 July 1964. RG 59 Central Dept Files 1964-1966, Box
2625 F4.
®®Reischauer to Rusk, “Japanese Prime Minister Questioning about U.S. Conflict of Interest on
Okinawa,”
7 July 1964. Dept of State Record No. 76691.
®®/6/rf.
®’Paul W. Caraway, “Okinawa, an Overview from the United States of America.” Kokusai Jiho,
December 1969, 15-21.
®*Message to the 28th Session of the Legislature of the Government of the Ryukyus, 1 February
1965.
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when he took office.*® Watson said the government performed “effectively and effi
ciently.” Unlike his predecessors, he would not “make a detailed report on the economic
and political situation, or .. . request specific legislation, or even . . . describe in detail the
situations requiring legislation.” Henceforth, the Chief Executive would assume full re
sponsibility for recommending the annual legislative agenda to the Legislature.
Watson’s conciliatory approach pleased Okinawan and Japanese leaders. He had a
good working relationship with the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and the Japanese government,
and U.S.-Japan relations on Okinawa improved during his administration. His arrival on
the island was followed by the visit to Okinawa of Director General Soichi Usui of the
Prime Minister’s Office, the visit of a survey mission of the Japan Socialist Party, Wat
son’s meeting with Prime Minister Sato in Tokyo, and the arrival of a Japanese govern
ment economic survey mission. The functions of the Japan-U.S. consultative committee
were expanded imder diplomatic notes exchanged between the Japanese Foreign Ministry
and the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo. “Instead of insisting that Ryukyuan laws conform to
American standards in every detail, as did his predecessor,” the Washington Post's Rafael
Steinberg wrote, “Watson lets the elected Ryukyuan legislature write and pass its own
laws. He and the staff of the U.S. Civil Administration give advice, but even if unsatisfied
with a bill they do not step in to block it.”’“ Indeed, the GRI Legislature adopted, and the
chief executive signed, a bill designating the Japanese Constitution Day (May 3) a legal
holiday—without any obstruction from the High Commissioner. Watson was also given
credit for simplifying travel procedures and relaxing travel restrictions, abolishing restric
tive labor regulations and the requirement of prior approval for publications, as well as
generally respecting Okinawan opinions and improving their conditions.
Then, in the summer of 1966, the High Commissioner stumbled over what turned out
to be a trip line: he directed that the GRJ Appellate Court transfer two pending cases—
one involving taxation on mackerel and the other election results—^to the USCAR Civil
Court in accordance with Executive Order 10713. The 1957 order had empowered the
High Commissioner to transfer “any case or controversy of particular importance affect
ing the interests of the United States” to a USCAR court.^'
In the first case, the GRI Central Circuit Court had challenged the validity of the High
Commissioner’s retroactive amendment to his Ordinance No. 17 (Commodity Tax Law)
against Executive Order 10713; the Ryukyuan government appealed to the Appellate
Court where it was pending. In the second case, the Central Circuit Court questioned the
validity of Civil Administration Ordinance No. 68 (Provisions of the Government of the
Ryukyu Islands). The Central Election Administration Commission filed an appeal in this
case, too, which was awaiting a decision from the Appellate Court.
Since the United States had “the right to exercise [any or] all powers of administra
tion, legislation and jurisdiction” over the Okinawan people under Article 3 of the Japa
nese Peace Treaty, USCAR noted, “the propriety and legality of any official act” of the
U.S. administration in the Ryukyus was “properly subject to examination by U.S. author
ity only.”^^ In other words, only USCAR courts had the authority to rule—or the power of
*®Address at the opening of the 31st Session of the Legislature of the Government of the Ryukyus,
1 February 1966.
^Reprinted in the Weekly Okinawa Times, 15 January 1966.
^'fhere were three levels of GRI courts: sessions courts, superior eourts, and an appellate court,
each made up of one or more American judges, employed by the United States Government and
appointed by the high commissioner.
’%SCAR news release, “USCAR Statement on Transfer of Two Court Cases,” 22 June 1966.
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judicial review— on the “constitutionality” of the U.S. ordinances; the Ryukyuan courts
had invaded the U.S. jurisdiction. The transfer order—and the High Commissioner’s ra
tionale—immediately backfired and turned many Okinawans against him and the United
States: it posed a serious threat to what they considered their last sanctuary for justice
under foreign rule: the integrity of the court,
Independent legislator Choko Chinen tendered his resignation in protest against the
High Commissioner’s action, which he said disregarded the judicial power of the Ryu
kyuan government. This prompted the Prefectural Council of Labor Unions and the Oki
nawa Teachers’ Association to call for the resignation of all legislators. The Legislature
adopted a unanimous resolution to request a repeal of the transfer order; other organiza
tions, such as the Naha City Assembly, the Council of Municipal Speakers, the Teachers’
Association, the Okinawa Reversion Council, the Ryukyu Bar Association, and the Civil
Liberties Union followed suit in a movement reminiscent of the island-wide protests
against the U.S. land policy in the 1950s. The Chief Justice of the Appellate Court, who
had been appointed by the high commissioner, made a similar request and expressed his
intention to resign. The Legislature adopted two additional resolutions, one addressed to
the American President and Congress and the other to the Japanese government, and sent
two members to Tokyo to request the Japanese government’s help for the withdrawal of
the order. The human rights committee of the Second Tokyo Bar Association made a
statement criticizing the High Commissioner’s order as “an unjust interference into the
judicial jurisdiction” of the Government of the Ryukyus and a violation of President Ken
nedy’s Executive Order which guaranteed the Okinawan people’s fundamental rights and
freedoms.
Watson, nonetheless, proceeded to appoint Stephen H. Simes from the Office of the
Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Headquarters in Japan, and two other American judges
to the USCAR Civil Court on September 28. On the same day. President Johnson an
nounced Watson’s retirement. He left the island on October 2.
Hearings continued through mid-October. Not once did the accused or his counsel in
the election case appear in court during the proceedings. The USCAR Civil Court finally
announced its findings on December 2. Significantly, the court not only upheld the valid
ity of U.S. ordinances in both cases, but also ruled, in Judge Simes’ words, that the Ryu
kyuan courts were “clothed with jurisdiction to examine a legislative act of the High
Commissioner in the light of the Executive Order.” Simes further declared that these
courts could determine validity or invalidity of ordinances, but that this did not give “fi
nality” to their decisions, which could still be reviewed by USCAR courts. This was con
sidered a monumental ruling. Executive Order 10713 had seemingly given the highest
USCAR appellate court the sole power to “interpret” the Executive Orders and proclama
tions, ordinances and orders of the High Commissioner.
In spite of the controversial court transfer issue, Watson earned high credit for his pol
icy of delegating to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands functions that were not essen
tial to the security interests of the United States. In 1965, for example, Watson not only
rescinded three ordinances and two directives which were considered obsolete or covered
adequately by GRI laws, but amended a number of Civil Administration (CA) ordinances
and proclamations and high commission ordinances and directives, delegating more func
tions and responsibilities to the GRI. In September 1966, he rescinded or amended eleven
acts altogether in what he called a “house cleaning” exercise. They included U.S. Navy
Military Government Proclamation No. 1 of 1945, CA Ordinance No. 95 of 1953 (“Elec^^Secretariat, GRI Appellate Court, Saibanshoho (Court Journal), 10 February 1967.
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tion Law for the Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands”), HICOM
Ordinance No. 38 of 1961 (“Provisions Concerning the Office Maintained by the Gov
ernment of the Ryukyu Islands in Japan,” and CA Regulation No. 2 of 1958 (“Regulation
Establishing Land Acquisition, Transfer and Release Policies and Responsibilities”).

Chapter VI: Onward to 1972
Security Interests and People’s Welfare
On July 21, 1964, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda moved Okinawa’s reversion further
forward by declaring that “Japan will take diplomatic measures for the return of Okinawa
to Japan.” Ikeda, however, died several months later but Eisaku Sato succeeded him in
November and set as a priority the solution of the Okinawa question.'
In mid-January 1965, Sato flew to Washington for a meeting with President Lyndon
Johnson. In their joint communique, they “recognized the importance of the United States
military installations on the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands for the security of the Far East.”^
Sato “expressed the desire that, as soon as feasible, the administrative control over these
islands will be restored to Japan” and, as if addressing himself to Caraway as much as to
the people back home, he indicated “a deep interest in the expansion of the autonomy of
the inhabitants of the Ryukyus and in further promoting their welfare.” In turn, Johnson
stated that he “looks forward to the day when the security interests of the free world in
the Far East will permit the realization of that desire.” Having agreed on the principle of
restoring Japanese administration over the Ryukyus, Sato and Johnson confirmed that the
two countries “should continue substantial economic assistance” to the islands to improve
the people’s welfare and well-being, and agreed to make use of the existing Japan-United
States consultative committee for the purpose.
The communique confirmed, once again, that the reversion question still had its inevi
table bedfellow, the security interests of the United States and Japan. To the leaders of
both countries, the two issues were intertwined: there could be no reversion which did not
take the security question into consideration. Hence it was apparent that administrative
reversion did not mean the withdrawal or even reduction of American military bases on
Okinawa.
In August, Sato visited Okinawa, the first incumbent Japanese prime minister to do so
since the war, and made the often-quoted statement that “I fully recognize that, as long as
Okinawa’s fukki to the fatherland remains unrealized, ‘the postwar period’ will not have
ended for our country. This is one belief that all the people on the mainland share.”^ The
Reversion Council, however, was so distrustful of a government that had left Okinawa
under U.S. administration for so many years “without any regard to the Okinawan peo
ple’s appeals” and “was now trying to solidify the status quo ... as a military base,” that
it met the visit with a protest rally. The ensuing demonstration became so violent that
several persons were injured and sixteen arrested, and Sato was forced to stay overnight
in a guesthouse on base.'’ The communique and Sato’s visit nonetheless helped to raise
Okinawan expectations for an early reversion, although with reservations. The question
'Minoru Kusuda, Shuseki Hosakan: Sato Sori-tono lO-Nenkan (Tokyo: Bungeishunju-sha, 1975),
29; and Hitoshi Senda, Sato Naikaku Kaiso (Tokyo: Chuo Koron-sha, 1987), 24-31.
^“Joint Statement by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Lyndon Johnson,” 13 January 1965.
^Speech in Naha, 19 August 1965.
*Ryukyu Shimpo, 20 August 1965.
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became exactly when and how.
In the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had agreed by mid-October 1965
that a study of U.S.-Japanese relations by the Departments of State and Defense should
include an analysis of whether Japan could take on administrative responsibility for Oki
nawa without impairing the value of the American bases there, ^ but in a subsequent
memorandum, they assured the Secretary of Defense that they were firmly opposed to
reversion. Okinawa had been developed into “an extensive complex of military installa
tions which cumulatively constitute an operational and support base of major dimensions
and which are not duplicated elsewhere in the Far East.” The administrative transfer,
therefore, “would degrade the U.S. strategic posture and seriously impair [its] military
position in the Far East,” they argued. “Exclusive U.S. jurisdiction over the Ryukyus will
continue for the foreseeable future to be essential to U.S. and free world security inter
ests.”® The JCS described the importance of U.S. forces on Okinawa as follows:
1.

2.

3.
4.

Okinawa provides a significant base for major U.S. ground, naval, and air forces.
There are some 16 major U.S. military installations in the Ryukyus ... [and] about 140
facilities of all types. Okinawa is also the hub of our extensive communications net
work in the western Pacific, especially for aircraft-control and warning purposes. The
Ryukyus are thus the focal point and connecting link in our bilateral and multilateral
military-security system in the Far East.
Kadena Air Base has become one of the busiest overseas U.S. airbases in the world.
The Port of Naha is jammed with shipping, while vessels wait outside the harbor for
berths to unload. The Navy utilizes Okinawa both as a servicing area for aircraft and in
support of the Seventh Fleet. Okinawa has become a keystone of the U.S. war effort in
Vietnam, and the buildup there continues.
Okinawa is the major nuclear-weapons storage depot in the Far East and a major base
for nuclear operations. Okinawa also supplies special weapons to the Seventh Fleet.
Okinawa performs . .. major logistic mission[s] in support of the operations of all U.S.
military services.

Loss of administrative control over Okinawa, the JCS predicted, would “severely di
lute the military value” of the bases. First of all, they would be placed under the restric
tions of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. And the United States would be required to con
sult Japan prior to undertaking operations or deployments from Okinawa or retaining or
deploying nuclear weapons and other sensitive munitions. Such restrictions, the JCS as
serted, could “virtually cancel effective Okinawa-based military capabilities throughout
the Far East,” impair the “effectiveness of forward military operations,” seriously inhibit
nuclear operations from Okinawa, and make the Nike-Hercules and Mace “non-operational.” The United States could “lose essential freedom of action in using .. . airfields,”
“lose political control of the air space over a vast area,” and find it “difficult to preclude
additional use” of Naha air base and other airfields. Japanese control over the communi
cations system could hamper U.S. military operations.
“Public-safety operations would be hindered and delayed by time-consuming Japa
nese political channelization,” and the United States would lose its “unrestricted right of
investigating security matters outside military bases.” The removal of travel restrictions

’jCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “US-Japan Relations (U),” JCSM-760-65, 16
October 1965.
*JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Future of the Ryukyu Islands (U),” JCSM-90065, 23 December 1965.
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would “permit the unimpeded entry of espionage agents and other subversive individu
als.” In addition, the United States would not only be “faced with complex and timeconsuming procedures for the acquisition of military lands” but also lose free use of for
mer Japanese public lands. Military employees, coming under a master labor contract
with the Japanese government, could be unionized “into leftist-dominated organizations”
guaranteed freedoms to undertake demonstrations, strikes and other slow-down activities.
These changes would also affect the existing mutual military-civilian use of electric
power, water supply, telecommunications, petroleum pipelines, airports and harbor instal
lations.
Furthermore, the JCS were concerned about physical security. “The United States
must be able to undertake maximum security measures to protect these indispensable
facilities against sabotage,” they stated. “Special considerations must also be given to the
protection of highly classified intelligence and counterintelligence operations, psycho
logical warfare and propaganda activities, movements of special weapons and ammuni
tion, as well as land, sea and air operational movements of a classified nature.”
The JCS were agreeable to eliminating those restrictions on the people’s freedoms
that were “not essential to the maintenance of the security of U.S. military installations”
and to continuing to transfer administrative ftmctions to the GRJ. But they objected to
any action that could erode Okinawa’s strategic value enhanced by the extensive freedom
of use that the United States had at its disposal. “The Joint Chiefs of Staff,” they con
cluded, “do not concur in proposals to relinquish administrative authority over the Ryukyus to Japan or to share such authority with Japan.”
History, however, was moving on a course beyond their control. In June 1966, Wash
ington established a special inter-agency study group to “analyze the argument and the
issues involved” in the Okinawa question and reach consensus in the government, par
ticularly between the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff’ The group in
cluded, under Richard Sneider, Japanese Affairs Director of the State Department, Mor
ton Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,
Norman Orwat, Deputy Director of J-5 (of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for Regional Affairs,
and Thaddeus Holt (later replaced by James Siena), Deputy Under Secretary of the Army
for International Affairs.
The inter-agency group started working on the “explicit premise” that “reversion
would not occur until the ‘sky was blue’,” that is, until no clouds or no threats to peace
and security existed in Asia. In other words, it was not expected to consider the question
of possible reversion, since the “blue sky” was not likely to occur as long as the cold war
continued.”** But the group did concern itself with the question and quickly reached a
consensus that “preserving the security relation with Japan was more important than pre
serving the status quo on Okinawa” and that the United States should accept reversion by
1970. Halperin’s memorandum in early August 1967 to Robert McNamara, the Secretary
of Defense, showed what sort of conclusions it had reached. He argued that failure to
conclude a reversion agreement before 1970 would set off a series of events in Japan and
’Priscilla Clapp, “Okinawa Reversion; Bureaucratic Interaction in Washington 1966-1969,” The
Japanese Association for International Relations, ed.. International Relations, 1974 (No. 2: “The
Political Process of Okinawa Reversion”), 15. Also see Morton Halperin, “American Decision
Making on Reversion of Okinawa: A Memoir,” in the proceedings of a seminar on “Okinawa Re
version: Its Long-Term Significance in U.S.-Japan Relations—Past and Present,” held in Tokyo 1314 May 1992.
*Halperin, 53.
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endanger the very existence of the U.S.-Japan security treaty due for renewal in that year.
Reversion, however, would keep the treaty alive “for the indefinite future.” Besides, the
United States could use its bases on Okinawa on the same terms as in mainland Japan. He
added that nuclear weapons could be removed without affecting the U.S. security inter
ests; they could be stored elsewhere in the Pacific. In due time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were convinced to accept the notion that the United States could use the bases after rever
sion and, therefore, early reversion would not jeopardize American security needs. This
was to become a basis of Washington’s position in its negotiations with Japan.
On the Japanese side. Foreign Ministry officials were inclined to permit the United
States to make free use of its bases in Okinawa in exchange for reversion. Should Japan
agree to make Okinawa an exception to the application of the Status of Forces Agreement
and grant the United States such free use of its Okinawa bases, Fumihiko Togo, directorgeneral of the Foreign Ministry’s North American Affairs Bureau, believed, “there would
be no reason why Washington should not be able to return administrative rights” over the
islands.’ In February 1967, Vice Foreign Minister Takezo Shimoda made a similar com
ment. “If we are to realize full reversion of Okinawa before tensions in the Far East dis
appear completely,” he said, the “Japanese people would have to show clearly whether
we would let the United States use the bases there freely.”How to solve related ques
tions, such as the introduction of nuclear weapons, he added, should better be left to fu
ture discussions. Prime Minister Sato rejected Shimoda’s view as unrealistic and, instead,
suggested that the realistic approach would be to raise Okinawan living standards and
promote their welfare to the level in mainland Japan to make them ready for eventual
reversion." He also ruled out, in light of Japan’s non-nuclear policy, the possibility of
“reversion with nuclear weapons.”" In August, he transferred the Council of Advisers on
the Okinawa Problem from the Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office to him
self and made it his own advisory body, to be chaired by Nobumoto Ohama, the Okinawa-bom president of Waseda University. Its mandate, he said, was to find ways of
“harmonizing Japanese people’s yearning [for Okinawa’s reversion] and the cold re
quirement for Japan’s security.”" The prime minister was increasingly irritated over the
gap between his appreciation of the importance of the American military bases on the
island for Japan’s defense and the public’s sentiment, which favored an early reversion
accompanied by restrictions on the use of the bases.
To “help the Sato government buy time on reversion with the opposition [parties] and
the Okinawans themselves,”" Secretary Rusk even suggested at a meeting in Washington
with Takeo Miki, the Japanese Foreign Minister, in September 1967 that a United StatesJapan-Ryukyus commission be created to find ways of reducing social and economic
differences between Okinawa and mainland Japan. One witness after another had testified
before congressional subcommittees in Washington that, despite the rapid economic pro-

’Fumihiko Togo, Nichibei Gaiko Sanju-nen: Ampo, Okinawa to Sonogo (Tokyo: Chuo Koron-sha,
1989), 116-17.
'°Asahi Shimbun, 2 February 1967.
"An answer to a question at a press conference at Otsu, 19 January 1967. The Okinawa Times, 19
February (evening edition) 1967.
"Statement at the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives, 31 March 1962.
"Speech at the inaugural meeting of the council on 15 June 1967. Asahi Shimbun, 16 June 1967.
"u. Alexis Johnson with Jef Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an
American Diplomat (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 475-76.
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gress in Okinawa, the people’s standard of living remained among the lowest in Japan.*’
The Japanese Prime Minister reciprocated by proposing, through Professor Kei Wakaizumi, his secret emissary, that he and the president agree during their forthcoming meet
ing to set a date for the reversion “within a few years.” “This,” U. Alexis Johnson, the
U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo wrote, “had the advantage of not tying us to any firm date for
reversion while indicating a firm intention to do so.”*®
Thus, when Sato met President Johnson in November, he “emphasized [Japan’s]
strong desire ... for the return of administrative rights over the Ryukyus” and “further
emphasized that an agreement should be reached between the two governments within a
few years” on the date for the reversion. The president expressed his understanding of the
Japanese position. To recommend measures to remove “the remaining economic and so
cial barriers” between Okinawa and mainland Japan so as to minimize “stresses” at the
time of reversion, the communique announced the creation of the tripartite Advisory
Committee to the High Commissioner. Significantly, Washington for the first time had
dropped its “blue sky” position of making reversion conditional on the return of peace
and security in Asia. And reversion was set as a definite agenda item.
At the same time, the two leaders, as in 1965, also “recognized that the United States
military bases on these islands continue to play a vital role in assuring the security of
Japan and other free nations in the Far East.” Except for the word “Japan,” absent in the
1965 communique, the reference to the military importance of Okinawa was almost iden
tical in the two documents. In the words of Ambassador Johnson, who had been deeply
involved in the negotiations over Okinawa, it was a victory for his powers of persuasion.
At a meeting between the prime minister and Rusk held shortly before the communique
was announced, “Sato . . . expressed a view that the effectiveness of our bases would be
strengthened by reversion because ‘Japan would be forced to live up to its security re
sponsibilities by this action’,” Johnson wrote. “This was exactly the outlook I had been
trying to advance with the Japanese government.”*^ An increased Japanese commitment
to defense, was, apparently, a quid pro quo for the U.S. promise to return Okinawa.
Not included in the communique was Japan’s acquiescence to Washington’s retention
of its right to store nuclear weapons in Okinawa after reversion. Ambassador Johnson
wrote that Sato was “determined to overcome the country’s nuclear allergy and build a
national consensus that would permit the acceptance of this difference between American
bases in Okinawa and in Japan proper.”**
Japan and the United States were now committed to fulfilling the Okinawan people’s
wishes for reversion, as Sato later stated, “as soon as possible.” Details needed to be
worked out on everything fi'om the specific date of the reversion and the future status of
United States bases and forces in Okinawa to the transfer of U.S.-owned corporations and
assets to the Japanese government and the continued operation of the Voice of America.
The three governments appointed representatives to the advisory committee, which began
its operations immediately.
*’See, for example. High Commissioner Watson’s testimony at Subcommittee No. 3 of the House
Armed Services Committee on 23 March 1966.
'^Ibid., 478. Regarding how the term “within a few years” came to be included in the communique,
see Kei Wakaizumi, “The Best Course Available": A Personal Account of the Secret US-Japan
Okinawa Reversion Negotiations (n.p., 1993), 76-110, and Tasaku Nakarishi-wo Shinzemu-to
Hossu (Tokyo: Bungeishunju-sha, 1994), 77-111.
’’Johnson, 480.
'^Ibid., 482.
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The position of the chief executive was changed so as to better reflect the popular
will. On December 20, 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11263 (amending
Executive Order 10713) to enable the legislature to elect the chief executive and the chief
executive to appoint his deputy. The American agencies involved—^the Office of the
High Commissioner, the U.S. Army and State departments, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and Bureau of the Budget—fully considered the “desirability of going all the
way” to permit a direct election, but they reached a consensus that “the over-all conse
quences would not be in the best interests of the United States,” in view of the possibility
that a chief executive election campaign “would inevitably provide an increased opportu
nity for prolonged anti-American demagoguery” and that the system “would result in the
election of a chief executive who would be antagonistic to the United States.”'*
Neverethelsss, the Executive Order was further amended on January 31, 1968, to pro
vide—some twenty years after the first Okinawan request—for the direct election of the
chief executive. The subsequent election, held in November, was fought between Chobyo
Yara, president of the Okinawa Teachers’ Association and long-time champion of the
fukki movement, and Junji Nishime, former mayor of Naha and president of the conserva
tive Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party. Yara, supported by a “reformist” coalition that
included the Okinawa People’s Party, campaigned on a platform calling for “immediate,
unconditional and complete reversion” and “removal of U.S. bases.” Nishime, backed by
local economic interests, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party, and the U.S. authorities in
Okinawa, for his part advocated a gradual transition to reversion to insure economic sta
bility and institutional identification with Japan. The campaign was focused on a highly
simplified argument between “war or sweet potatoes.” While the reformists claimed that
the Okinawans would continue to live with military bases and the consequential threat of
war if Nishime won, Nishime’s group warned that victory for its opponent would cause
the Okinawan economy to crumble and oblige the people to eat sweet potatoes as before
World War II.
The voters elected Yara over Nishime by 237,565 to 206,011 votes, a clear margin of
more than 30,000 votes. The people had unequivocally rendered their verdict; they fa
vored immediate reversion unaccompanied by military bases, not to mention nuclear
weapons. Yara’s victory convinced Ambassador Johnson that “political costs [would]
continue to mount unless reversion took place in the near future.”^" General James B.
Lampert, the High Commissioner, recognized Yara’s victory as a “landmark in the Oki
nawan movement for reversion” and “strong evidence” of the people’s desire for early
settlement of their problem.^' The reversion movement was no longer associated with
communism or labeled as “communist-inspired.” Unlike General Moore, who in 1957
engineered the expulsion of Kamejiro Senaga fi'om the position of mayor of Naha,
Lampert took a “positive and cooperative attitude” toward the new administration. James
V. Siena, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, went as far as describing him as “one of
the most respected public figures” in Okinawa.^^ The relaxation of the U.S. grip over the
islands’ judiciary, as a result of the rescission of Ordinance No. 12 (“the Ryukyuan Court
’’“Status of Residual HICOMRY Functions, Funds & Projects,” NARA RG 319 (“History of USCAR”), Box 5 F5.
^’Johnson, 508.
^’office of the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, The United States Civil Administration
of the Ryukyu Islands: Report, Vol. 20 (30 June 1971 to 15 May 1972), v.
^^Statements at the subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Matters, the House Appro
priations Committee, 29 April 1969.
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System”) in November 1968 which had transferred the authority to appoint the Chief
Justice of the Ryukyu Court of Appeals from the High Commissioner to the Chief Execu
tive, further enhanced this reputation.
The long-pending issue of the pre-peace treaty claims was also resolved in October
1966 when the United States Congress passed a law authorizing $21,000,000 for the
payment. The claims were reviewed by the USCAR Legal Affairs Department; the U.S.
Army Engineer District, Okinawa (USAEDO), the designated agent for the high commis
sioner, paid the claimants through the chief executive for the validated land, property
damage, death and personal injury, and fishery claims.
Restrictions on travel between Okinawa and mainland Japan were gradually relaxed.
The Civil Administration (CA) Ordinance “Control of Travel to Japan by Residents of
the Ryukyu Islands” was amended in 1960 to permit revalidation of single-journey travel
documents to Japan for a four-year-period and to extend the validity period of multipletravel documents from one year to two years. Further changes between 1964 and 1966
speeded up the processing of travel documents for Japanese citizens applying for a visit
to Okinawa and shortened the entry application form from twenty-two items to seven
teen. The validity of entry permits was extended from six months to twelve, and Japanese
officials visiting on approved government technical assistance programs were issued mul
tiple entry permits. The GRI Immigration Agency, which remained under the operational
control of USCAR’s Public Safety Department, had turned down twenty-seven applica
tions for Japan travel documents in 1964 but it rejected only two in 1965. While US
CAR’s Ryukyu Travel Unit in Tokyo rejected 109 entry permits from Japan to the Ryukyus during the half-year period between October 1960 and March 1961 alone, the num
ber dropped to only twelve in 1965 including those for three non-Japanese.
Japan and the United States agreed in 1966 to authorize the Japanese government liai
son office in Naha to issue passports to people in Okinawa who had already received
permission from the U.S. authorities for their proposed travel. Control of exit from and
entry into the Ryukyus remained with USCAR, however, which maintained a policy of
restricting travel between Okinawa and mainland Japan by “known communists, subver
sives, and criminal elements.”^^ In 1967, USCAR continued to identify such “undesir
able” persons among mainlanders applying to visit Okinawa for the annual reversion day
(April 28) activities.^''
Under the changing circumstances, the legal and political status of Okinawa and the
Okinawan people was clarified somewhat, though not to the satisfaction of many legal
experts or the Okinawan people. In 1951, a U.S. Court of Appeals court had ruled that the
United States maintained a “de facto" sovereignty, but not a “de jure" sovereignty on
Okinawa:
The will of of the United States has ... the “supreme will” on Okinawa. The United
States has, therefore, acquired, and still retains, what may be termed as a "de facto sover
eignty.” However, the traditional “de jure sovereignty” has not passed to the United States.
The conqueror does not acquire the full rights of sovereignty merely by occupying and
governing the conquered territory without a formal act of annexation or at least an expres
sion of intention to retain the conquered territory permanently. It does not necessarily fol
low, therefore, that Okinawa is not “[a] foreign country” within the meaning of the Tort
^^William H. Bruns to the Civil Administrator (“Policy for Japanese Entry Applicants for Reversion
Day), 30 March 1967. NARA RG 260 (“Records of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu
Islands: the Liaison Department”), HCRI-LN Box 105.
^fbid.
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Claims Act. So long as the ultimate disposition of that island remains uncertain, it offers a
persuasive illustration of the observation that “the very concept of ‘sovereignty’ is in a state
of more or less solution these days.”^*

Dulles had written in the same year that Article 3 of the peace treaty with Japan did
not turn the islands into a territory of the United States nor its inhabitants into U.S. na
tionals.^^ In February 1952, Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, noted that the Ryukyus
“would be considered as being under the ‘protection” of the United States within the
meaning of the Chicago Convention [on civil aviation],” and thus considered to be
American territory. The islands would become Japanese territory in that sense only when
the United States returned it to Japan.^^ But, a district court in Hawaii concluded in 1954
that the defendant (a native of Okinawa with permanent residency in Hawaii) was “an
alien,” since the United States was only a de facto sovereign,^* The Senate Appropria
tions Committee tried to define this anomalous status in 1959 as follows;
In the exercise of its authority, the United States enjoys the attributes of sovereignty.
However, the Ryukyu Islands are not U.S. territory, never having been ceded by Japan.
U.S. statutory law as a whole is not applicable to the area. The law applicable in the islands
is the law of Japan prior to 1945 and, since that time, enactments of the U.S. military gov
ernment and its successor the U.S. civil administration and the local government. U.S.
courts have declared the islands to be a “foreign country” in considering the application of
U.S. statutes thereto. Thus, the United States continues to administer the Ryukyu Islands as
a foreign area or country under authority of treaty law.^®

At the Defense Department, which was responsible for the administration of the is
lands, a paper prepared in early 1960 in response to the American Civil Liberties Union
viewed the people of Okinawa as Japanese nationals.^® As long as they were under U.S.
administration, however, the ACLU reasoned, their status was different from that of the
people of mainland Japan. Okinawa and Japan shared a relationship unlike the one be
tween foreign countries.
In the same year, the United States Civil Administration in Okinawa began to issue a
“Certificate of Identity” for Okinawans, or “Ryukyuans” traveling to countries other than
Japan, stamped with a spread eagle, the official seal of the High Commissioner. On the
cover and the fi-ontispiece were typed the name of the issuing authority: “United States
Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Government of the United States of Amer
ica.” The document explained that the bearer, “while traveling abroad is assured of aid
^^Cobb V. United States, 191 Fed. 2nd 604 (9th Cir., 1951), 608. Also see page 241 of U.S. De
partment of State, Digest of International Law, vol. 1 (Washington; U.S. Government Printing Of
fice, 1963), under the subheading, “Sovereignty in the State of Imperialism.”
^‘Dulles, Department ofState Bulletin, 452:9 (1951), 25. Quoted in the December 1965 decision of
the USCAR Civil Court on the “Tomori election dispute,” reprinted in the Weekly Okinawa Times,
10, 17, 24 and 31 December 1966, and 7 January 1967.
^’Quoted in “Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion,” an enclosure, 15 August 1952, FRUS,
1952-1954, Vol. 14, 1325.
United States v. Ushi Shiroma, 123 Fed. Suppl. (D. Hawaii, 1954), 145-149. See Beikoku Rempo
Saibansho no mita Okinawa no Chii,” Ryudai Hogaku, No. 1 (1958), 106-114, and Digest of Inter
national Law, vol. 8, 348-9.
^’Appropriations Committee, U.S. Senate, Mutual Security Appropriations for I960 (and Related
Agencies): Hearings (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1959), 751.
^°Tokyo Shimbun, 30 January 1960.
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and assistance from United States embassies and consulates, and the certificate is identi
fied as a document which is issued in lieu of a passport.” The Japanese government, on
the other hand, issued Japanese passports to Okinawans in mainland Japan and abroad.
Okinawan vessels were prohibited from flying either the Japanese or American flag.
A High Commissioner’s ordinance required them, when traveling outside Ryukyuan wa
ters, instead to display a special flag; the international code flag “D” (Delta) with an equi
lateral triangle cut from the fly. The “D” flag signaled a ship in distress, perhaps sym
bolic of the ambiguous identity of Okinawa.
Theoretically, the Ryukyu Islands remained part of neither Japan nor the United States
until 1962, fully seventeen years after the war, when President Kennedy officially de
clared the Ryukyus to be “a part of the Japanese territory.” High Commissioner Watson
began to refer to the Okinawans as “Japanese nationals” as well as the “Ryukyuan peo
ple.” In 1967, Ryukyuan ships were permitted to fly the national flag of Japan, with a
white pennant on top carrying the words “R30ikyus” in red Roman and Chinese charac
ters, instead of the “D” flag which had occasionally caused problems for Okinawan fish
ermen with foreign authorities.
In the same year, the responsibility for issuing passports to Okinawans was transferred
from USCAR to the Japanese government; their nationality changed from “Ryukyuan” to
“Japanese,” at least in documents for travel to Japan and abroad. USCAR nonetheless
retained the right to screen applicants while its documents continued to regard Japan as a
“foreign” country (as in “foreign” trade) and visitors and short-term residents from Japan
as “aliens.”
The relaxation of travel restrictions allowed more Okinawans than ever before to
travel to Japan either as tourists or to visit relatives, work or study. An increasing number
of new junior high school and senior high school graduates crossed the sea to work in
groups in Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe, and other industrial cities where Jobs were
available in abundance thanks to Japan’s booming economy. A total of 4,040 Okinawans,
most of them presumably such graduates, “emigrated” to Japan through the facilities of
the public employment security office in 1967 and 8,272 in 1969, compared with only
102 in 1958. The actual total could easily have double this, if those who left to work on
the mainland on their own had been included. Although a large number of those young
workers found life in the mega-cities difficult to adjust to and returned home only a few
years later, work in Japan helped to relieve the tight Job market in Okinawa and brought
young people into contact with the culture and lifestyles of the mainland. The number of
students studying at mainland colleges and universities also multiplied.
Okinawa, however, remained a “foreign area” under Japanese customs law even after
the United States recognized the Ryukyus as belonging to Japan. When a group of Japa
nese pacifists returned to the mainland in 1968 after visiting Okinawa and being ordered
out of the island by the U.S. authorities for having allegedly trespassed on Kadena Air
Base, they were asked to go through the usual Japanese customs and immigration clear
ances. They refused. Jumped off their ship and disappeared into the waiting crowd. Sev
enteen others, on their way back from Okinawa, refused to show their identification cards
(serving as passports) on the principle that such immigration procedures were unneces
sary between Okinawa and mainland Japan, Jumped off their ship onto the pier and re
entered the country without undergoing inspections.
The number of USCAR ordinances, proclamations and legislative acts in existence
was reduced from 138 in 1961 to seventy-three by 1970. The authority to grant foreign
investment licenses in the Ryukyus was also transferred from USCAR to the Ryukyuan
government—albeit almost a year after the Ryukyuan government adopted its own in-
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vestment act; yet the civil administrator retained the “reviewing authority” on all applica
tions.
Ordinance No. 144 was amended to lift all remaining restrictions for displaying the
Japanese flag.
The Japanese and American governments even agreed to permit Okinawan represen
tation in the Japanese Diet; the first postwar Diet elections in Okinawa, held in November
1970, elected five members to the House of Representatives and two to the House of
Councillors. Successful candidates included Kosuke Uehara, leader of the All-Okinawa
Military Employees’ Trade Union; Kamejiro Senaga of the Okinawa People’s Party;
Tsumichiyo Asato of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party; and Shinei Kyan, president of
the Okinawa Teachers’ Association. The only winner presumably favored by Tokyo and
Washington was Junji Nishime of the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party.
The Price Act ceiling was raised from $6,000,000 to $12,000,000 in fiscal 1965, and
then to $17,500,000 in fiscal 1968. Actual United States government assistance reached
$20,900,000 in 1970 including $17,500,000 in economic aid and $3,400,000 to fund the
USCAR administration, before dropping to $6,700,000 in 1971. The revenue came
mostly from the USCAR general fund, derived from petroleum sales, operation of three
USCAR corporations (Ryukyu Electric Power Corporation, Ryukyu Development Loan
Corporation, and Ryukyu Domestic Water Corporation), and dividends from the Bank of
the Ryukyus. In addition, the United States provided free distribution of foodsmffs under
its “Food for Peace” program. Most expenditure was allocated in grants to the Govern
ment of the Ryukyu Islands, for economic development and public works, and in invest
ment in USCAR corporations.
The Japanese government increased its aid from $2,800,000 in fiscal 1963 to
$63,200,000 in fiscal 1970 including $14,700,000 in loan fiinds. It totaled $97,300,000 in
fiscal 1971 and jumped to $167,000,000 in 1972, roughly two-thirds of it in grants and
the rest in long-term loans (financial investment loan funds and others generated through
the sale of Japanese rice in Okinawa). The Ryukyuan government administered the bulk
of the money, used for its own operation, as well as industrial promotion and infrastruc
ture development, education, social welfare, assistance to municipalities and reversion
commemoration projects.
Social security programs improved significantly as a result. While only unemploy
ment insurance existed in Okinawa in 1961, government workers’ annuities, workmen’s
compensation, medical insurance, and the national pension plan were all available to the
workers by 1970, as in mainland Japan. Employees of the U.S. forces, too, were covered
for workmen’s compensation, unemployment, and temporary disability, although not in
retirement.

B-52s, Nuclear Submarines, and Chemical Munitions
“Blocking reversion [in 1968] were,” Ambassador Johnson recalled, “two familiar is
sues of substance and one of tactics: nuclear weapons storage, freedom of use of bases for
conventional operations, and how the timing would be handled.”^' The greatest and most
pressing problem was what to do with the huge American military complex. Its strategic
value was recognized not only by the American but also by the Japanese government. In
a meeting with Ambassador Reischauer and General Watson in December 1964, Prime
’’Johnson, 508.
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Minister Sato “stressed the importance of utilizing the Ryukyus for military security pur
poses.” Japan and the United States, he stated, should solve Okinawan problems “on the
basis that the Ryukyu Islands were ‘dedicated’ to keeping the security of the area.”^^ He
even suggested that the high commissioner “educate the Okinawans on the importance of
the military bases.” When Sato met President Johnson a month later, as noted above, they
both “recognized” the importance of the American bases on Okinawa “for the security of
the Far East.”
The escalating American involvement in the war in Vietnam reconfirmed the military
importance of the island: Okinawa became a vital logistic, staging and training station for
the U.S. forces. A Congressional Quarterly Service publication summarized Okinawa’s
strategic value as follows:
A counter-guerrilla warfare school, extensive warehouses and military hospitals and the
computer center for Vietnam logistics are located on the island. The 5,620-acre Kadena Air
Base is one of the largest Air Force installations in Asia and is able to handle an almost
unlimited number of all types of U.S. planes. Special forces train for Vietnam in the Oki
nawan jungles; the Marines have a division headquarters; and the Navy operates several
ports. Psychological warfare operations, radio monitoring, intelligence operations and
Voice of America broadcast facilities to the Asian mainland are all located on Okinawa. So,
too, are two chemical companies—the 267th and 137th—under the 2nd Logistical Com
mand, which has testing facilities for chemical warfare. B-52 bombers have been stationed
in Okinawa since 1966. Additional B-52s were sent there following the January 1968 sei
zure of the Pueblo by North Korea. They have been flying sorties to Vietnam regularly
since then, although the United States has not officially acknowledged this. The U.S. mili
tary has neither confirmed nor denied the presence of nuclear weapons on the island, but it
is known that they are stockpiled on Okinawa.”

Thomas Havens writes in Fire across the Sea:
Even before the air campaign in Vietnam began, a squadron of KC-135 tanker planes
moved from Guam to Kadena air base. These planes were soon used to refuel B-52 bomb
ers during their monotonous westward flights from Guam to targets in Indochina. Okinawa
was the jumping-off point for the first 15,000 American combat troops to enter the war, in
cluding the 173rd Army Airborne Brigade and elements of the Third Marine Division, be
ginning in March 1965. Roughly 50,000 United States troops were stationed in the Ryu
kyus during the conflict, staffing ammunition depots, supply warehouses, training grounds,
ports, air bases, missile sites, and communication centers.”

In 1965 alone, 70,000 troops were said to have passed through Okinawa on their way
to Vietnam. Okinawa had become an extension of the battleground, involved in the
American military buildup in South Vietnam. Havens continues:
. . . The second logistical command, headquartered in Okinawa, handled about threequarters of goods consumed each month by American forces in Vietnam, mainly through
Naha military port and White Beach harbor. The 3,750-meter runways at Kadena air base
^^“Memorandum of Conversation [on Ryukyu Islands]”, 14 December 1964. NARA RG 59, Cen
tral Foreign Policy File, 1964-1966, Box 2626, F4, A-841 from U.S. Embassy in Tokyo.
^^“U.S. Defense Policy in Asia: The Okinawa Question,” Global Defense: U.S. Military Commit
ments Abroad (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, September 1969), 34.
^‘'Thomas Havens, Fire across the Sea: the Vietnam War and Japan, J965-1975 (Princeton: Prince
ton University Press, 1987), 87-88.
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averaged a takeoff or landing every three minutes around the clock, totaling more than a
million flight operations during 1965-1973. The jungles of Okinawa were training acres for
as many as 9,000 United States Army Special Forces (Green Berets) at the peak of the war,
and troops from South Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, and South Korea also
underwent training there . . .. Okinawa was a major storage ground for poison gas chemi
cals, a port for American nuclear submarines, and the site of thirty-two nuclear-tipped
Mace B missiles in launch shelters beneath the ground.

The U.S. forces in Okinawa, evidently retained their hard cold-war view of the world.
In his address to the GRI legislature in February 1965, General Watson stated; “we con
tinue to live in a dangerous and troubled world. The communist powers remain commit
ted to the so-called world revolution and to the use of force, if necessary to achieve it....
It is true today, as it has been true for two decades, that this part of the world would be
overrun by forces hostile to freedom except for the presence of free world military forces
spearheaded by the United States.” And, in Tokyo later in the year, he reiterated that it
remained the policy of the United States “to keep strong military forces in the Ryukyus
for so long as conditions of threat and tension continue to exist in the Far East.”^^ The
United States maintained the Ryukyus because there it had the “freedom to move troops
and equipment to the base without delay, the freedom to stockpile equipment for neces
sary action,” the “freedom to dispatch troops, equipment, aircraft, and ships anywhere,”
and the “freedom to provide logistical support” to U.S. forces anywhere. In defending
these “freedoms,” the High Commissioner argued, “loss of administrative rights would
reduce or destroy the freedom of our military forces to act, and seriously impair the us
ability of Okinawa as a base in defense of free world interests.” Once again, it was “the
existing threats and tensions” in the Far East and the “freedom” Okinawa provided for
American military strategy, and not the desire of the Okinawan people repeatedly and
democratically expressed in their elections, petitions or public demonstrations, that de
termined policy.
The involvement of Okinawan bases in the Vietnam war inevitably cast shadows over
the people and once again fueled their longing for the earliest possible reversion to Japan.
The stepped-up military activities on the island increasingly turned Okinawan people’s
attention to the bases and the problems associated with them, such as military-related
accidents, the roar of military aircraft engines, and growing acts of violence and crimes
often involving servicemen on their way to or back from the war zones.
A number of groups began to express their concern about the bases and their role in
the war. Mass rallies called for an end to the Vietnam war as well as of the U.S. admini
stration of the islands. In July 1965 the GRI Legislature adopted a unanimous resolution
addressed to the U.S. President and Congress, repudiating the bombing sorties from Oki
nawa and demanding an immediate halt to the acts that, they charged, were involving the
people of Okinawa in the war. The arrival of B-52 strategic bombers at Kadena Air Base
prompted the Legislature to pass a resolution demanding their withdrawal.
Various groups launched protests against the port-call of American nuclear subma
rines after cobalt 60 was detected at Naha port. Residents of Kadena, the village located
immediately adjacent to the huge air base of the same name, were outraged not only by
noise but by the contamination of their household wells with aviation fuel. Then, in No
vember 1969, a B-52 Stratofortress, heavily loaded with bombs, failed to take off,
crashed, and exploded at Kadena Air Base. The blasts seriously injured two of the seven
^^An address to the Foreign Correspondents Club, 29 September 1965.
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crew members, shocked the residents of nearby villages out of their pre-dawn beds, sent
debris and bomb fragments raining down on their houses, and shattered window panes
over a wide area. Although damage was relatively light, the magnitude of the crash—a
short distance away from ammunition dumps and what many people believed were un
derground storage areas for nuclear weapons—^terrified not only the villagers but Okina
wans at large and drove home to them how close they lived to a disaster and a war front.
Another series of protest rallies ensued.
The November/December 1999 issue of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists indicates
that most of the nuclear weapons listed below were stored on Okinawa in the latter part of
the 1960s, reaching about 1,200 in 1968. Whether they would be withdrawn from Oki
nawa by the time of its reversion, i.e., whether the same restrictions would apply to
United States military bases in Okinawa as they did to those in mainland Japan, became a
major concern among the people.^*
Weapons deoloved to Okinawa 1954Weapon/Initial EntryA/Vithdrawn
PaoMo De|)layitMntt On Shore

Non-nuclear bomb/Jul 54/Jun 67
Bomb/Dec 54-Feb-55/280mm gun/Dec 55-Feb 56/Jun 60
8-inch howitzer/Jun-Aug 57/Matador/Sep-Nov 57/Dec 60
Depth bomb/Dec 57-Feb 58/ADM /Feb-May 58/Honest John/Dec 57-Feb 58/Nike Hercules/Jan-Mar 59/Corporal/Mar 60/June 65
Hotpoint/Jul-Sep 60/Dec 60
Lacrosse/Oct-Dec 60/Dec 63
Mace/Apr-Jun 61/Jun 70
Falcon/Jul-Sep 6/-1
Little John/Apr-Jun 62/Dec 68
ASROC/Jan-Mar 63/Apr 66
Terrie/Jan-Mar 64/Jun 64
Davy Crockett/Apr-Jun 64/Dec 68
155mm howitzer/May 66/-

Source: “Appendix B” (Deployments By Country, 1951-1977) to “The History of the Custody
and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons July 1945 through September 1977” (http://www.
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/19991020/), quoted in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 55:6 (No
vember/December 1999), 66. (Reprinted by permission of the Bulletin.)

In 1969, the Third Marine Division returned to its Okinawan home base from Viet
nam, the headquarters of the Third Marine Amphibious Force was established, and the
island was made the homeport of Amphibious Group One of the Seventh Fleet.

^^orris, Arkin and Burr, “Where They Were.” All nuclear weapons on Okinawa were withdrawn
by June 1972, according to the article.
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“War or Sweet Potatoes”
As a timetable for reversion began to be discussed and many people grew nervous, the
economic importance of military bases became a major campaign issue. In the first chief
executive election in Okinawa and the general election, simultaneously held in November
1968, the voters were asked to make a choice between two options, “war or sweet pota
toes.”
The All-Okinawa Military Employees’ Trade Union became increasingly militant in
the late 1960s.^’ Formed by eleven smaller unions in 1963, it had grown to be the largest
labor union in the Ryukyus by 1967 with a membership of 16,500. One of its principal
targets was CA Ordinance No. 116 and, then Ordinance No. 63 which High Commis
sioner Unger, immediately before his departure, had proclaimed as its replacement. While
USCAR extolled the new law as a marked improvement over the old one, the union criti
cized it as being even more restrictive than Ordinance No. 116, something that would
“turn the clock 50 years back.”
Originally issued in English only, the proposed ordinance prohibited “all persons”
from picketing and conducting rallies or demonstrations with the aim or effect of interfer
ing with the operation of the military bases or “essential industries” (i.e., military trans
portation, utilities, or medical facilities). It would be illegal for any person, labor organi
zation or its representative to “interfere with employees’ access” to their work place or to
engage in any activities that might interfere with the operation of the military bases or
essential industries. Penalties consequent upon an offense—a fine, imprisonment or
both—were more severe than those under Ordinance No. 116. Unger’s announcement
infuriated military workers so much that they voted to join an island-wide “general
strike” scheduled for early February to demand the removal of B-52s and the discontinua
tion of the visits of nuclear submarines to Okinawan ports.
The U.S. Civil Administration put off implementing the new ordinance indefinitely
pending further review. Leaders of the Prefectural People’s Joint Struggle Council for the
Protection of Human Lives, representing 140 organizations, called off the general strike
at the last minute after Chief Executive Yara pleaded with them to cancel it “in the inter
est of the people’s welfare.” Instead, the council staged a mass rally and demonstrations
around Kadena Air Base, and adopted resolutions demanding the withdrawal of B-52s.
The Japanese government had promised to negotiate with Washington “in all sincerity”
for their removal “in the not too distant future” and pressed Yara to make a decision on
that basis.However, they were to continue their bombing missions from Okinawa until
1970.
Increasingly, military workers turned their attention to their own working conditions
and resorted to strikes in order to win at least some of their demands. In June 1969, union
members picketed at most of the gates to military installations and marched to the
USARYIS Headquarters in a one-day walk-out, demanding a wage increase, larger sev
erance pay and basic labor rights. The U.S. forces announced that disciplinary penalties
would be imposed on the absentees, ranging from a letter of reprimand to a short suspen
sion and, in the few cases of repeated violations, dismissal. The union threatened another
strike. Confrontation was avoided when they concluded a “peace pact” whereby the em-

^^For the history of the union, see Kosuke Uehara, Kichi Okinawa no Kuto (Tokyo; Soko, 1982).
^®Prime Minister Sato’s statement at a press conference, 29 January 1969.
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ploying agencies moderated or withheld their planned disciplinary actions and the union
pledged not to strike or demonstrate against the U.S. forces until the following February.
Subsequently, the U.S. forces offered, and the union accepted, a 17-percent wage in
crease and a substantial raise in separation allowances.
The union also staged a strike for a year-end bonus against an Okinawan contractor
performing custodial services for the U.S. Army Hospital in spite of a USCAR warning
that medical treatment services were an “essential industry” under Ordinance No. 116,
thereby making a strike illegal. The Army canceled the contract, the company dismissed
fifty-seven workers, and the contract went to another firm which eventually hired them.
Other U.S. forces contractors became similar targets and agreed to pay bonuses, a cus
tomary supplement to salaries in Okinawa and mainland Japan.
The Okinawans employed by a local stevedoring company to work at U.S. military
ports were also dissatisfied with their wages and working conditions. They organized the
Military Port Employees Labor Union in 1968 and threatened to take leave en masse on
December 26 and 27. The union called off the absentee tactic when U.S. forces decided
to increase the number of military personnel working as stevedores to forestall its effects,
but it went ahead with a strike in May and June. While other military personnel were
called in to augment the regular American military stevedores to maintain port opera
tions, the company and the union continued their negotiations until they settled the dis
pute, ending a nineteen-day work stoppage. Since the union’s demand for a guaranteed
minimum monthly wage remained unsettled after a series of further negotiations, how
ever, it resorted to a work-to-rule campaign in September. Despite temporary augmenta
tion of the labor force with military personnel, the tactic affected essential operations at
Naha military port so seriously that U.S. forces had to send for two companies of military
stevedores from the United States. The dispute was finally resolved the next month, and
the American stevedores left the island in December.
Peace between the U.S. forces and their Okinawan employees did not last long. In
December 1969, the Joint Services Committee announced that “reductions-in-force
(RIFs),” affecting 1,900 to 2,800 civilian employees (including 350 Americans and sixty
third-country nationals), would be carried out as part of the Pentagon’s world-wide
budget-cutting measures. American military units all over the world were subject to re
ductions, deactivations and withdrawals as a consequence of the reduction of defense
expenditures under the Nixon Doctrine.
The United States faced a serious recession, unemployment, federal budget cuts, a
steady drain on its gold reserves, a major balance-of-trade deficit, and the devaluation of
the dollar. The number of U.S. forces persoimel and their dependents in Okinawa de
clined sharply, largely as a result of air force reduction and realignment of bases in the
western Pacific. Winged Mace-B missiles, for example, were withdrawn and the 498th
Tactical Missile Group was deactivated in October 1970.
The announcement of personnel reductions so unsettled the military workers that the
union picketed at the gates of all U.S. forces facilities for two days in January 1970 de
manding that the dismissal notices be withdrawn. U.S. forces provided non-union mem
bers with beds for overnight stay on base and restored the dismissals that had been can
celed as part of the “peace pact.” With no progress in sight, union members walked out
and picketed again later in the month, this time for five days. The dispute was settled by
an agreement to reduce the penalties that had been announced by the U.S. forces and to
extend the peace pledge for ninety days. The U.S. forces moderated their position further
upon advice from Carl Glewlow, the Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense For Civilian
Personnel Policy who visited Okinawa in April to review the situation. They decided not
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to take disciplinary action against employees solely for having participated in strikes. “It
was concluded,” High Commissioner Lampert remarked, “that strict enforcement of the
no-strike provision of CA Ordinance 116 was not feasible under the circumstances and in
view of the approaching reversion of Okinawa to Japan under which base workers would
have the right to strike.”^’Military workers continued to hold strikes in 1971 and early
1972, the longest one lasting more than a month, in protest against job cuts, reductions in
working hours, and other cost-cutting measures.
The cutbacks in military expenditures adversely affected the Okinawan economy
which had become heavily dependent on income from U.S. military installations and per
sonnel, from such sources as wages and salaries, contractual arrangements, land rentals,
and sales of goods to military personnel and their dependents. With an estimated 55 to 60
percent of people’s income coming from these military sources, the budget cuts cast
shadows over Okinawa’s future.
Economic uncertainty was worsened by an underlying ambivalence among many
Okinawans toward the Japanese government. Fringe groups calling for postponement or
cancellation of the reversion or for independence, emerged, although they never won the
support of any significant segment of the population. Tsugumasa Kiyuna, also known as
Tsai Chang, who, with the support of Chiang Kai-shek, had organized an association in
Keelung in 1950 to demand the independence of the Ryukyus, persisted with some of his
activities in Taiwan and Okinawa through the early years of the 1960s.'''’ In October
1969, Jugo Thoma, a former chief executive, several of his former associates, and some
economic leaders formed “Okinawa for the Okinawans.” It demanded that the reversion
be postponed until after Okinawa’s economic foundation was firmly established. This
was on the grounds that it would damage ordinary people’s livelihoods if recession oc
curred in 1972.
Two years later, members of the group organized the Ryukyu Independence Party un
der Binsho Sakima, former chief secretary to Thoma. Describing the reversion as “noth
ing more than a political strategy for annexing the Ryukyus to Japan,” it declared that
“our fatherland is the Ryukyus” and called for the establishment of “a free and independent country.
Some dissident intellectuals such as Akira Arakawa criticized the reversion movement
for ignoring Japan’s past treatment of Okinawa and spreading unrealistic illusions about
the islands’ future under Japan, and advocated resistance to efforts to reintegrate the Oki
nawan people into the Japanese state.''^ The discovery of ocean-floor oil in the southwest
ern part of the Ryukyus also prompted the Republic of China not only to claim sover
eignty over the disputed Senkaku Islands but to renew its opposition to the U.S.-Japanese
agreement on Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.'*^ Presumably sanctioned by the Taiwan
’’Office of the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, The United States Civil Administration
of the Ryukyu Islands: Report, Vol. 20 (30 June 1971 to 15 May 1972), ix.
^Ryukyu Shimpo. 18 June 2000.
’’See an advertisement by Sakima in the Ryukyu Shimpo and the Okinawa Times on 11 May 1971,
which was translated into English by the Public Affairs Department of the USCAR. The advertise
ment was entitled “We Choose Independence! Appeal for the Establishment of‘Ryukyu Independ
ence Party’.”
’’See Akira Arakawa, Han-Kokka no Kyoku (Tokyo; Gendai Hyoron-sha, 1971).
“'’Foreign Ministry statement on 11 June 1971. Peking pledged to “liberate” Taiwan and restore its
control over Taiwan and the islands within its jurisdiction including Diaoyudao (the Senkakus)
(Foreign Ministry statement on 30 December 1971). For the Japanese government’s views and
Chinese statements, see the Foreign Ministry’s Information and Culture Bureau, ed., “Senkaku
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government, the press in Taiwan campaigned in June 1971 against the agreement and for
the independence of the Ryukyus.‘“' Newspapers there claimed that the administrative
transfer was against the will of the Okinawan people and that, since they had never aban
doned efforts to regain their independence, the Government of the Republic of China
reserved the right to speak for them on their future.'*^
Meanwhile, an unprecedented development was emerging in the foreign investment
sphere. In June 1967, the Pacific Gulf Oil Corporation announced plans to establish a
100,000-barrel-a-day oil refinery and a bulk storage and reshipment facility on the east
coast of central Okinawa. Over the next three months, Kaiser Cement and Gypsum Cor
poration, California Texas Oil Corporation (Caltex) and Esso Standard Eastern filed simi
lar applications with the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. Together, the projects would
be worth $167,000,000 and provide a production capacity of nearly 200,000 barrels a
day, or ten times as much as the Ryukjn Islands’ total requirements, including those of
U.S. forces.
Some Okinawans were concerned that the projects might be an American ploy to ex
ploit Okinawa economically, that the huge inflow of foreign capital would dislocate the
local economy, or that the proposed reclamation work, ongoing exhaust fumes and possi
ble oil spills would cause environmental problems. They had reason, they felt, to suspect
the motives of the U.S. multinational corporations whose moves were obviously sup
ported by the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands.
Since 1951, USCAR had maintained a virtual monopoly over the petroleum, oil and
lubricants (POL) required on the islands. It procured its POL needs from Caltex under a
series of contracts and marketed them locally through its Petroleum Distribution Activity
(PDA) which controlled all oil supplies to Okinawan corporate and private consumers
and international air and marine carriers. It also supplied some petroleum products to the
U.S. forces on the islands though some were procured directly by the U.S. Army.
Net earnings fi-om the operation were channeled into the USCAR general fund, which
was mainly used for community development programs. Moreover, although USCAR
had transferred to GRI the jurisdiction over foreign investment and importation of foreign
techniques into the islands in September 1965, it kept High Commissioner Ordinance No.
11 (Foreign Investment in the Ryukyu Islands) in effect. Foreign investors were now li
censed by the Chief Executive, upon recommendation by the GRI Foreign Investment
Board, but the board’s recommendations were subject to review by both the Chief Execu
tive and the U.S. Civil Administrator. And technically, the High Commissioner had a
veto power to override the Chief Executive’s decisions.”^
The GRI was inclined to welcome the investments. To break away from an economic
Shoto-nitsuite” (1972) on http://www.worldtimes.co.iD/gv/data/senkaku/main.html. accessed 19
January 2001.
'•''U.S. Embassy in Taipei to Secretary of State, “GRI Support for Ryukyuan Self-Determination,”
28 June 1971. NARA RG319 (History of USCAR), Box 22, F5. The Embassy believed that the
press campaign was “designed to show GRC [Government of the Republic of China] opposition to
[the] reversion treaty and [that it was] not [a] serious move to sponsor [the] Ryukyuan liberation
front.”
The Republic of China had supported the “self-determination” of the Okinawan people since the
1950s. See, for example, the U.S. Embassy in Taipei to the State Department, 14 February 1957
and 3 July 1961.
‘The GRI Legislature passed its own foreign investment bill in July 1968 to replace the ordinance
and Chief Executive Matsuoka signed it into law in September, but USCAR, considering it “ex
tremely negative and restrictive,” kept the ordinance in force.
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structure dependent on military bases and to build a viable and stable economy, it as
serted, Okinawa needed outside investment. Japanese companies, which had so far shown
tittle interest in extending their activities to Okinawa, argued that they would invest in the
island only if it were made a “paradise” for them with incentives such as provision of
low-interest funds and exemption from corporate taxes, but the Japanese government
would not agree to these terms.'*’ Under the circumstances, the GRJ regarded the Ameri
can investments as a godsend which would provide a great boon to the local economy in
the way of new jobs, land rentals and taxes."** It quickly approved Gulfs $60,000,000
investment proposal for the construction of a refinery and a storage terminal.
Alarmed, Tokyo immediately asked the GRI to reject applications by those companies
that had not invested in Japan already, to limit the ratio of foreign capital to less than 50
percent for the other companies, and to keep the total refining capacity in Okinawa within
a reasonable limit. In fact, the government would exert its efforts “at length to defeat the
attempts of the proposed investors in the name of national interests, instead of studying
what role these investments could play for the development of the Okinawan econ
omy.”'*’ It was concerned that the American firms were trying to evade Japan’s restrictive
foreign investment regulations by entering its market through the backdoor and gain a
foothold in the country and that approval of these refineries might throw open its doors to
other American companies such as automobile manufacturers. If authorized to operate in
Okinawa after its reversion, these firms would become the first wholly foreign-owned oil
companies in Japan, with the combined capacity to produce 10 percent of the country’s
refining output. Although the multinationals insisted that they were interested in Okinawa
as a relay point for expanding their markets in Southeast Asia, Tokyo put pressure on the
GRJ to disapprove the last-minute entry of such foreign capital or to approve it on condi
tion that the corporations would abide by Japan’s regulations after Okinawa’s reversion.
Caught between its own policy and pressure from Tokyo, the GRI acted so slowly and
cautiously on the other applications that High Commissioner F. T. Unger in December
1967 criticized the GRI for maintaining “outmoded and antiquated concepts of protec
tionism” against foreign investment. It was missing a great opportunity for creating a
thriving, modem and viable economy. “Few localities in the Western Pacific East Asia
area,” he declared, “have done so little to attract outside investment as the Ryukyus.”^’
One month later, on January 20, 1968, the GRI authorized the four companies to con
struct oil refineries.^' Together with Gulfs refinery and storage facilities, the five li
censes totaled $217,000,000. The companies had accepted the condition that they would
not retail in the Ryukyus any of the oil refined locally. They would operate only within
confined areas (designated as a free trade zone) and respect local trade regulations when
^^Ryukyu Ginko [Bank of the Ryukyus] Chosa-bu, ed., Sengo Okinawa Keizai-shi (Naha: Ryukyu
Ginko, 1984), 1045. Chapter 4 (pp. 1031-74) deals with the GRl’s policy toweu’d the proposed for
eign investments and the Japanese government’s various attempts to counter it.
‘**Deputy Chief Executive Saburo Odo suggested that the benefits of the proposed projects to Oki
nawans might be “comparatively small.” The GRI Tax Bureau suspected that arrangements would
be such that the American companies might not be required to pay corporate taxes.
*^Sengo Okinawa Keizai-shi, 1028-30.
^°A speech at the Harborview Club, Naha, 13 December 1967.
*'For information regarding the projects of the oil firms and their possible economic effects on
Okinawa, see pages 197-212 and 271-307 of Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, “Kogo Yochi
oyobi Shintoshi Chosa,” a study conducted at the request of the U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu
Islands under contract to the Okinawa District, Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army. The
study was completed in June 1969.
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allowed to export their products from the free trade zone into the Ryukyus for wholesale
purposes. They were also required to observe strict public nuisance regulations and to
accept local and Japanese capital for joint ventures.
Tokyo reacted quickly. It warned the four companies that it would impose the same
restrictions on the “rush-in” multinationals as applied to other foreign investors already
established in the country and that it would contain non-complying companies in a “free
trade zone” outside Japan’s domestic market.
In the meantime, the GRI continued to grant licenses to American companies. Be
tween July 1967 and June 1968, the government approved twenty-five other licenses with
a combined value of $2,400,000. The total, $240,000,000, compared with only
$21,000,000 authorized for foreign investment as of June 1967. American capital, which
at the end of June 1967 had $11,500,000 approved for investment in areas such as whole
sale and retail businesses, cement and cement products, soft drink bottling, and livestock
and poultry, jumped to $229,000,000 in one year. In comparison, the second-ranking
Japanese investments increased only marginally during the same period from $7,000,000
to $8,000,000.^^
Subsequent developments further heightened Okinawan expectations in July 1968,
when two local companies, Ryukyu Oil and Ryukyu Cement, joined Nippon Oil of To
kyo to establish Toyo Petroleum Refining, with 80 percent of the $10,000,000 construc
tion cost for a refining plant to be loaned from banks on suretyship of Caltex and Kaiser.
Caltex, Kaiser and Nippon Oil were to offer technical assistance to the joint venture
while Caltex would provide crude oil. Toyo Petroleum hoped to supply fhel oil to the
Ryukyuan Electric Power Corp. (REPC), a USCAR instrumentality which accounted for
90 percent of all oil consumption in the islands. The following month, REPC announced
international bidding to select one refinery that would meet all local demand for oil.
Then, in October, USCAR asked the oil companies to expedite construction of their re
fineries which would supply the oil requirements of the REPC for ten years and those of
the local market for three years.
The course of events, however, took a sudden and unexpected turn in February 1969
when USCAR chose Esso Standard (Okinawa) over Gulf Oil and Toyo Petroleum to re
place Caltex as the sole supplier of oil products to the REPC and the other local consum
ers. Caltex and Kaiser dropped their plans to construct their own refineries and did not
participate in the competition. The arrangements with Esso obviously ran contrary to the
GRI requirement that the oil companies manufacture petroleum products only for export
purposes and not for local retail consumption. As a result, an Okinawan newspaper
speculated that “the four firms aimed at the local military and civilian oil consumption
market in the first place under the guise of seeking expansion of their overseas markets.”^^
In August 1970, the High Commissioner approved the establishment of a port at Kim
Bay on the east coast and authorized Gulf Asian Terminals to “exclusively operate” the
port, its facilities, ancillary and auxiliary services, “control the movement” of all mer
chant vessels within the port, and at its discretion “prohibit the entry” of any such ves-

^^The High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Facts Book FYI967 (Naha: The United States
Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1967), 10-11, and Facts Book FY 1968, 10-10 (Naha:
The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1968).
”An Okinawa Times editorial, translated into English and reprinted in the Weekly Okinawa Times,
15 February 1969.
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sels.^'* Designated as the “Port Administration,” Gulf Asian Terminals was empowered to
appoint berthing masters, issue port regulations, install navigational aids, levy port ser
vice charges on vessels, while being exempt from any “tax, assessment, and levy, duty,
excise, rental, or other charge, fee, exaction, or imposition.” The High Ccommissioner
could use the port or its facilities at his discretion “in the event of a military or civil
emergency within the Ryukyu Islands.”
In the same year, the GRI authorized the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA)
to build a $100,000,000 aluminum smelter, Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation
to build a $1,600,000 electronics plant and Esso Standard Eastern to construct a number
of liquid petroleum gas tanks at a cost of $500,000. It also permitted Gulf Oil to increase
its investment in its oil refinery project by $15,000,000 and in its terminal project by
$1,000,000.
As of the end of June 1971, 377 foreign investment licenses had been issued, author
izing a total investment of $418,600,000, including $230,000,000 by the Okinawa Alu
minum Company, a joint venture among five Japanese companies. The proposed estab
lishment of the aluminum smelter placed Japan ahead of the United States for the first
time, $243,000,000 to $172,000,000, in authorized foreign investments.
When the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) threatened in Janu
ary 1971 to raise oil prices, Japan abruptly changed its policy toward the oil issue in Oki
nawa. In August, it announced a plan to build a so-called central terminal station (CTS)
on Miyagi-jima, a small island in Kim Bay, with fifty 100,000-ton tanks for storing oil
for domestic use. The plan called for the project, when completed, to become the largest
oil storage facility in the world, with the number of tanks doubled to 100 a month later, or
enough to meet Japan’s oil requirements for twenty days. This prompted the Arabian Oil
Company of Japan to apply for a license to invest $300,000,000 for the construction of an
oil refinery and bulk storage terminal, and the Kyodo Oil Company for a license to invest
$2,000,000 for a joint venture with Gulf Asian Terminals, both of which were granted.^^
Esso received a license to invest $20,500,000 to reclaim additional land and on it build
nine bulk storage tanks. Gulf Oil Corporation budgeted $15,000,000 for the added cost of
refinery construction, and Gulf Asian Terminals $3,500,000 for enlargement of its bulk
storage terminal. Gulf and Esso were permitted to remove their refineries from the free
trade zone restriction.
Esso completed its petroleum terminal facilities in December 1970 and a refinery on
Miyagi-jima, linked to the main island by a three-mile causeway, in 1972. The facilities
consisted of a sea berth and twelve tanks with a capacity of 640,000 barrels each. Gulf
Oil built its refinery in early 1972 on the same coast, complete with a steam generation
plant, crude oil distillation units capable of producing 80,000 barrels a day, marine deliv
ery facilities for reshipment by super tankers, and pipelines linked to Okinawan power
plants and military oil terminals many miles away.
In addition. National Semiconductor Corporation was authorized to invest $1,900,000
for the construction and operation of a facility to manufacture integrated circuits and
^‘'Civil Administration Directive No. 1, “Establishment of Kinwan Port,” 1 August 1970.
“when applications by Kyodo Oil, Okinawa Mitsubishi Development and Nansei Sekiyu (Oil)
were added, the total storage capacity planned by the Japanese corporations would reach
22,450,000 kiloliters or 14,120,000,000 barrels. This was more than four times the 3,140,000,000barrel ceiling established by the GRI which regarded the oil terminals as having few spillover ef
fects in terms of employment or industrialization. After the reversion, the Okinawa prefectural
government reconfirmed its policy, but no longer had the administrative power to impose it.
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semi-conductors, Ibusuki Kanko Company $1,250,000 for the construction of a tourist
hotel, Japan Airlines $600,000 for the development of a beach and golf course, and Nip
pon Cement Company $568,000 for purchasing an interest in the Ryukyu Cement Com
pany. By May 15, 1972, authorized investments had come to a total of $766,000,000.
In the end, however, most of the American corporations were forced either to abandon
their projects, switch to joint ventures with Japanese companies, or to scale back. AL
COA canceled its plans. Gulf went into a joint venture arrangement under which it would
control only 40 percent of the outstanding equity shares, with the rest held by Toho Oil
and Mitsubishi Chemicals. Esso and Fairchild entered into a 50-50 joint venture ar
rangement with Japanese companies.’* “[T]he island’s very real prospects for economic
development,” Thomas Howell argued, “have been sacrificed to the greater imperatives
of Japanese industrial policy.”’^
There were other issues awaiting a settlement. The disclosed presence of chemical
munitions in Okinawa prompted the GRI Legislature and other organizations to demand
their immediate removal. The Legislature called on the U.S. authorities to transfer court
jurisdiction and criminal investigation rights from USCAR to the GRI in cases involving
American military persoimel, and stop the establishment of a firing range in the moun
tainous northern area.
In 1970, public anger at the U.S. forces also built up in connection with the assault of
a high school girl by an American serviceman and the acquittal by a military court of
another serviceman who had killed an Okinawan pedestrian in a traffic accident. Ten
days after the court decision, a minor midnight traffic accident in Koza involving an
American driver and an Okinawan pedestrian attracted an angry crowd and touched off a
riot unprecedented in postwar Okinawa. More than eighty American vehicles with yellow
licence plates were overturned, burned or otherwise destroyed and some local business
establishments were damaged during the five-hour disturbance.
A group of people even penetrated a short distance into Kadena Air Base and set fire
to American school buildings. MPs used CS (tear) gas and fired warning shots into the air
to disperse the crowd. The U.S. forces imposed “security condition green one,” forbid
ding any of their personnel to enter Koza City until further notice, and High Commis
sioner Lampert warned that the removal of chemical munitions could be postponed if
such incidents occurred again.
The USARYIS director of intelligence reported that “the majority of the Special Pro
jects Group [believed] that the Koza incident began spontaneously.” He added, however,
that they also thought that “leftist elements [who had participated several hours before in
a public demonstration protesting against the storage of chemical munitions] . . . incite[d]
the onlookers to violent action.”’* The Air Force commander in Okinawa, however, saw
“in 1972, Esso Standard, 50 percent owned by Esso Eastern and the remaining 50 percent share by
General Sekiyu (Oil) and Sumitomo Chemicals, was renamed Nansei Sekiyu (Oil) Company. Cur
rently, 87.5 percent is owned by General Oil and the rest by Sumitomo Chemicals. After reversion.
Gulf Oil Corporation’s refinery was reorganized into a joint venture known as Okinawa Sekiyu
Seisei (Refinery), 45 percent owned by Gulf, 45 percent by Japan’s Toho Oil and 10 percent by
Mitsubishi Chemicals. It was acquired entirely by Idemitsu Kosan in 1980.
”Thomas R. Howell, “Foreclosing A Japanese Hong Kong: Okinawa, 1967-1972,” Japan Policy
Research Institute (JPRI) Occasional Paper No. 15 (March 2000). http://www.ipri.org/ipri/Drotected
/op 16.html. accessed 5 January 2000.
*®From Col. William J. Tmxal to the Commanding General (Lampert), USARYIS, 20 December
1970. Okinawa-shi, Beikoku ga Mita Koza Bodo: Koza Riot as Seen by the U.S. (Okinawa-shi,
Okinawa: Okinawa City Government, 1999), 94.
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it a little differently. “Based on all available factual information,” he commented, “it ap
pears likely at this time that the . . . civil disturbance was a spontaneous, unplaimed ex
plosion of underlying anti-American feelings.” He noted that such “seemingly insignifi
cant” incidents as “taxi-cab robberies, drunken driving by Americans, and other ‘crimes
of violence’” had been extensively reported on by the local news media over the previ
ous several months and “likely created an ‘ugly American’ image in the minds of many
Okinawans.”^® In Okinawa and mainland Japan, the incident was generally believed to be
an outburst of the people’s pent-up and smoldering resentment toward the American mili
tary occupation symbolized by the presence of poisonous gases and B52s and the acquit
tal of the serviceman. Police took fifty-two persons into custody and subsequently sent
thirty-four of them to the prosecutor’s office on charges of aggravated and simple assault,
destruction of U.S. government property under Ordinance No. 144, and obstruction of the
performance of police duties under the GRI criminal code. None was charged with riot
ing. Ten adults were subsequently indicted, while charges against the rest were dis
missed.*®
How much impact the incident may have had on the reversion negotiations between
Tokyo and Washington is not clear. Prime Minister Sato asked the Okinawan people to
refi'ain fi’om taking actions which might interfere with the smooth process of reversion.
Foreign Minister Aichi and Armin Meyer, the U.S. ambassador, met on December 30 to
discuss the situation on Okinawa. A U.S. Embassy press guidance memorandum prepared
for the meeting emphasized that the “intensive work” on reversion had not been affected
by the “unfortunate” incident, and that the chemical munitions would be removed “as
expeditiously as possible.”*' To prevent a recurrence of similar incidents, it pledged that
the two governments would strengthen their “close collaboration with each other and all
those concerned” in Japan, the United States and Okinawa. “To that end,” the guidance
stated, “full and fi-ank consideration will be taken of the background factors [that led] to
the incident including the problem of adherence to law and order by all those living in
Okinawa. The criminal jurisdiction will continue to be studied, including possibilities of
improvement in its exercise and operation. The U.S. is giving consideration to expanded
use of the revised memorandum of understanding for improvement for investigative pro
cedures signed on November 8, 1970, and to the establishment of a joint U.S.-GRJ com
mission to study enhancing highway safety on Okinawa.”

Reversion, with Bases Intact
The escalation of the war in Vietnam and the consequent anti-war movement in the
United States forced President Johnson to withdraw his candidacy for reelection in March
1968. Richard Nixon won the 1968 presidential election on campaign promises to bring
peace with honor in Vietnam and to unite a country divided by the war and racial ten
sions.
Negotiations between Japan and the United States on reversion and related issues
’’Comments by Lt. Col. John H. Kramb, USAF, “Department of Defense Intelligence Information
Report,” 20 December 1970. Ibid., 103-104.
“The Naha District Court found four of the ten guilty in June 1975. They appealed against the de
cision; the Fukuoka High Court dismissed the appeal the following year. One of the remaining six
died during the trials, three disappeared, and two were found guilty of crimes unrelated to the inci
dent. Hiroshi Hosaka, “Kaisetsu Koza Jumin Bodo; Commentary: Koza Civil Riot,” ibid., 12-13.
’'U.S. Embassy to Secretary of State, 30 December 1970. Ibid., 197-98.
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moved ahead quickly. In November 1968, Sato was ready to comply with the continued
storage of nuclear weapons and free use of bases by the United States in exchange for
President Nixon’s acceptance of his agreement with Johnson.®^ By January 1969, how
ever, Sato was determined to press for an Okinawa without nuclear weapons and with
“homeland-level” restrictions on the bases. This was against the advice of foreign minis
try officials such as Togo and Shimoda. These officials believed that, in order to achieve
an early reversion, the government should permit the United States to re-introduce such
weapons into Okinawa after reversion in times of crisis.In March, however, Sato an
nounced to the Diet that it was his policy to pursue a reversion with homeland-level re
strictions and without nuclear weapons.
For its part, the United States was confronted with a serious economic crisis blamed in
part on years of overseas military commitments such as in Vietnam. In July 1969, the
recently elected President announced the Nixon Doctrine which called for allied nations,
particularly those in Asia, to take more responsibility for their own defense; the United
States would no longer commit its forces to fight in Asian conflicts but would confine
itself to supplying weapons and technical assistance. “Asian hands,” he declared, “must
shape the Asian future.” The President proceeded to prepare a phased withdrawal of
American ground troops from Viemam in a so-called Viemamization policy.
He also sought detente with both Moscow and Beijing, resulting in the strategic arms
limitation talks (SALT) and a new four-power accord on Berlin with the Soviet Union, as
well as the establishment of diplomatic relations with China. At the same time, the gov
ernment imposed wage and price controls and suspended the convertibility of dollars to
gold, allowing the U.S. currency to float against the deutsch mark and yen in an attempt
to prop up the American financial position and force its allies help to stabilize the U.S.
balance of payments.
It was in the middle of these developments that, in January 1969, Nixon appointed
Henry Kissinger as his national security advisor and directed the National Security Coun
cil’s inter-agency group for East Asia to prepare a paper, for consideration by the NSC,
on “alternative U.S. policies toward Japan.” Significantly, the issues identified in U.S.Japanese relations included Okinawa’s reversion, American bases in Japan, the U.S.Japan security treaty, and economic relations between the two countries.^
Apparently based on this study and after further consideration by the NSC review
group, Nixon reached a decision by the end of May on the American position and signed
a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM 13)—a “top-secret” directive to the
State Department outlining Washington’s strategy for negotiations with Japan.
It stated that, first, he was prepared to agree to Okinawa’s reversion by 1972 “pro
vided there is agreement in 1969 on the essential elements governing U.S. military use
and provided detailed negotiations are completed at that time.” Secondly, the negotiation
should be based on “our desire for maximum free conventional use of the military bases,
particularly with respect to Korea, Taiwan and Viemam.” Thirdly, it should be based on
“our desire to retain nuclear weapons, but indicating that the President is prepared to con^^Tamotsu Takase, Daremo Kakanakatta Shuno Gaiko no Uchimaku (Tokyo: Toyokeizai-sha,
1991), 34.
*^Togo, 157, and Takezo Shimoda, Sengo Nihongaiko no Shogen, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Gyosei Mondai
Kenkyujo, 1985), 177-78.
“Kissinger to Secretaries of State, Defense and the Treasury, the Director of Central Intelligence,
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21 January 1969. NARA RG 273 NSSM Box 2,
NSSM 5.
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sider, at the final stages of negotiations, the withdrawal of the weapons while retaining
emergency storage and transit rights, if other elements of the Okinawan agreement are
satisfactory.”*^ By October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had “reconciled” themselves to the
notion that reversion, without nuclear weapons, was inevitable.**
By the time Sato and Nixon met at the White House in November 1969, the two gov
ernments had reached an understanding that Japan would pay the United States
$685,000,000 for “civilian assets it will acquire on reversion” and for “certain costs con
nected with reversion.”*’ Specifically, Japan agreed to purchase “such income-producing
properties as the electric power company, a bank and a POL [petroleum, oil and lubri
cants] distribution facility,” and roads and buildings “constructed for civilian and joint
civil-military use.”
Japan also agreed to “action which will neutralize the adverse balance of payments
impact” resulting from the impending dollar-to-yen conversion in Okinawa. Japan would
“assume liabilities of various sorts for which the United States would otherwise be re
sponsible,” such as “land rental payments, social security obligations to Okinawans em
ployed by the U.S. and our obligation to restore leased land ... to its original condition.”
In addition, it would “pay any costs of relocation of facilities made necessary by the re
version agreement.” The United States further “made it clear” to Tokyo that “we are anx
ious to protect the interests of non-Ryukyuan [i.e., mainly American] businesses currently
operating in Okinawa. Japan did not want to appear to be “buying back” Okinawa and,
therefore, they agreed “discussion of these problems prior to the Nixon-Sato meeting
should remain ‘secret forever.’” The Mainichi Shimbun disclosed in June 1971 the exis
tence of a secret agreement between the two governments that Japan would take on the
American responsibility to pay the $4,000,000 required to provide for the restoration of
some of the U.S.-held land to its original state.
In 1998, Professor Masaaki Gabe of the University of the Ryukyus discovered a U.S.
govermnent document confirming that Japan had secretly agreed to shoulder not only the
four million dollars but also an additional $160,00,0000 for the improvement and reloca
tion of military facilities. The Japanese government has, however, denied that such a se
cret deal exists.**
The confidential memorandum also disclosed that the United States had constructed
and maintained “a complex of military bases and facilities at an original cost of more
than $600 million, and which have an estimated replacement value of $2.5 to $3 billion.”
Although the implications of this statement were not clear, it was assumed from the con
text that Japan was willing to take responsibility for certain base-related expenditures. It
added that the United States would continue to use its military complex after reversion.
On November 21, the two leaders issued a communique stating that “the two govern
ments would immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for
**National Security Council to Secretaries of State, Defense and the Treasury, and Director of Cen
tral Intelligence, 28 May 1969. The disclosure of this decision by Hedrick Smith in the New York
Times (3 July 1969) so upset U. Alexis Johnson, the Undersecretary of State, that under his direc
tion and at his suggestion an investigation was conducted at the State and Defense Departments to
discover the source of the information. Elliot L. Richardson to the President, 4 June 1969, NARA
RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-69, Box 2400.
**Johnson, The Right Hand ofPower, 544.
*’NSDM 13, “Background—Okinawa—^Economic and Financial Issues of Reversion,” 28 May
1969, Nixon Project NSC Files, VIP Visit Box 925 F3.
Ryukyu Shimpo, 24 July 1998.
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accomplishing the early reversion . . . without detriment to the security of the Far East
including Japan.” The consultations, they agreed, would be expedited in order to make
the reversion a reality “during 1972.” In June 1970, the Japan-U.S. security treaty, which
would be applicable to Okinawa after reversion, was automatically extended.
The terms of the reversion now became an overriding concern to the people: among
them, the future status of U.S. military bases on the island loomed large. With regard to
nuclear weapons, Sato explained the Japanese people’s “particular sentiment” against
them and the Japanese policy based on this feeling. Nixon offered an assurance that re
version would be carried out “in a manner consistent with” Japanese policy. In a confi
dential minute to the joint communique, the President affirmed the U.S. government’s
“intention ... to remove all the nuclear weapons from Okinawa by the tie of actual rever
sion.” He added, however, that, “in time of great emergency,” it “will require [their] re
entry ... in Okinawa” with prior consultation with Japan. “In time of great emergency,”
it continued, the United States “also requires the standby retention and activation ... of
nuclear storage locations” at several bases in Okinawa.®’ Sato, in response, stated that the
Japanese government “will meet these requirements without delay when such prior con
sultation takes place.” Thus, the United States would not store nuclear weapons on Oki
nawa without the Japanese government’s agreement, but the Japanese government would
favorably consider a United States request for deployment of such weapons in Okinawa.
Secretary of State William Rogers and the Deputy Secretary of Defense testified to the
Senate that “we will not have nuclear weapons on Okinawa after reversion” and assured
that “if there are any nuclear weapons there now, they will not be there after reversion.”™
Finally, on June 17, 1971, the two governments reached an agreement to accomplish
the return of administrative rights over the Ryukyus to Japan during 1972, subject to the
conclusion of specific arrangements and approval by the Diet and Congress. Japan would
now, once again, assume “full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all powers
and administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the
Ryukyu Islands.”
At the same time, the agreement committed Japan to grant the United States “the use
of military facilities and areas” in the Ryukyus in accordance with the security arrange
ments between the two countries. It exempted Washington from any obligation to restore
facilities and areas to their original condition and Tokyo from any obligation to compen
sate the United States for any improvements it had made in facilities and areas to be re
turned to Japan. Japan waived all claims, including those of Okinawans, against the
United States and its nationals “arising from the presence, operations or actions of [its]
forces or authorities.” Japan recognized “the validity of all acts and omissions” made
under the U.S. administration and “the validity of. . . final judgments in civil cases” ren
dered by any court in the Ryukyus before reversion. The properties of the USCAR-owned
corporations would be transferred to the Japanese government, as would other U.S. prop
erties located off-base; Japan would pay Washington $320,000,000 for these assets and
the extra costs the United States would bear in such areas as employment after reversion.
The Voice of America would continue to operate for five years.
At the signing ceremony in Tokyo, Sato declared that he was “indeed gratified” at the
agreement which would accomplish something “so long awaited for by our people.” He
*^Wakaizumi, "The Best Course Available, ” 396.
™Department of the Army to RUHHRGA/CINCUSARPAC, 22 October 1971, CINCUSARPAC to
RUEADWD, Department of the Army, 12 November 1971. KARA RG 319 (History of USCAR),
Box24F3.
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declared himself “deeply moved” when considering “how the people of Okinawa must
feel about this great event.” Referring back e to his 1965 assertion that the postwar period
would not end for Japan until Okinawa was returned to the “mother country,” he added
that he was “confident” that Japan could now truly be said to “have emerged from the
postwar period” and was “ready to move forward to face the new era of the 1970s.” The
ceremony was attended by members of his cabinet, Armin H. Meyer, the American am
bassador, and Lieutenant General James B. Lampert, the U.S. high commissioner in the
Ryukyus.
Conspicuously absent, though, was Chief Executive Yara. Much to Tokyo’s embar
rassment, Yara had declined the Japanese government’s invitation on the grounds that he
was disappointed with the agreement in some important respects. In his message to the
GRI Legislature, delivered several days earlier, he had reiterated his opposition to rever
sion with American military bases intact, the deployment of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces
troops to the island, and to the extension of the Japan-U.S. security treaty to Okinawa.
Yara stated that the contents of the agreement were “far from the ardent wishes of the
prefecture’s people.” Instead of reflecting their opinions, he said, the agreement caused
“suspicions and complaints” over the status of the military bases, the claims for damages,
and the continued presence of the Voice of America, the Seventh Psychological Opera
tions Group, and other special units.
On June 17, Yara expressed his gratitude to Prime Minister Sato and other officials
for their “hard work and efforts” in reaching the agreement, but repeated that it was
hardly satisfactory from the standpoint of the Okinawan people. “It was my sincere
hope,” he stated, “that, when Okinawa returned to Japan, our anxiety related to military
bases would be dissolved at long last or that, even if this hope was not realized immedi
ately, the form of the bases would change so much as to reduce the anxiety substantially.”
In the agreement, however, the two leaders “recognized the important role the United
States bases in Okinawa played.” He expressed skepticism over the U.S. facilities which
would remain, including the enormous Kadena air base, various Marine, navy and army
bases and a host of other imits such as the Seventh Psychological Operations Group and
the SR-71 (Blackbird) reconnaissance unit that did not exist in the mainland, would have
hondonami or “homeland-level” status. Yara also complained that the Japanese govern
ment had agreed to pay for assets that legitimately belonged to the Okinawan people and
should be handed over to them gratuitously as a matter of course.
A mass rally held by the Okinawa Reversion Council on that evening called for the re
jection of the agreement “which ignored the [wishes] of the people,” and for “full rever
sion” without military bases and nuclear weapons. The GRI Legislature, attended only by
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, adopted a resolution on June 18 expressing its grati
tude to the Japanese and American governments for having achieved “a great success in
peaceful diplomacy” while a crowd of protesters confronted the riot police outside. That
night, the Association of Business Owners held a lantern parade in Naha under a banner
that was somewhat less than celebratory; “It’s Reversion. Let’s Work Hard.”
Most Okinawans were not happy with the agreement. What they had been aspiring for
all those years was to become Japanese nationals with the same constitutional rights,
privileges and obligations as anybody else, no more and no less. In their minds, their de
sire was not something to be bargained for an increased Japanese military commitment or
the continued presence of U.S. bases. Prime Minister Sato had stated in December 1969
that it was unprecedented in world history for a country to achieve peaceful recovery of a
territory it had lost in a war. To many Okinawans, however, it was simply a matter of
Japan reclaiming its sovereign land and those Japanese nationals it had placed in trust
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with a foreign power, restoring them to their appropriate status.
An opinion poll conducted among Okinawans a week after the signing of the rever
sion agreement showed nearly a half of the respondents dissatisfied with it, because there
was no prospect of Okinawa being free of nuclear weapons or of military bases being
reduced upon return to Japan. Roughly the same percentage of people wanted the Voice
of America, the SR-71 reconnaissance unit, and the Seventh Psychological Operations
Group to be removed upon reversion. Nearly 64 percent felt uneasy and 43 percent pes
simistic about their future after reversion.’’
On November 24, the agreement was approved in the Japanese House of Councilors
by the majority Liberal Democratic Party, but in the absence of the three representatives
from Okinawa who boycotted the plenary session in protest, together with members from
the Socialist and Communist parties. Yara criticized the LDP’s unilateral action which he
said was taken without sufficient consideration of the Okinawan people’s plight, and
called for renegotiation. The Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council released a statement
protesting the “forced passage” of the accord and subsequently held a rally denouncing it.
The House also passed, this time with the support of all parties, a resolution calling for
de-nuclearization and reduction of military bases in Okinawa. By the end of December,
the House of Representatives had also endorsed the accord and passed the required legis
lation. In the United States, the Senate had already ratified the agreement on November
10 by an overwhelming majority: eighty-four in favor to six against, with ten abstentions.
As High Commissioner Lampert noted, however, Okinawan people were gripped with
“ambivalent feelings, anxiety and tension.” They “look forward to the end of American
administration and their return to Japan; but, at the same time, they are uncertain, and
they worry about how reversion will affect them personally. Most Okinawans would like
to see greater reductions in our bases; but, at the same time, they fear that there might be
large-scale reductions in the jobs provided by our bases without other jobs being avail
able. The Okinawan economy and standard of living have been heavily dependent on our
bases as well as various forms of U.S. economic assistance which will terminate on re
version. Okinawans are concerned lest Japan not provide the economic assistance which
they believe will be required. Presently, the Okinawan people are particularly apprehen
sive that they might suffer serious economic losses as a result of the President’s recently
announced measures to protect the dollar and Japan’s decision to float the yen.”” He
trivialized the military base issue by linking it to “jet noises and other activities . . . which
unavoidably cause inconvenience and irritation” and which “a vocal minority in the civil
ian population” exploited to “completely oppose our presence.” But, obviously, it was a
much bigger and more deep-rooted issue of serious concern to most Okinawans, as indi
cated by opinion polls and Yara’s victorious election platform in 1968 demanding the
removal of U.S. bases. Lampert acknowledged that “jet noises and other activities” such
as “thoughtless acts of misconduct and offenses by Americans against Okinawans added
fuel to the fire.”
Workers expressed their anger and fimstration on November 10, 1971, the second an
niversary of the Sato-Nixon joint communique, by staging a twenty-four hour “general
strike,” the biggest ever held in Okinawa, involving eighty unions and more than an esti
mated 90,000 participants. Schools across Okinawa were closed, the bus service was can
celled, and gates to military bases were picketed. One riot policeman was burned to death
when radical students hurled a petrol bomb. U.S. forces on the island invoked “condition
^'Ryukyu Shimpo, 11 July 1971.
’’Speech before the Fort Buckner Officer’s Wives Club, 10 September 1971.
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green one,” placing Naha and its neighboring Machinato commercial area off-limits to its
personnel for twelve hours. Japan’s decision to float the yen sharply increased commod
ity prices in Okinawa and added to people’s anger at the central government which re
fused to compensate for the losses. Demonstrators “snake-danced” through the streets of
Tokyo in protest against the agreement.
On January 7, 1972, Sato and Nixon signed an agreement in San Clemente, Califor
nia, to effect the reversion on May 15. The President “indicated the [U.S. government’s]
intention ... to confirm upon reversion” that its assurances about nuclear weapons in
Okinawa “have been folly carried out.”’^ The Prime Minister thanked Nixon and then
“explained . . . why he felt it necessary” to have the U.S. bases on the island, after rever
sion, “realigned or reduced to the extent possible, particularly those in areas densely
populated or closely related to industrial development.” The President assured him that
“these factors would be taken folly into consideration in working out . . . mutually ac
ceptable adjustments” on a basis “consistent with the purpose” of the security treaty.
In the summer of 1971, the Department of Defense shipped chemical munitions,
13,000 tons of mustard and nerve gas, from Okinawa to Johnston Island, an unincorpo
rated U.S. territory in the central Pacific which had been used for nuclear-weapons tests
until 1962. Nuclear weapons were to be removed from Okinawa by November 1971.
Plans called for a motor convoy to transport them from Army and Air Force storage loca
tions and Nike sites at Henoko and elsewhere to White Beach and then ship them to other
U.S. Army bases in the Pacific and to the Sierra Army Depot at Herlong, California.’''
Those at Kadena air base were to be air-lifted out of the island. A secret Department of
State background paper in December 1971, however, indicated that they still remained on
the island: “We are confident,” it stated, “that the weapons can be removed by midMay.”’^
On May 15, 1972, the Ryukyu Islands formally became Okinawa Prefecture again.
Ships at anchor and fire trucks sounded sirens at midnight to signal the beginning of a
new era. At twenty-two minutes past midnight. High Commissioner Lampert departed
from Kadena Air Base, symbolically terminating American occupation. The Ryukyu Po
lice were re-named Okinawa Prefectural Police at 5:30 a.m. in a ceremony which saw the
Japanese flag hoisted above the main office. At 6:15 a.m., the Prefectural Assembly—^the
former Ryukyu Legislature—opened its first session and adopted sixty bills before ad
journing thirty minutes later. At 7:30 a.m., the United States returned Naha Airport to
Japan. At 8:10 a.m., Yara stamped the governor’s seal for the time on the documents
passing the assembly’s bills into law. At 8:45 a.m., the plaque on the old GRI executive
building declaring that it was “dedicated by the United States of America to the people of
the Ryukyu Islands” was removed. Ten minutes later, the prefectural government build
ing nameplate was unveiled. At 9 a.m., conversion of U.S. dollar prices into Japanese yen
prices began throughout the prefecture. Later in the morning, the postal stamp commemo
rating the reversion went on sale across the country, some 40 members of the Japanese
Self-Defence Forces held an inaugural ceremony for the advanced administrative unit,
and NHK began televising its educational programs in Okinawa.
In Tokyo, the government declared its determination to work toward creating a
“Joint Statement of Japanese Prime Minister Sato and U.S. President Nixon,” San Clemente, 7
January 1972.
’''Department of the Army to RUHHRGA/CINCUSARPAC, 22 October 1971.
’^“Removal of Nuclear Weapons from Okinawa: Background Paper,” unspecified date, December
1971, NSA Record Number 80222.

164

Democracy Betrayed

“peaceful and affluent” prefecture, and closed its offices for the afternoon to celebrate the
occasion nationally. Prime Minister Sato called the reunion “a historic accomplishment,”
congratulated the Okinawan people for their “perseverance, labor and wisdom” which
had brought it about, expressed appreciation for the pains they had endured over such a
long time, and pledged the government to work to ensure that reversion would bring last
ing and tangible benefits to the population. Ataru Funada, speaker of the House of Repre
sentatives, spoke of his and the nation’s pleasure at having Okinawa back and wished the
Okinawan people peace and prosperity. At the same time, Sato stated that he was “fully
aware” that the people, upon reversion, had “various worries and many demands,” while
Funada acknowledged that Okinawa, which had suffered greatly during and after the war,
was still ridden with problems.
Indeed, Okinawa was not in a festive mood. While the government hosted a com
memorative ceremony in Naha in the morning, attended by 1,200 invited guests and
linked to the national ceremony in Tokyo by simultaneous broadcasting, the Okinawa
Reversion Council held a protest demonstration in the afternoon. Some 10,000 teachers,
company workers, students, women and others rallied in the rain around the council
which described the reversion as “a Ryukyu shobun.”^^ Later in the afternoon. Governor
Yara told the press of “a very critical phase,” “a harsh future,” and “many difficult prob
lems” confronting the people.
One immediate problem that needed to be addressed was a consequence of the dollarto-yen currency conversion and consequent price increases. The conversion took place at
190 locations throughout the prefecture between May 15 and May 20. Allowed to float,
the dollar had depreciated so much by then that the exchange rate was set at ¥305. A total
of $134,790,000 in cash and $1,242,560,000 in savings were exchanged for
$410,539,000,000. The government paid the difference of $61,883,000 in cash and
$50,013,000 in savings (net assets) that had been registered with the government in Oc
tober 1971 when the official rate was fixed at ¥360. It did not compensate for the remain
ing loss of the equivalent of ¥2,287,230,000.
Inflation affected people further in other ways. The prefectural government and some
major companies, as they had previously agreed, converted the wages of their employees
at an exchange rate of ¥360. Public utility charges and bus and taxi fares were also ex
changed at that rate. Cleaning shops, public bathhouses, restaurants, hotels, barber shops
and other businesses that consumed gas, electricity and water in large quantities raised
their prices accordingly. But for most other transactions and labor costs, the exchange
rate was fixed at ¥305. As a result, most wage earners lost ¥55 for each dollar, while peo
ple in debt gained ¥55. The new prices of most daily essentials were either raised to the
next round figure or converted at rates substantially higher, further affecting families.
Salters lost their business to the nationalized Japanese salt monopoly. Japan’s AntiProstitution Law, in effect in Okinawa for the first time, threatened to force the prosti
tutes—estimated at more than 10,000—out of business or into the underground market.
Many people were now burdened with huge new debts.
On the other hand, Tokyo decided to exempt, deduct or otherwise keep most of the
taxes at the current rates for one to five years, and to control the prices of rice, powdered
milk, sugar and petroleum. The government also took measures to provide assistance to
those who had lost jobs as a result of the reversion, permit special import quotas for par’®Historically, “Ryukyu shobun” refers to the “forced annexation” of the islands to Japan in 187279. The term was used here also to refer to Japan’s agreement in 1952 to allow the United States to maintain
direct control over the Ryukyus.
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ticular items, and to revamp the University of the Ryukyus as a national institution with
an attached general hospital. National health insurance, welfare annuity insurance, work
men’s accident compensation insurance, unemployment insurance and other such systems
were to be applied to the Okinawan people without becoming disadvantageous to them.
Metric distances were introduced on road signs, though Okinawans would continue to
drive on the right side for several years.’^ A marine exposition was to be held in northern
Okinawa in 1975 to commemorate the reversion as well as to activate the economy.^*
As Yara pointed out, however, the biggest problem of all was the continued presence
of the American bases. Given the small size of these crowded islands, the military instal
lations were out of alt proportion. The United States still maintained 42,000 troops and
dependents and eighty-seven military facilities spreading over 59,000 acres, roughly 11
percent of the entire prefecture and close to 20 percent of the main island of Okinawa.
About 35 percent of the land occupied by the U.S. forces was privately owned and most
of the rest belonged to the national or municipal governments. In contrast to mainland
Japan, where nationally-owned land accommodated 88 percent of the American military
facilities. Bases remained a dominant and irritating feature of Okinawa.
On May 15, 1972, Secretary Rogers assured Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda that
Okinawa had been returned “in a state consistent” with its policy on nuclear weapons.’*
A U.S. government document later confirmed that the weapons were removed from Oki
nawa, but not until June 1972, a month after reversion.** Suspicions lingered in the minds
of many people that the weapons might still be stored there.
“The major question,” as U. Alexis Johnson, the American ambassador to Japan re
called later, “was handled to the mutual satisfaction of Japan and the United States and
became a positive factor in their relations.”*' The only group, it seems, whose satisfaction
was excluded from this exercise in mutual back-slapping was the Okinawan people them
selves.

^^The change-over was carried out on 30 July, 1978, when all moving vehicles stopped at 5:50 a.m.
and then moved to the left of the roadway during the next ten minutes. Late-comers simply kept to
the left.
’®Thirty-six countries and a number of Japanese corporations participated in the exposition. It at
tracted some 3,500,000 visitors and public and private mainland investment in Okinawa estimated
at ¥350,000,000,000, which spurred land purchases, construction of roads and hotels, souvenir
shops and golf courses, followed by adverse after-effects such as increased land prices, bankrupt
cies and higher unemployment.
’^Rogers to Fukuda, 15 May 1972.
*®“The History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons July 1945 through September
1977” (Appendix B, titled “Chronology Deployment by Country 1951-1977”), quoted in Robert S.
Norris, William M. Arkin and William Burr, “Where They Were.”
*'U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an American Diplomat (Engle
wood Cliffs, Calif.: 1984), 548.

Chapter VII: Okinawa at the Turn of the Century
Economic Benefits and Cultural Identity
Reversion has turned out to be a mixed blessing for most Okinawans. They have re
gained their international status as Japanese citizens with their rights, freedoms, and
privileges guaranteed by the Japanese constitution. A bilateral treaty and several agree
ments now restrain United States forces, who no longer exercise absolute, final power
over them. Economically, Okinawans are much better off than they were under American
occupation. They now receive the full benefits of Japan’s education, social security and
medical systems, but an undercurrent of discontent with Japan and the status quo persists.
There are even stirrings of support for political independence among some intellectuals.
To anyone familiar with pre-reversion Okinawa, the landscape has been transformed
beyond recognition. Naha sprawls to the south, east and north for miles. The island is
now home to a new airport building, seaports, many highways and bypasses, a prefectural
government complex, tourist hotels, golf courses, public hospitals, civic and convention
halls, office buildings, apartment complexes and school buildings.
Highway One, the old military road, now renamed Route 58, still serves as the northsouth axis of the main island, and has been extended and equipped with greenways in
places as well as sidewalks. An eight-mile-long monorail linking the airport to downtown
Naha and Shuri, the ancient capital, is under construction, to be completed by 2003.
Shuri Castle, destroyed during the 1945 Battle of Okinawa, has been restored, along
with its finely-chiseled stone walls, on the old hilltop commanding views of Naha and the
East China Sea. The Cornerstone of Peace at the Memorial Park, with the names of more
than 250,000 people of all nationalities killed in the Battle of Okinawa inscribed on gran
ite, now stands, along with its attached museum, on a cliff in the southernmost part of the
island. This is where the last and bloodiest fighting took place.
Sub-tropical trees and flowers line most streets and decorate city and tourist parks
built and developed since the reversion. Drive-in suburban shopping centers have re
placed most of the small family shops and old downtown shopping streets. In the absence
of railways, streets are usually congested with buses, taxis and privately owned cars. Oki
nawa is so motorized, in fact, that people rarely walk to work or shop.
Along the central part of the east coast of Okinawa huge oil storage and refining com
plexes proliferate. The Okinawa Terminal Co., successor to Gulf Asian Terminals, is
equipped with eighteen crude oil tanks on Henza Island off the tip of the Katsuren Penin
sula that can store 11,680,000 barrels (1,740,000 kiloliters). On the same island, the Oki
nawa Sekiyu Seisei (Refinery), a 100-percent subsidiary of Idemitsu Kosan, maintains
eighteen tanks with a total capacity of 11,730,000 barrels and facilities capable of refin
ing 110,000 barrels a day. Okinawa CTS (Central Terminal Station) Corp., owned by
Nisseki Ryoyu Engineering and Construction, a 100-percent subsidiary of the Mitsubishi
Oil Corporation, and Cosmo Oil, has forty-seven crude oil tanks with a storage capacity
of 28,300,000 barrels on reclaimed land connecting Henza with the neighboring island of

VII: Okinawa at the Turn of the New Century

167

Miyagi.
Each of these three complexes is linked to an off-coast docking station for crude oil
carriers from which oil is piped to the appropriate storage tanks. Nansei Sekiyu, 75 per
cent owned by General Oil, maintains on the main island coast of Nishihara thirty-six
tanks holding 6,000,000 barrels of crude oil and 3,590,000 barrels of petroleum products.
The company is capable of refining 100,000 barrels of crude oil a day. The oil is either
trans-shipped to various refineries in mainland Japan or locally distilled into products
such as liquefied petroleum gas, naphtha, kerosene, light oil, liquefied carbon dioxide and
dry ice for consumption in Okinawa, mainland Japan and other Asian countries.
So much land has been reclaimed from the sea and or leveled by bulldozers for resi
dential, industrial and recreational areas over the last three decades that the coastline and
topography of the main island of Okinawa has been transformed. Okinawa’s standard of
living, which remained pathetically below American and Japanese levels during the U.S.
occupation, has advanced phenomenally since reversion. Even so, Okinawa still ranks at
the bottom of Japan’s standard of living in many respects, quantitatively and qualita
tively.
Under consecutive ten-year Okinawa Development Plans, Tokyo has poured in huge
amounts of money, adding up to ¥6,400,000,000,000 over the last three decades for vari
ous projects to develop transportation networks, public utilities, education, public health
and agriculture and to improve the people’s welfare.' In 2000 alone, ¥343,000,000,000
(roughly $3 billion) was projected for government expenditures in Okinawa. In addition,
the Defense Facilities Administration Agency has subsidized municipalities and indi
viduals with expenditures amounting to ¥14,000,000,000 to ¥16,000,000,000 annually in
recent years, to alleviate problems caused by their proximity to U.S. facilities, such as
helicopter and jet-plane noise, land erosion and electronic disturbances. The government
also provides grants to municipalities whose financial resources are adversely affected
doubly, by military occupation of large areas of public land and exemption of U.S. forces,
personnel and dependents living off base from property taxes and public utility charges.
These grants totaled ¥6,200,000,000 in 1997 alone.^
These financial transfers from the national government, reaching ¥1,200,000,000,000
in 1996 or 53 percent of all external revenues, have helped to power a 5-percent annual
increase in Okinawa’s real gross expenditure since reversion. The economy has grown
more than 6 percent annually in real terms, or twice the national average. This has
brought per capita income in Okinawa up from less than 50 percent of the national aver
age before reversion to nearly 70 percent by March 1998.
In spite of such massive injections of cash, per capita income has continued to lan
guish at the bottom among all the prefectures of Japan and the economy remains fragile.
Remote from mainland Japan, lacking essential resources for industrial development and
accustomed to a service-oriented economy, Okinawa has been heavily dependent on baserelated revenues and, since reversion, public works financed by the national government.
Instead of engendering capital-intensive, growth-generating industries, the huge financial
assistance has given a boost to the labor-intensive construction industries and government
administrative services and thereby only stimulated consumer spending. Farming and
fishing have continued to decline in importance, with many bays giving way to reclama'For government subsidies and grants, see Okinawa Kaihatsu Cho [Development Agency], Oki
nawa no Shinko Kaihatsu (Tokyo: Okinawa Kaihatsu Cho, 2000) and Okinawa Prefectural Gov
ernment, Okinawa no Beigun Kichi (Naha: Okinawa Prefectural Government, 1998).
^Okinawa no Shinko Kaihatsu, 229
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tion for new towns and resorts and farmland to roadways, communities and athletic
grounds. Major corporations from the Japanese mainland have bought up farmland for
resort development, built tourist hotels and shopping centers, and extended their networks
of chain stores and fast food outlets to Okinawa. Construction companies from mainland
Japan have also undertaken many of the largest public works projects.
The industrial structure is skewed extraordinarily toward the tertiary, or service, sector
which earns 81 percent of the gross prefectural product (against the already high Japanese
national average of just below 70 percent) and employs 73 percent of the labor force
(against 63 percent in all of Japan). The service sector includes medical facilities, lodg
ings, restaurants, bars, laundries and barber and beauty shops, insurance associations,
daycare centers, educational institutions, service stations and auto repair shops.
In contrast, the goods-producing secondary sector comprises only 20 percent of the
gross prefectural product and hires 20 percent of the labor force in Okinawa, far below
the respective but not overly high Japanese national averages of 34 percent and 32 per
cent.^ In spite of the magnitude of their operations, the oil companies that maintain stor
age facilities near their refineries on the east coast of Okinawa contribute only a little to
the local job market. Nansei Sekiyu, for example, has less than 180 people on its payroll,
Okinawa Sekiyu Seisei about 220, and Okinawa CTS about sixty.
With few products to export, Okinawa had a trade deficit of ¥123,000,000,000 in 1998.
Exports, mainly to Taiwan, China and other Asian countries, were largely limited to pe
troleum refined from imported crude oil, and totaled around ¥65,000,000,000. Imports,
worth ¥187,000,000,000, consisted largely of oil from the Middle East, food and timber.
Okinawa Sekiyu Refinery (initially established by Gulf Oil, but now 100% owned by
Japan’s Idemitsu Oil) and Nansei Sekiyu (established by Esso and now partially owned
by its subsidiary. General Oil) import crude oil from Oman, the United Arab Emirates,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran, refine it into a variety of products and re-export them to
Asian countries. Free trade zones, established before and after reversion, have not been
successful.
Tourism, considered an export industry, more than makes up for the trade deficit. The
number of tourists attracted to the subtropical climate, Shuri Castle and other historic
sites, beaches and coastline, war memorials, and souvenirs, has been steadily increasing
since reversion, reaching 4,127,000 visitors in 1998, nearly 97 percent from mainland Ja
pan and most of the rest from Taiwan. Some come to Okinawa to attend conferences,
seminars, workshops, business seminars, exhibitions, and cultural festivals, held at the
Okinawa Convention Center and many other venues. Generating ¥440,000,000,000 in
revenues, nearly fourteen times the level at reversion, tourism now accounts for 11 per
cent of Okinawa’s gross domestic product or 17 percent of all its outside income. In com
parison, rents for the land used by U.S. forces, raised several times since before the
reversion, totaled ¥74,000,000,000 in 1999.''
With little money reinvested in the local economy, Okinawa remains among the poor
est regions in all of Japan. The unemployment rate in 2000 ranked roughly twice the na
tional average. With new employment opportunities being scarce, unemployment is espe
cially high among young (ages 15-24) people. The even more scarce job opportunities in
^Okinawa no Shinko Kaihatsu, 59, and John C. James emd Terunobu Tamamori, Okinawa: Society
& Economy, revised and updated (Naha: Bank of the Ryukyus International Foundation, 2000), 1415.
''Okinawa Prefectural Government, Okinawa no Beigun oyobi Jieitai Kichi (Naha: Okinawa Prefec
tural Government, 2000), 45.
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the more remote islands have caused a population concentration on the main island of
Okinawa; 1,200,000 of the 1,300,000 people in the Ryukyu Islands live on the island,
which accounts for 53 percent of the total land area. Within the island of Okinawa, many
people—^mainly younger ones—have deserted the towns and villages, particularly in the
north, to live in Naha and its sprawling suburbs.
Wages are 30 percent lower in Okinawa than the national average and working hours
are 10 percent longer. Average household savings in Okinawa are the lowest in the coun
try and the debt to savings ratio is 20 percent higher than the national average. The aver
age home’s floor space is 18 percent smaller than the national average. Water shortages,
caused by overpopulation, urbanization and inadequate forests and reservoirs, remain a
chronic problem. Nevertheless, tap water is available to 99.8 percent of the families,
slightly above the national average, but adequate sewage systems are less common.
Okinawans are now covered by universal health, unemployment and medical insur
ance, and receive government funded old-age pensions. Medical care, far inferior to that
in mainland Japan before reversion, has also improved significantly. The numbers of phy
sicians, dentists, nurses, nurse practitioners and pharmacists have increased substantially
since reversion; spread over 42 inhabited islands, however, Okinawa prefecture still has
fewer doctors, dentists and nurses in proportion to its population than the country as a
whole.
Okinawans have more children and live longer on average than other Japanese.
Twenty-two percent of the population is under age 14, the highest figure in Japan. Men’s
lifespan, 77.22 years in 1995, was the fourth longest in Japan while women led the coun
try at 85.08 years. This longevity is attributed to the warm climate, the easygoing disposi
tion of the people, and their balanced diet of low-fat, low-salt pork, kelp, tofu, fish, and
vegetables. The new lifestyles—consuming high-calorie fatty foods and carbonated
drinks, driving to work and to shop, and exercising little—are, however, taking their toll;
Okinawa has the highest incidence of diabetes in the country.^
Educational and cultural development has also been significant. The quantity of
school facilities has caught up with, or even exceeded in some cases, the national average,
although superannuated buildings remain and swimming pools are inadequate at some
elementary and junior high school levels. The University of the Ryukyus is now a na
tional university located on a 330-acre campus in central Okinawa (with an additional
800-acre forest in northern Okinawa and a 930-acre tropical biosphere research center),
with more than 8,000 students in six faculties, a junior college, and graduate programs. In
addition, there are a prefectural university of arts and a nursing university, three private
universities and two junior colleges. Some 30 percent of high school graduates proceed to
university, well below the Japanese national average, with roughly an equal percentage
going on to vocational school. Most of the rest seek employment in Okinawa or else
where in Japan, many, at the turn of the millennium, without success.
The huge government expenditure in roads, public buildings, parks, social security
and education, often described as the “carrot” to win people’s support or acquiescence to
the military burden, has not entirely succeeded in its other goal of remolding the Okina
wans into “Japanese.” They retain so distinct a sense of historical and cultural identity as
Okinawans that, nearly thirty years after reversion, many still feel somewhat uncomfort
able about identifying themselves with Japanese symbols such as cherry blossoms, Mt.
Fuji, the national flag and the national anthem, the Emperor, Shintoisim and the Yasukuni
^Okinawa Sogo Jimukyoku, Okinawa-ken Keizai-no Gaikyo (December 1999), and Ryukyu Shimpo,
3 December 2000.
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Shrine dedicated to the soldiers who fell in war. Even Japanese folk songs, folk dances,
folk festivals, religious rites and traditions still appear foreign to many Okinawans.
Okinawan culture is thriving. U.S. administrators during the occupation encouraged
the people to appreciate their distinct history, arts and traditions. Music played on the
three-string sanshin, the performing arts, and arts and crafts (pottery, fabric weaving and
dyeing, lacquer ware) not only survived the war but were revitalized. Sanshin instrumen
tal and vocal music became standard fare on radio and television. Ryukyuan dance and
drama, accompanied by the sanshin, drums and other instruments, were regularly per
formed in theaters and at festivals. Artisans hand-printed the bingata cloth, elaborately
dyed with colorful designs of trees, flowers, streams, snow and grasses, and wove the
vegetable-dyed yq/i/ from hemp fiber and bashofu using a fiber made from the multi
layered coats of banana trees. Bingata cloth, once worn exclusively by noble or rich fami
lies, and Jofu, the high-quality fabrics which were formerly presented to the Ryukyuan
court as a tax, were now appreciated as souvenirs, as outfits for older people on special
occasions, and for wear by Ryukyuan dancers. The coarser, simpler-patterned bashofu
cloth, once common among rural people, found its way into manufacture of accessory
souvenir items as well as dancing costumes. Potters produced household tools such as
bowls, cups and pots, and lion-like shiisaa figures for roofs.
Religious traditions, marked by nature and ancestor worship, were practiced widely in
spite of government’s attempts to eliminate some of their aspects as superstitious.
Equally persistent were people’s dietary habits. They favored glutinous rice, champuru (a
combination of stir-fried vegetables, pork and tofu slices, of tofu and sliced bitter gourd,
and of fine noodles and pork slices), pork, seaweed or tofu soup seasoned with dried bonito shavings, soba (noodle soup topped with pieces of pork and tofu, chopped green on
ion and other condiments), and kelp, and drank awamori, a clear liquor distilled from
Thai rice.
Okinawans continue to celebrate their cultural traditions despite having been reinte
grated into Japan’s educational system and its mass communication networks. Animistic
worship of indwelling spirits and ancestors remains central to people’s lives, although
perhaps not so scrupulously observed as before. Many still believe in the presence and
supernatural power of spirits in both heaven and natural phenomena, and in places such
as the sea and other bodies of water, the house-pot and the hearth.* They also believe that
their ancestors remain close to their worldly dwelling-places and descendants, observing
their lives. People go to great lengths to show their respect for the supernatural spirits and
for their ancestors, who are believed to have the power to mete out punishments and re
wards in response to maintenance of proper ritual ties and prayers. Each village has utaki
or sacred groves and every “origin house,” or “parental house within the patrilineage”’
has ancestral tablets for rituals and prayers. A Yuta (shaman) is often hired to communi
cate with the ancestors in ceremonies or in case of serious misfortune, which some people
still believe is caused by insufficient prayer. On important occasions, people pay homage
at their family tombs, the most conspicuous of which are turtle-back-shaped constructions
which still dot the landscape.
Although most houses are now built with reinforced concrete and a flat roof, some are
hip-roofed with traditional reddish tiles. Almost ubiquitous are the shiisaa (or shiishi)
pottery or stone lions on the roof and, sometimes gateposts as well, and the ishigantuu, a
*For Okinawan religion, see William P. Lebra, Okinawan Religion: Belief, Ritual, and Social Struc
ture (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1966).
fbid., 221.
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stone or pottery plate placed at a crossroads, both believed to ward off evil spirits.
Many people still speak the Okinawan language, particularly in the countryside, al
though it is losing out to Japanese, the language of education and the mass media. The
rural culture—folk songs and dances, rock music, food, lifestyles, beliefs, language, lit
erature, architecture, karate—remains distinct. The “Okinawa comer” of bookstores car
ries titles in areas as diverse as ancient, wartime and postwar history, military bases, and
economic development, women, literature, folktales, arts, language, flora and fauna, and
tourism.
Sanshin folk songs—rhythmical, lively, plaintive, touching, mostly in the Okinawan
language—are played regularly on the local radio and television, and sung at gatherings,
festivals, karaoke bars or at home. Most record shops carry tapes and CDs featuring local
sanshin musicians, along with international and mainland Japanese folk and rock albums.
The slow and solemn classical court music played on sanshin, koto and drums, the kumiodori, classic Ryukyuan theatrical performance combining dramatic action, dance,
recitatives and sanshin music, and the more folksy dramas attract fans to concert halls,
theaters, and to television.
Some music and dancing groups and drumming groups have performed elsewhere in
Japan, on nation-wide television and radio, and in other Asian countries, the United
States, Latin America and Europe. Several sanshin folk singers have made the national
hit charts and are popular in Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries as well. The
kumiodori and classical Ryukyuan music have been designated by the national govern
ment as “important intangible assets” and two classical sanshin players and two kumio
dori actors have been named “living national treasures.” The midsummer obon festival
features an “eisa," in which young men and women in costume dance and jump to the
dynamic beating of drums and rhythmic utterances of “eisa, eisa" in the streets or open
fields, sometimes attract tens of thousands of spectators. Parties, weddings and celebra
tions usually end with men and women standing up for improvised “kachaa-shif' dancing
to tunes played by sanshin and drums backed by loud whistling.
Okinawan pottery continues to be in high demand among tourists and connoisseurs as
well as glass and lacquer ware. The pottery, in particular, is appreciated for its unique
figures and glazing and artistic quality. Costumes and accessory items made of bingata
and bashofu, and Miyako-y'o/i/ are highly appreciated for their quality and designs. Miyako-yq/w has also been designated as an intangible national cultural treasure. A potter, a
bingata artist and a bashofu weaver are Okinawans holding the title of living national
treasure.
Okinawan artistic talent is not limited to the indigenous culture for expression. Local
musicians are well known for Jazz, rock, and Latin music. Several Okinawa-born singers
have made successful careers in popular music on the competitive national scene. Oki
nawan novelists such as Tatsuhiro Oshiro, Eiki Matayoshi and Shun Medoruma have
won national prizes. The prefecture has also produced well-known painters, sculptors,
and architects.
Champuru, soba and a variety of pork dishes remain the most popular meals, and
awamori continues to be the most favored spirit. These are distinct from typical mainland
Japanese meals and sake. Champuru has even become a popular keyword to describe the
multi-blended Okinawan society and culture.
The people’s pride in their heritage was enhanced in 1992 when the main hall, eastern
and western halls and stone walls of Shuri Castle were restored. Originally built in the
early fifteenth century, the Castle became the residence of successive kings of the Ryu
kyu dynasties until the kingdom was taken over by the Japanese government in 1879. The
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halls and the stone walls were destroyed at the beginning of the Battle of Okinawa. The
castle, a favorite tourist spot, is a reminder of a glorious past when Ryukyu was an inde
pendent kingdom trading with China, Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asian countries. At its
entrance stands the Shurei-no Mon, or Gate of Courtesy.
Most recently, at the end of 2000, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cul
tural Organization (UNESCO) recognized nine cultural properties in Okinawa as world
heritage sites. All dating back to the heyday of the Kingdom of Ryukyu, they are the rem
nants of Shuri Castle and the castle ruins at Nakijin, Katsuren, Zakimi and Nakagusuku,
the Shikina-en royal garden, the Sonohiyan-utaki stone gate and royal mausoleum near
Shuri Castle, and Seefa-utaki on a steep ridge along the southeast coast of Okinawa.
Seefa-utaki, the place where, according to legend, Amamikyo, the creator of the Oki
nawan people, settled after having descended from heaven to the nearby island of
Kudaka.
Okinawan identity, resurgent as a result of an underlying feeling that the islands have
fallen victim to Japanese political discrimination, has even bred “independence for Oki
nawa” minority factions. Such groups existed shortly after the end of the war and imme
diately before reversion, but never enjoyed large public support.* The most recent cam
paign for independence occurred in 1997, the 25th anniversary of Okinawa’s reversion to
Japan, amid discussions between Japan and the United States on new security arrange
ments and on the American military presence in Okinawa.
In February, Kosuke Uehara, a member of the House of Representatives for Okinawa,
asked the government what it would do “if Okinawa wanted independence.” In March,
Chojo Oyama, former chairman of the special land committee of the GRI Legislature and
once a leader of the reversion movement, published a book calling for a declaration of
Okinawa’s independence.’ Oyama stated that Japan had discriminated against Okinawa
simply because it was not part of Japan. “Okinawan people have been avoiding reality,”
he wrote. “We should now recognize that our Okinawa does not belong to Japan and we
should proudly declare that we Ryukyuans are different from the Japanese.”
In May, a group of intellectuals organized a two-day session to debate Okinawa’s in
dependence. The panelists argued the need for Okinawa to stand on its own feet and stop
being subordinate to political, psychological and economic control from Japan.'® Writing
in 2000, Masahide Ota, governor of Okinawa from 1990 to 1998, recalled that an Okina
wan immigrant to Hawaii had argued in 1951 in favor of self-determination for the Oki
nawan people, including a plan leading to independence from Japan, and lamented the
lack of a “spirit of independence” among contemporary Okinawans."
In the same year, Akira Arakawa, often regarded as the ideological “guru” of anti
reversion sentiment for his continued discourse on the subject since the early 70s, called
for resisting the forces for integration into the Japanese state. For Arakawa, the anti-re
version argument “does not advocate a political movement for independence. It is a
search for irreplaceable intellectual deposits” rooted in Okinawa to counter integration
*On Okinawa’s independence, see, for example, Koichiro Yoshiwara, ed., Okinawa: Hondo Fukkino Genso (Tokyo: San’ichi Shobo, 1968); Tsutomu Takenaka, Ryukyu Kyowakoku (Tokyo:
San’ichi Shobo, 1972); Shin-Okinawa Bungaku, No. 18 (December 1970) and No. 19 (March
1971); Koji Taira, “Okinawa’s Choice: Independence or Subordination,” Chalmers Johnson, ed.,
Okinawa: Cold War Island (Cardiff, Calif.: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999), 171-185.
’ChoJo Oyama, Okinawa Dokuritsu Sengen (Tokyo: Gendai Shorin, 1997).
*°‘Ryukyu Dokuritsu-no Kanosei-wo Meguru Gekironkai,’ Jikko linkai, ed., Gekiron: Okinawa
'Dokuritsu’-no Kanosei (Kyoto: Shisuikai Shuppan, 1997).
"Masahide Ota, Okinawa: Kichi-naki Shima-eno Dohyo (Tokyo: Shueisha, 2000), 17-18.
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into Japan as a state. It is also a minority’s statement of the right to live and the right of
self-determination against a majority.'^

U.S. Bases Remain an Irritant after the Cold War Ends
Most of the big American bases have remained, together with the problems associated
with them and without any guarantee that they will be significantly reduced in size or
eventually removed. In spite of the end of the Cold War in 1989 and a thaw on the Ko
rean peninsula, U.S. forces in Okinawa continue to be a formidable presence, claimed to
be essential for world security and for defense of the Japan-United States alliance.'^
U.S. military facilities still occupy nearly 20 percent of the island of Okinawa, or 10.5
percent of the entire prefecture including the remote southern islands. Not only do these
bases represent 23.5 percent of the entire land space rented to the U.S. forces in Japan,
but the United States uses almost all of them exclusively, unlike in mainland Japan where
it shares a large proportion of its bases with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. The result
is that 74.8 percent of the entirely U.S.-controlled facilities in Japan are concentrated on
an island which accounts for only 0.5 percent of Japan’s total land space. Of the ap
proximately 100,000 U.S. troops present in the Asia-Pacific region at the end of the
1990s, about half of them were in Japan, and almost 30,000 of these were stationed in
Okinawa.
Moreover, the United States maintains air traffic control over Okinawa as it did before
1972. All planes flying at an altitude of less than 20,000 feet within a radius of fifty nau
tical miles from Kadena Air Base and less than 5,000 feet within a radius of thirty nauti
cal miles from Kume-jima Airport are regulated by the radar and approach control (RAPCON) at Kadena. This enables the U.S. Air Force not only to give its aircraft the right of
way in these areas but also to maintain at Kadena its only air mobility training center, for
the training of C-5, C-17, C-141, and KC-135 pilots, navigators, flight engineers, loadmasters, and boom operators in the skies over Okinawa. Inevitably, civil airliners
approaching Naha Airport must fly low through an often windy airspace “tunnel” called
“Naha RWY 36,” which many pilots find alarming.'^ Accidents and breakdowns within
the RAPCON system instantly affect airline schedules. In November 1999, a radar
breakdown forced 150 airliners to cancel flights, delay arrivals and departures or main
tain holding patterns in the air.‘^
When President Bill Clinton visited Okinawa in July 2000 to participate in the Sum
mit conference of nine world leaders, he made a point of speaking to the Okinawan peo
ple from the Peace Park. After referring to the Cornerstone of Peace monument, which he
said reminded “us of our common responsibility to prevent such destruction from ever
’^Akira Arakawa, Togo to Hangyaku (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2000), 147.
’’Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa wrote in 1998 that it was “egotistical for Americans to be
lieve that the United States has done Japan a favor by defending it all these years by stationing its
forces within the country.” He described Okinawa as “one of the islands least vulnerable to Soviet
attack during the Cold War,” stating that the U.S. kept marines there not for Japan’s defense but for
possible deployment in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. “Are U.S. Troops in Japan
Needed?: Reforming the Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, 77:4 (July/August, 1998), 2-4, 5.
'‘*“97th Operations Support Squadron,” http://www.altus.af.mil/pgoss.html, accessed 20 December
2000.
’’Tetsuo Maeda, Zainichi Beigun Kichi-no Shushi Kessan (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2000), 267.
'^Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced in March 2000 that the United States would re
turn the RAPCON to Japan when and if the operational requirements of U.S. forces are met.
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happening again,” he remarked: “Over the past fifty years, our two nations have come
together in this spirit, to meet that responsibility. The strength of our alliance is one of the
great stories of the twentieth century. Asia is largely at peace today because our alliance
has given people throughout the region confidence that peace will be defended and pre
served. That is what alliances are for, and that is why ours must endure. Of course, Oki
nawa has played an especially vital role in the endurance of our alliance.”
President Clinton obviously realized that this was not what the Okinawan people
wanted to hear from the leader of a country which for half a century had imposed on
them responsibilities they considered unfair, unwarranted, excessive and contrary to their
wishes to return to a peaceful life without the bases. “Okinawa did not ask to play this
role—hosting more than 50 percent of America’s forces in Japan on less than 1 per cent
of Japan’s land mass,” President Clinton conceded, adding that the United States was in
the process of consolidating its bases on the island and that “we will continue to do what
we can to reduce our footprint on this island.”
U.S. forces in Okinawa are under the Pacific Command and are organized into a
headquarters and four component commands (Army Pacific, Pacific Fleet, Marine Forces
Pacific and Pacific Air Forces). The main components include the 3rd Marine Expedi
tionary Force (III MEF) at Camp Courtney and Camp Hansen, a Marine Corps training
base, and the 1st Marine Aircraft and 18th Wings, the 390th Intelligence Squadron, the
353rd Special Operations Group and the 82nd Reconnaissance Squadron at Kadena.'^
The 18th Wing of the Air Force, with F-15 all-weather tactical fighters, E-3 AWACS
(Airborne Warning and Control System) for surveillance, command, control and commu
nications and KC-135 aerial refueling aircraft, is complete with operations, logistics, sup
port, civil engineer and medical groups. Ill MEF, headquartered in Camp H.M. Smith,
Hawaii, maintains a ground infantry division, an aircraft wing, service support group and
a command element on Okinawa.
In addition, the Navy keeps Kadena Naval Air Facility to command fleet activities in
the area while the Army maintains an in-theater Army special operations force (airborne).
Mountainous northern Okinawa provides facilities for live firing and amphibious training
exercises, artillery live fire exercises, helicopter operations, ship-to-shore movement
training, embarkation training, AV-8 Harrier aircraft take-off and landing exercises, para
chute training, and jungle training. The military units are supported by auxiliary airfields,
ammunition storage areas, ordnance handling facilities, a naval hospital, a logistics base,
and communications centers.
The Pacific Command, which is responsible for over a half of the earth’s surface from
'^In April 2001, a U.S. Navy EP-3E Aries II electronic warfare (VQ) and reconnaissance aircraft
that had taken off from Kadena was forced to make an emergency landing on China’s Hainan Is
land after colliding in mid-air with a Chinese fighter jet, creating diplomatic tensions between the
two powers. The aircraft was on a six-month deployment with Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron
One (VQ-1) from Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, Washington, whose 181st Military Intelli
gence Detachment was based at Misawa in northern Japan. Nicknamed the “World Watchers,” the
planes and personnel of the squadron were responsible for Navy electronic reconnaissance from the
east coast of Africa to the west coast of the United States. The EP-3E, carrying devices capable of
gathering a wide range of electronic transmissions, was believed to be engaged in routine surveil
lance missions. Tokyo chose to make no official statement on such U.S. activities from Okinawa.
For information on the incident, see Naval Air Station Whidbey Island fhttp://www.
naswi.navv.mil/va-l/welcome.htmn. and the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Intelligence
Resource Program (httD://www.fas.org/irp/Drogram/collect/ep-3 aries.htm. and httD://www.fas.org
/irp/program/collect/docs/man-ipc-ep3 aries-010403a.htm).
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the west coast of the United States to the Indian Ocean and from the Arctic to the Antarc
tic, is assisted by functional commands. Its Special Operations Command conducts civil
affairs and psychological operations in support of military operations. The Space Com
mand is in charge of the military satellite systems used for communications, navigation,
weather, surveillance, and ballistic missile attack warning information. The Strategic
Command controls the strategic nuclear force structure. The Transportation Command
provides airlift, aerial refueling, sealift, and land transportation to deploy forces to crises,
exercises, and other peacetime engagements.’*
Many Okinawans feel that this amounts to a disproportionately heavy burden on Oki
nawa for the sake of the security of the United States and Japan, a burden which has been
borne too long, and hope that the U.S. will reduce and then withdraw its forces and close
down its bases on the island. Some progress was made between 1973 and 1990. For ex
ample, the United States agreed to return some 14,000 acres of land, including Naha Na
val Air Facility, Naha Air and Naval Auxiliary Facility, Machinato Housing Area, Naha
Port Facility, and portions of the mountainous Northern Training Area, Camp Hansen,
Camp Zukeran and Kadena Ammunition Depot. By March 1999, the 70,790 acres held
by the United States in 1972 for military purposes had shrunk by 17 percent to 58,700
acres, and the number of facilities had dropped from eighty-seven to thirty-eight.’®
Yet most Okinawans believe that the continued massive U.S. presence, a constant re
minder of the Battle of Okinawa and the subsequent American occupation, is in conflict
with their love of peace and constantly involves them and their islands, however indi
rectly, in wars and conflicts near and far. It is also a source of crimes, accidents and envi
ronmental pollution. And the bases are increasingly viewed as detrimental to Okinawa’s
economic development.
Once considered the economic pillar of an island lacking natural resources and ex
portable goods, the bases have significantly declined as a source of income. Rental rates
for the land used by U.S. forces were raised phenomenally after reversion, bringing the
total amount from ¥12,600,000,000 in 1972 to ¥74,300,000,000 in spite of the reduced
area.^® Salaries of local employees working on base increased during the period from
¥24,000,000,000 to ¥53,000,000,000 and the expenditures of American military person
nel, government employees and their dependents from ¥41,000,000,000 have risen to
¥56,000,000,000. But the U.S. forces, once the largest single employer in Okinawa, with
56,000 local workers on their payrolls, now hire only 8,400. Total U.S. military-related
receipts have dropped from over 50 percent of the gross domestic expenditure at their
pre-reversion peak to 15.6 percent in 1972, and to a mere 5.2 percent by March 1998,
mainly as a result of the drastic depreciation in the value of the U.S. currency from ¥360
to approximately ¥120 to the dollar.
In some respects, the bases are actively detrimental to economic development as they
are frequently located in areas where they restrict communications, urban planning and
commercial, agricultural and industrial activities. In order to address this problem, the
prefectural government prepared in 1993 a blueprint for phasing out the military bases by
‘®“U.S. Pacific Command at a Glance,” http://Dacom.mil/about/Dacom/htm: “United States Pacific
Command: Area of Responsibility,” httD://www.Dacom.mil/about/aor.htm. both accessed 27 Octo
ber 2000.
''^Okinawa no Beigun oyobi Jieitai Kichi, 1-3. During the same period, U.S. bases in mainland Ja
pan were reduced in size by 60%.
“So much is paid in rents, including for land that has little intrinsic value, that many landowners
are opposed to any reduction in the number and size of U.S. bases.
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2015 and converting them into industrial, residential and recreational zones.^' The moun
tainous Northern Training Area, for example, would be turned into a wildlife refuge and
forest park, Okuma Rest Center into a resort and recreational zone, Kadena Air Base and
Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma into major urban development areas, the Kadena
Ammunition Storage facility into a nature conservation, urban and agricultural zone, and
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield largely into a commercial district. Naha Port facilities would
be developed into an urban and harbor area linked to Naha airport and the downtown.
While none of these projects has been realized, the merits of the conversion are obvi
ous, according to the Okinawa Prefectural Government’s reports.^^ The former Hamby
Marine Corps airfield in central Okinawa, for example, has been transformed into a popu
lar shopping and amusement town with a campsite for a Japanese professional baseball
team, movie theaters, major shopping centers, a Ferris wheel, and restaurants. The base
used to employ about 100 local workers and provide tax revenues of less than $10,000,
but the new businesses now generate some 10,000 jobs, $24,000,000 in sales and the
equivalent of roughly $140,000 a year in property taxes. Landowners receive three times
as much as they would have from the base, even considering the subsequent post
reversion rent increases.
Likewise, a former U.S. communication site in the city of Gushikawa which used to
employ only four local workers, is now a town with a population of 5,000 and the seat of
the municipal government. The air and naval auxiliary facility near Naha airport has been
turned into a residential and commercial district, with sales of nearly $500,000,000 and
which is home to several schools and large parks,. It is estimated that the 1,200-acre Ma
rine Corps Air Station at Futenma, which is eleven times larger than the former Hamby
airfield and currently employs only 170 Okinawans, would become a major residential
and commercial town bringing immeasurable economic benefits to the area.
Irritation at the lack of progress on the closure and conversion issue has been com
pounded for many by Japan’s financial support for the U.S. military presence. Japan pays
for not only the local workers who “render labor services” to the U.S. forces under an
agreement signed in 1960, but also for a number of other items from what is known in
Japan as the “omoiyan'” (sympathy) budget, initiated in 1978 in consideration of the dol
lar crisis in the United States.^ The omoiyari expenditure, provided outside the security
treaty requirement, accounts for roughly 40 percent of Japan’s host-nation support for
maintaining forward-deployed American forces in Japan. As the U.S. State Department
stated in June 2000:
Japan’s Host Nation Support (HNS)— roughly $4.5 billion—is the most generous of any
U.S. ally and, in spite of its present fiscal difficulties, Japan has put a high priority on main
taining current funding levels. The Government of Japan’s payments in support of U.S. forces
generally approach three-quarters of total U.S. basing costs in Japan.
Under the terms of the bilateral Special Measures Agreement (SMA) . . . Japan pays the
costs of local Japanese labor employed by U.S. forces and public utilities on U.S. bases. Under
the separate Facilities Improvement Program (FIP), Japan voluntarily provides substantial
funding for quality-of-life projects, including housing, community support and recreation fa^'Okinawa Prefectural Government, The Basic Plan for the Site Utilization of the Lands Currently
Used by the U.S. Military in Okinawa (Naha: Okinawa Prefectural Government, May 1993).
^^Quoted by Masahide Ota in his Okinawa: Kichi-naki Shima-heno Dohyou (Tokyo: Shueisha,
2000), 166-167, 213-214.
The omoiyari budget is translated into English as “facilities implement project” and “labor cost
sharing.”
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cilities, and utilities upgrades. Japan has also shown increased flexibility under the FIP in con
structing direct operational facilities, such as hangars and hardened aircraft shelters.

Under the latest cost-sharing arrangements approved in 1995,^’ Japan pays not only
the regular salaries and fringe benefits, language bonuses, year-end allowances and re
tirement allowances of the Okinawans employed on U.S. bases, but provides facilities to
accommodate American military personnel, such as post offices, service stations, clinics,
schools, libraries, day care centers, theaters, gyms, and pays the bills for public utilities
used by U.S. forces and their families.^* The omoiyari program is so generous that Secre
tary of Defense William Perry and former Assistant Secretary Joseph Nye “have often
argued that one reason the U.S. military should remain in Japan is because the Japanese
Government pays for over seventy percent of the basing costs.”^^ Or, in the words of a
Senate resolution, “Japan’s host nation support is a key element in the U.S. ability to
maintain forward-deployed forces” in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan.^*
Of the approximately 80,000 Americans in Okinawa, nearly 30,000 are active-duty
military personnel from all four branches of the armed forces. The remainder include
1,400 Department of Defense civilians, 700 teachers and staff at DOD dependents
schools, and 25,000 family members. While some of them live off base, many are ac
commodated at more than 8,120 military family housing units—multiplexes, duplexes,
apartment blocks and single family homes—in nineteen areas.
Kadena Air Base, sprawls across some 4,900 acres with an adjoining munitions area
of 6,300 acres. This base alone accommodates 7,000 active-duty personnel, 10,500 de
pendents and 4,500 civilian personnel. In addition to day-care centers and before- and
after-school programs, there are four elementary schools, one middle school and one high
school on base with nearly 5,000 students; the high school possesses a large gymnasium,
a fifty-meter outdoor swimming pool, a football field with a 400-meter track, outdoor
lighted basketball and tennis courts, and a soccer field.^^
“Opportunities to begin and complete secondary certificates, as well as associate, bac
calaureate and masters’ degrees are available at the various colleges and universities ofFact sheet. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, 26 June 2000.
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/iapan/fs-iapan hostnat 000626.html.
Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning New Special Measures
Relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, regarding facilities and areas and
the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan,” signed on 27 September 1995 in New York.
^*In fiscal year 1997, Japan’s “burden-sharing payments” totaled $4.9 billion: $712 million for land
leased for U.S. military use; $1.7 billion under the Special Measures Agreement for the costs of
local national labor employed by U.S. forces in Japan, public utilities on U.S. bases, and the trans
fer requested by Japan of American military training from U.S. bases to other facilities in Japan;
$876 million in indirect costs such as rents foregone at fair market value and tax concessions; and
$1.7 billion for new facilities, vicinity improvements, relocation construction and other costs. The
United States General Accounting Office, “Report to the Honorable Duncan Hunter, House of Rep
resentatives [on] Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. Military
Presence on Okinawa” (GAO/NISAD 98-66), March 1998, 16. Japan’s contribution may be com
pared with Italy’s $1.1 billion (1998), Germany’s $957 million (1998), and Britain’s $127 million
(1998). For the omoiyari budget, see Maeda, Zainichi Beigun-Kichi no Shushi Kessan, 147-240.
^’See Robert Hamilton, “An Idea That Just Won’t Float,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 1997,
43.
^*Senate resolution 306, 30 September 1996. Congressional Record, 1995, SI2000.
^’http://www-02.kadena.af mil/current/18pa/PublicAffairs/dodds.htm. accessed 12 December 2000.
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fering on-base programs,” the base homepage states.^” The institutions mentioned are
Central Texas College, University of Maryland Asian Division, University of MarylandCollege Park, Troy State University, Michigan State University and the University of
Oklahoma. Enlisted members of the Air Force are also able to complete requirements for
job-related certificates or associate of applied science degrees through the Community
College of the Air Force.
On-base quarters for officers look like urban apartments. “Kadena is on line to have
one person in each dorm room by the year 2002,” its on-line homepage boasts. “Immedi
ate plans include more microwaves, new furniture, large refrigerators and postal boxes.
Kadena has the largest permanent party, unaccompanied housing contingency in the Air
Force. Kadena has 203 apartment-style quarters in seven buildings which meet standards
for officers and civilian equivalents. Each apartment consists of a living room, bedroom,
private bathroom and kitchen. Apartments are fully furnished, carpeted and have central
air conditioning. There are 370 rooms designated as xmaccompanied NCO quarters,
which have private bathrooms and central air conditioning. All unaccompanied members
are assigned private rooms.”^*
Kadena has a medical clinic, a bowling center, an eighteen-hole golf course, a football
field, a roller blade rink, and a separate 120-acre recreation area. Okuma Recreation
Area, an island forty-five miles north of Kadena, offers “fifty-two air conditioned ca
banas, plus three large camp site areas for both single people and families. Facilities in
clude everything fi'om a surfside restaurant, bar and lounge, to an indoor theater, minia
ture golf course, nine-hole golf course, recreation center as well as boating and diving
facilities.”^^
Camp Zukeran, which serves as the Marine Corps Bases’ Okinawa Headquarters and
the U.S. Forces Japan’s Okinawa Area Field Office, and houses weapons and equipment
maintenance facilities, accommodates a residential area with a golf course and other
amenities. In December 1996, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to consolidate
the U.S. housing areas in Camp Zukeran and neighboring Camp Kuwae and to return the
land thereby freed by March 2008. The single-family homes there will be replaced by
new high-rise apartments.
Accidents and incidents involving U.S. forces continue to be serious.Between 1972
and 1999, military aircraft accidents numbered 142, ninety-five of them outside military
bases, leaving twenty-six people dead, a further twenty-four missing presumed dead, and
twenty-three others injured. Military exercises were blamed for nearly 400 forest and
other fires which laid waste to more than 7,000 acres. There have been serious pollution
problems caused by chemicals such as polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) released from
transformers; PCB, cadmium, mercury, lead and arsenic residues which were detected at
a military sewage treatment plant, and chrominium (highly poisonous sexivalent chrome)
leakage from a logistics facility.
It was also learned in 1997 that U.S. forces had tested depleted-uranium incendiary
shells on an islet near Kume Island, in violation of internal regulations of the U.S. forces

http://www-02.kadena.af mil/current/18pa/PublicAffairs/services.htm, accessed 12 December
2000.
http://www-02.kadena.afmil/current/18pa/PublicAffairs/moving.htm, accessed 12 December
2000.
http://www-02.kadena.af mil/current/1 Sna/PublicAffairs/services htm. accessed 12 December
2000.

^^See Okinawa no Beigun Kichi, 191-201.
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in Japan. Radiation from depleted-uranium used in shells and tank shielding is suspected
to be one of the causes of “Gulf War Syndrome” from which some of the troops who
served in the Gulf War and in the Balkans have suffered gastrointestinal dysfunction,
severe fatigue, chronic headaches, joint aches and memory loss. The United States subse
quently cleaned the islet, but 85 percent of the spent depleted-uranium shells are believed
still unrecovered.^"* Since Okinawa is so crowded,^^ many of the bases are inevitably lo
cated in close proximity to civilian communities. Consequently, Okinawans are exposed
to intense levels of noise from military aircraft and bombing exercises, as well as to pol
lution spilling over from bases, and accidents involving aircraft and automobiles.^®
Although the numbers of crimes committed by U.S. forces and their dependents have
been declining in recent years, 4,800 Americans committed nearly 5,000 crimes including
520 “atrocious,” 970 “violent,” 2,500 larcenous and fifty “moral” offenses since rever
sion.” “Atrocious” crimes include murder, armed robbery, rape and arson. “Since 1988,”
Chalmers Johnson writes, citing an article in the Dayton Daily News based on facts ob
tained by invoking the Freedom of Information Act, “Navy and Marine Corps bases in
Japan have had the highest number (169) of courts-martial for sexual assaults of all U.S.
military bases worldwide. Since there is a big Navy base at White Beach and a Navy con
tingent at Kadena and the Marines have twenty different bases spread all over Okinawa,
Japan for all intents and purposes here refers to Okinawa. This rate was 66 percent more
cases than the number two location, San Diego, with 102 cases but with more than twice
the personnel.”^* Johnson states that the incidence of reported rape at the American bases
in Okinawa, eighty-two per 100,000 people, is twice that in the United States.
U.S. authorities now warn military personnel and their dependents to respect Japanese
laws and customs. “The Status of Forces Agreement doesn’t give one immunity from
prosecution,” a Kadena homepage reminds military personnel.” “In fact, the SOFA is
Just the opposite and is what enables the Japanese government to arrest, to investigate and
to prosecute you. In addition, some people think the SOFA gives them the same constitu
tional rights they enjoy under the U.S. constitution. That is not true either and cases are
not thrown out because some U.S. constitutional rights were violated.”
Such warnings, however, are far short of adequate in the view of many Okinawans,
including former Governor Ota and his conservative successor, Keiichi Inamine, in
guarding the safety and welfare of the Okinawan people against the U.S. forces. On nu
merous occasions, they have pointed to shortcomings of the Status of Forces Agreement,
which governs the U.S. bases and troops in Okinawa as elsewhere in the country, and
called for its amendment. In particular, they are troubled by the way in which “extraterri
toriality” provisions have been used to shield suspects wanted for interrogation by
prefectural police. Over the twenty-nine years since reversion, the Okinawan police have
asked the U.S. authorities to hand over nineteen suspects for serious crimes such as mur^*Ibid, 201.
’^Compare the island of Okinawa (460 square miles, including offshore islets, 1,200,000 people)
with Guam (210 square miles, 150,000 people), Oahu (590 square miles, 850,000 people), Rhode
Island (1,200 square miles, 1,000,000 people), Cyprus (3,570 square miles, 770,000 people).
^®For statistics on U.S. bases and military personnel in Okinawa, see Okinawa no Beigun oyobi
Jieitai Kichi, 12-20.
68-84.
Okinawa: Cold War Island, 114-15. As discussed elsewhere, there have been many serious
crimes committed by Americans. A six-year-old girl was raped in 1955, thirteen bar hostesses were
killed between 1961 and 1974, and taxi drivers were killed in 1965 and 1967. It is believed that
there have been many unreported rape cases.
”http://www-02.kadena.af.mil/current/18pa/PublicAffairs/legal.htm, accessed 12 December 2000.
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the U.S. authorities to hand over nineteen suspects for serious crimes such as murders,
robbery, rapes and arsons; they have succeeded in securing only one.
A twelve-year old school girl was kidnapped on September 4, 1995, on her way back
from a community stationery shop in northern Okinawa by two Marines and one seaman
in a rental car. She was then bound hand and foot with duct tape, and raped. The Okina
wan police had identified the suspects by September 8 and issued warrants for their ar
rest. However, the U.S. authorities did not hand them over until September 29, after the
commander of U.S. forces in Japan, Ambassador Mondale and President Clinton apolo
gized for the rape. Okinawans were so angered by what they viewed as an appalling
crime, and by the high-handed attitude of the military police, that teachers, parents, stu
dents and others estimated at between 50,000 and 85,000 took to the streets to protest in
the largest demonstration held in Okinawa since the reversion.
The incident had driven home to them again the sad reality that, twenty-three years af
ter the American occupation had ended, they were still living in the midst of foreign mili
tary forces. The commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Admiral Richard C. Macke,
added fuel to the flames in November when he commented that the servicemen “could
have had a girl” for the price of their rental car. The two Marines and the sailor were
eventually sentenced in a Japanese court to six and a half to seven years in prison, and
Admiral Macke was forced into early retirement.
Okinawan protests forced the Japanese and American governments to agree to make
operational changes to the agreement whereby the United States would give sympathetic
consideration to surrendering suspects before they were formally indicted in murder, rape
and other particular cases. But what these “other cases” involved was left to the discre
tion of the U.S. authorities, with the result that they refused to hand over American sus
pects in a fatal hit-and-run and a serial arson case.
In August 2000, the prefectural government again called on Tokyo to amend the
agreement, so as to require U.S. forces to surrender pre-charged suspects to Japanese
police and for their personnel to be made liable for compensation for traffic or other acci
dents resulting in injury, death or property damage, to pay automobile taxes at a rate
equivalent to those levied on Japanese citizens, and to restrict military use of civilian air
and sea ports to times of emergency. Tokyo was also asked to add pollution clauses to the
agreement which would permit Okinawan government officials to enter military bases for
on-the-spot inspections for possible environmental damage and require the United States
to clean the polluted areas.
The rape of the school girl triggered more than an island-wide protest: demonstrations
also took place in mainland Japan, the United States and elsewhere (e.g., in Beijing where
Okinawan representatives raised the matter at the Fourth U.N. World Conference on
Women). The incident drew greater attention to the base issue as it occurred during the
year commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Okinawa, and one year after
Japan and the United States had initiated a review of their security treaty arrangements.
In 1994, the two governments had begun examining the basis of the alliance through a
year-long U.S.-Japan security dialogue. When Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama and
President Bill Clinton met in January, they promised mutual efforts to reduce and realign
U.S. bases in Okinawa. But Okinawan hopes for reduction and eventual removal of U.S.
forces were dealt a blow in February when the Department of Defense issued a report
which committed the United States to maintain the “continued forward deployment” of
about 100,000 troops in Japan and South Korea “for the foreseeable future” to counter
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post-Cold War threats in the region.'*'*
This meant that the status quo for U.S. forces in Okinawa would continue for an inde
terminate period.
Governor Ota raised an objection and, during his visit to Washington in May, re
quested the immediate resolution of what he called “three priority issues”: the return of
Naha Port Facility, termination of parachuting exercises at Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield
and the return of land occupied by the airfield, and the termination of live firing exercises
over a highway near Camp Hansen. He also demanded the return of Futenma Air Station,
certain sections of coastal zones and some air space restricted to U.S. military use, and
the Okuma Rest Center and several other institutions occupying municipal land, and
asked that U.S. forces reduce aircraft noise pollution, enforce measures to prevent envi
ronmental problems, and impose strict discipline on military personnel. In September,
Ota refused to take action which would force some landowners to continue to lease their
land to the Japanese government for use by American forces under the 1952 Law on Spe
cial Measures for Land for the U.S. Military.
When government representatives from the U.S. and Japan held the twentieth Security
Consultative Committee meeting in New York on September 27, 1995, they agreed to
make President Clinton’s scheduled visit to Japan in November “an historic opportunity
to reaffirm the central importance of the U.S.-Japan security alliance for both nations”
and signed a new five-year special measures agreement on cost-sharing programs."**
Specifically with regard to Okinawa, they “pledged to work intensively together to
solve the three priority issues as soon as possible, . . . deeply deplored the recent serious
incident in Okinawa, and recommitted themselves to work cooperatively and intensively
in the Joint Committee Study concerning the implementation of criminal jurisdiction pro
cedures under the Status of Forces Agreement.” In November, the Japanese government
adopted a new “National Defense Program Outline,” which underscored the idea that the
Japanese defense forces should play appropriate roles in the security environment after
the Cold War through close defense cooperation with the United States.
In the same month, the two countries established the Special Action Committee on
Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO) under the auspices of the Security Consultative
Committee, “to effectively achieve consolidation, realignment and reduction of those
facilities, while seeking to maintain harmony with the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Secu
rity Treaty.” On April 15, 1996, the Security Consultative Committee adopted an interim
report submitted by SACO. Two days later, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and
President Clinton confirmed that the Japan-U.S. security relationship “remains the cor
nerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and
prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century.”
The agreement was based on the premise that while “the possibility of global armed
conflict has receded,” the Asia-Pacific region remained unstable and uncertain. “Tensions
continue on the Korean Peninsula,” they stated. “There are still heavy concentrations of
military force, including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential
regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means
of delivery all constitute sources of instability.”'*^ With respect to Okinawa, the two
leaders “reconfirmed their determination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and
East Asian Strategy Report 1995.
^'“Joint Announcement Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee,” signed in New York on 27
September. The President’s visit was postponed.
“'^“Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security—An Alliance for the 21st Century,” 17 April 1996, in
Washington D.C.
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“reconfirmed their determination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce
U.S. facilities and areas consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Coopera
tion and Security,” and their commitment to conclude the SACO process by November
1996.
SACO recommended in its final report, and Washington agreed, that the United States
should:
1.

2.
3.

4.

return some 12,400 acres [about 20 percent] of U.S.-held land in Okinawa to Japan, in
cluding a major portion of the Northern Training Area,'*’ an auxiliary airfield, a
communications site and portions of camps by March 2008;
implement changes to training and operational procedures, such as by terminating artil
lery fire-training over Highway 104 and relocating parachute drop training to le-Jima;
implement noise reduction initiatives, such as by limiting night flight training opera
tions, building noise reduction baffles, relocating aircraft operations away from a resi
dential area, and removing KC-130 transport aircraft to mainland Japan; and
improve changes to Status of Forces Agreement procedures, such as by attaching num
ber plates to all U.S. forces vehicles, providing investigation reports on U.S. military
aircraft accidents and making efforts to insure timely notification of local officials and
the Japanese government of all major accidents involving U.S. forces’ assets or fami
lies, and facilitating visits to U.S. facilities and areas.'*^

In one of the initiatives, the United States agreed to “move all artillery firing off Oki
nawa.” “By doing so,” Kurt Campbell, deputy assistant under-secretary of defense for
Asian and public affairs, stated, “we had to rotate units through live-fire areas in both
Japan and, to a certain extent, in Korea. This puts some inconvenience on U.S. forces
undeniably, and I occasionally hear some grumbling about it. . . from my military coun
terparts, particularly the Marines. However, we believe that that inconvenience is worth it
in the sense [that] it removes an inconvenience on the people of Okinawa. So we are con
stantly searching for ways in which U.S. forces can make less of an intrusion on the dayto-day lives of people in the region as a whole.”'**
Indeed, the measures recommended by SACO, if put into effect, would resolve many
of the Okinawan people’s irritants for the moment. As of April 2001, however, none of
the SACO recommendations for the return of facilities has been implemented except for
the 1,185-acre Aha Training Area which has been released fi'om joint use by the U.S. and
Japanese Self-Defense forces. SACO called on the United States to vacate a 9,850 acre
portion of the 20,000-acre Northern Training Area and relinquish its joint use of certain
reservoirs (390 acres) by March 2003 on condition that Japan provide enough land to
ensure access to the ocean and relocate seven helicopter landing zones to the area from
elsewhere on the island. An ecological survey, however, could delay the process.
For various reasons, return of other facilities included in SACO’s agenda for return,
such as the 149-acre Gimbaru Training Area (originally scheduled for March 1998), the
471-acre Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, the 132-acre Sobe Communication Site, and the
151-acre Senaha Communications Station (March 2001), are not likely to be realized on
schedule. With regard to Naha Naval Port, which the United States in 1974 agreed to
relinquish if Japan provided alternative facilities elsewhere in Okinawa, some seventy
acres have been returned, but 140 acres remain under U.S. control. SACO recommended
“^It was renamed Jungle Warfare Training Center (JWTC) in March 1998.
“'^“The Final Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa,” 2 December 1996.
‘‘^A briefing at the USIA Foreign Press Center in Washington, D.C. on the 1998 East Asia Strategy
Report, 23 November, 1998. http://www.fas.org/man/docs/98112410.htm
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“best [joint] efforts to accelerate” its return and the relocation of its facilities to a nearby
pier area.
Still, there has been much progress in the implementation of changes recommended in
the SACO final report.''^ By March 1998, the United States had implemented all three
changes in training and operational procedures. The 3rd Marine Division’s artillery livefire exercises over Highway 104 in the Central Training Area were relocated to training
ranges in mainland Japan."*’ Parachute jump training was moved from the Yomitan Auxil
iary Airfield to the auxiliary airfield on le-jima, and the Marine Corps transferred “condi
tioning hikes” on off-base public roads to roads within bases.
Washington has also implemented aircraft noise abatement measures at Kadena Air
Base and MCAS Futenma, although nighttime missions and training flights are stilt per
mitted. SACO also called for noise-abatement initiatives at U.S. bases in Okinawa, but
that had to await Japan’s construction of facilities for Navy aircraft and MC-130 opera
tions and construction of noise reduction baffles, both at Kadena Air Base. More than
5,000 residents of six municipalities near Kadena Air Base have sued the Japanese and
U.S. governments, demanding the termination of early-morning and nighttime flying and
payment of ¥6,200,000,000 ($56,000,000) in damages for the physical and mental harm
caused by aircraft noise.
As part of what the U.S. forces call a “good neighbor policy,” Status of Forces
Agreement procedures have been changed to insure timely reports to Japanese authorities
of military accidents, increase public exposure of joint committee agreements, and make
it easier for people to visit their land, ancestral tombs or sacred sites within bases. New
procedures also require the U.S. forces to attach number plates to official vehicles, in
cluding tactical vehicles and have members of the forces purchase supplemental insur
ance for personally owned vehicles."**

“So Long As Conditions of Threat Exist. . . .”
A particularly contentious issue which remains unresolved concerns the relocation of
the Marine Corps Air Station in Futenma, retained “to maintain and operate facilities and
provide services and materials to support Marine aircraft operations.”^’ It is the home of
the 1st Marine Air Wing which serves as the air component of the 3rd Marine Expedi
tionary Force, the wing’s Marine Air Group-36 flying about seventy tactical fixed and
rotary wing aircraft such as CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters and KC-130 aerial refueling
airplanes.
Occupying the central 25 percent of Ginowan City, surrounded by 80,000 residents
and sixteen schools, the 1,200-acre station with a 9,000-foot runway and parallel taxiway
has not only been a source of various environmental problems but also a major hindrance
to surface transportation and the area’s commercial and housing development. A number
^“Report to the Honorable Duncan Hunter, House of Representatives [on] Overseas Presence:
Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa,” 42-45.
""Japan agreed to pay transportation costs to the mainland artillery ranges and offered to transport
the units aboard its commercial airlines. Ibid., 43.
^*A working team representing the national, prefectural and municipal governments, U.S. forces
and food and entertainment businesses decided in December 2000 that the American authorities
would make an “alcohol check” on GIs at each gate, instead of keeping local bars “off-limits” to
them from midnight to 5 a.m.
^’“Report to the Honorable Dimcan Hunter...,” 27.
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of helicopters and observation planes have crashed upon or just after takeoff from the
station, killing at least six crewmembers and leaving fourteen others missing in the sea. A
fuel tank once fell on the university campus abutting the base.
After numerous demands by the prefectural and municipal governments to close the
station, the United States accepted a SACO recommendation to vacate it and return the
land to the Japanese govermnent which has leased it from about 2,000 private landown
ers. This agreement was, however, not unconditional: SACO had suggested in April 1996
that Futenma Air Station be returned within the next several years “after adequate re
placement facilities are completed.” The station’s “critical military functions and capa
bilities” would be maintained, the interim report stated, by constructing a heliport’® on
other US facilities and areas in Okinawa, developing additional facilities at Kadena Air
Base, transferring KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base in mainland Japan, and conduct
ing “a joint US-Japan study on emergency use of facilities in the event of a crisis.” Sub
sequently, SACO came up with three specific alternatives to Futenma: 1) incorporate the
heliport into Kadena; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and con
struct a sea-based facility (SBF).
Predictably, the plan met with opposition on Okinawa. The town council of Kadena,
the municipality already 83 percent occupied by military facilities, including the huge air
base and an ammunition depot, protested against the recommendation and asked the
United States, through the Japanese government, to be excluded from consideration. The
city council of Nago,” which includes Camp Schwab on the east coast, also declared
itself against the construction of a heliport there. People in Nago, Kadena, and Yomitan,
Chatan and Kin, the towns also rumored to be candidates for the relocated facility, held
rallies to demonstrate their opposition.
Nevertheless, on December 2, 1996, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee
approved the SACO recommendation to opt for the sea-based facility to be located off the
east coast of the main island of Okinawa.’^ “Compared to the other two options,” the fi
nal SACO report stated, “the sea-based facility is judged to be the best option in terms of
enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining the opera
tional capabilities of United States forces. In addition, the sea-based facility can function
as a fixed installation during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no
longer necessary.” The facility, the report said, would be about 1,500 meters (4,900 feet)
by 600 meters (2,000 feet) and equipped with a 4,200-foot Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)’°The name “heliport” is a political euphemism for a fully-equipped giant offshore airport, accord
ing to Robert Hamilton, a former U.S. Marine who served in Okinawa for two years in the late
1980s and is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Maryland School of Public Affairs. “In addition
to the obvious landing areas required, hangar space for all helicopters is needed for maintenance
and protection from the harsh salt water environment. Next, a lot of space is needed to store the
large variety of parts and tools required to keep these highly complex machines in operation. And
don’t forget about storage space for aviation fuel, and also a guarded area for ammunition. Fur
thermore, every military air facility needs a fully stocked and manned medical facility on the prem
ises, since accidents requiring immediate lifesaving services do occur. Also needed is a fire and
rescue capability that requires considerable space . . “An Idea That Just Won’t Float,” Marine
Corps Gazette, February 1997, 42.
*'ln spite of its designation as a “city,” the administrative Jurisdiction of Nago consists of the name
sake urban district on the west coast and forty smaller communities, mostly isolated mountain and
coastal villages spreading across the mountainous northern part of the island. The total population
in 1998 was 55,074.
”“The Final Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa,” 57-58.
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compatible runway. It would also provide direct air operations support, and indirect sup
port infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics and personnel amenity
functions, and base operating support.
It would be coimected to the coast by a pier or causeway, and its design would be one
of three that government engineers considered technically feasible: (1) a floating pier
supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed, (2) a platform consisting of
steel pontoon-type units, or (3) a semi-submersible platform supported by the buoyancy
of a submerged foundation. It would be up to Japan to design and build the facility ac
cording to United States specifications and to provide it under the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty and the Status offerees Agreement.
In November 1997, Tokyo presented to the prefectural government of Okinawa and
the municipal government of Nago a “basic plan” to construct the sea-based facility off
the northeastern coast of the island. Public opinion in Nago was divided. Somewhat iso
lated from the main commercial and population centers in southern and central Okinawa
with its development partly hampered by its mountainous terrain, the area has been eco
nomically depressed for a number of years. The mayor, conservative citizens and mem
bers of pro-business groups were in favor of the proposal which they hoped would boost
the local economy. However, in a referendum conducted in December, despite Tokyo
promising huge financial grants to Nago in case of a yes vote, only 46 percent of the eli
gible voters supported the proposed construction of the heliport within the municipality.
Although a majority voted no, the mayor of Nago visited Prime Minister Hashimoto
soon afterwards, declared his support for the heliport project, and then resigned. The
cabinet chose to respect his support more than the non-binding plebiscite. Two days be
fore the subsequent mayoral election. Governor Ota made his position clear: he would
respect the result of the plebiscite and oppose moving the Futenma station anywhere else
in Okinawa. To approve its relocation within the prefecture, he declared, would be tanta
mount to authorizing the voluntary establishment of a new military base, something that
had never before happened in postwar Okinawan history. Ota, instead, demanded that the
station be moved elsewhere in Japan or to Guam, Hawaii or the continental United States.
By then, relations between Okinawa’s Governor and the Tokyo administration had
become severely strained. Ota, former journalism professor trained at the University of
Syracuse, had already displeased Tokyo in 1995 when he declined to sign the documents
that would authorize the central government to retain the land its owners had refused to
lease for military use. Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama sued Ota perfunctorily, seek
ing a court order to force him to execute the duties delegated to him by the central gov
ernment under the Local Autonomy Law. Ota lost the case when a high court ordered him
to sign the leases by proxy but still refused to obey the order, upon which Murayama’s
successor. Prime Minister Hashimoto himself signed the documents by proxy.
The Governor appealed to the Supreme Court. “Anyone responsible for the admini
stration of my prefecture,” Ota recalled later, “would have found it difficult to accept
further reinforcement and perpetuation of the bases. I could not, in conscience, agree to
sign leases enabling the stationed military units to extend their coerced use of Okinawan
land. ... I believed the signing involved issues of basic human rights, such as constitu
tionally-guaranteed property rights, the right to live in peace, the right to self-rule. ... In
that sense, the base question was not just an Okinawan issue. It was an issue of Japanese
sovereignty and the principle of democracy that concerned all Japanese.” The court.
”Ota’s speech to RAND in May 1998. Also See “Governor Ota at the Supreme Court of Japan,” in
Okinawa: Cold War Island, 205-214.
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however, summarily dismissed his claim.
In a prefecture-wide referendum held in September, ten days after the Supreme Court
decision, 89.9 percent of the respondents, or 54% of the eligible voters, favored realign
ment and reduction of the military bases and a review of the Status of Forces agreement,
thereby giving moral support to Ota.
Five days later, however, the Governor disappointed many of his supporters by taking
administrative steps which effectively cleared he way for the government to force use of
its land expropriation process. In April 1997, the Diet passed, almost unanimously, a re
vision of the law on expropriating land for U.S. military use in Japan which many Oki
nawans felt was an insult to them. The revision was designed to make it legal for the gov
ernment to hold on to some pieces of land in Okinawa during a period after the leases
expired because of the owners’ refusal to renew them prior to the Land Expropriation
Committee completing its investigation on the appropriateness of the expropriation. In his
public announcement, Akira Kioi, president of the Japan Confederation of Bar Associa
tions, questioned the constitutionality of the revision, which applied retroactively and, for
all practical purposes, only locally to Okinawa.^'*
When Ota aimounced his opposition to relocating the Marine Corps air station to a
site within Okinawa, Hashimoto thought that the Governor, who he believed agreed, at
least tacitly, to the proposal, had betrayed him. Tokyo was so inftuiated that it froze its
statutory subsidies to Okinawa.
In the meantime, the SACO proposal for a sea-based facility had been questioned by
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the research and investigative arm of the
U.S. Congress. In a sixty-two-page report, issued in March 1998, the GAO described
replacing the Futenma station with a sea-based facility as “a major challenge.”^ It was
estimated that it would cost $4,000,000,000 to design and construct the facility and
$200,000,000 a year to operate and maintain it compared with the less than $3,000,000
the United States pays annually to run the existing station at Futenma. In addition, the
report suggested that the United States and Japan would face “major technological chal
lenges, as no sea-based facility of the type and scale envisioned has ever been built” and
“operational complications because the sea-based facility . . . would be insufficient to
support all U.S. operating requirements and maintain maximum safety margins, as stated
in a Marine Corps study.”^® The sea-based facility would have to withstand the severe
typhoons that strike the region several times a year, and the occasional tsunami. It would
have to be built in such a way as not to sink or capsize and to resume normal operations
within a day or two after an aircraft crash or an enemy or terrorist attack.^’ Furthermore,
“routine operations aboard the facility may inadvertently contaminate the nearby ocean
environment, influencing coral reefs. Accidental runoff of fuels, cleaning fluids, and
other substances for aircraft and base operations could also pose a risk.”^* It would take
“up to ten years,” instead of the “five to seven” estimated by SACO, to design and build
the sea-based facility in accordance with U.S. operating and affordability requirements
and to relocate.*’

^‘'Quoted in Okinawa: Kichi-naki Shima-eno Dohyo,l3\-32.
**“Report to the Honorable Duncan Hunter, House of Representatives [on] Overseas Presence:
Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa,” 6.
5-7.
^’’Ibid., 38.
^^Ibid, 5-7.
^^Ibid, 40.
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In the election held in November 1998, Ota lost his bid for a third term as Governor to
Keiichi Inamine, a business leader and Ota’s ally in the massive demonstration denounc
ing the rape incident and calling for reduction of military bases. In his campaign. Inamine
had committed himself to restoring a relationship of mutual trust with the central gov
ernment and securing restoration of economic development funds from Tokyo. He also
called for the earliest possible move of the Marine Corps air station from Futenma and
proposed the construction of a new airport in northern Okinawa which would also ac
commodate the relocated air station. Expected to trigger industrial and commercial de
velopment in the surrounding areas, he said the new airport would be used as a joint civil
and military facility for its first fifteen years and would then be turned over to Japan for
civil purposes only.
In this context, it was, perhaps, no coincidence that Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and
his cabinet decided in April 1999 to hold the summit meeting of the G-8 (Group of Eight)
nations in Nago in July 2000, a surprise not only to Japan’s Foreign Ministry but also to
the prefectural government. Meanwhile, Richard Armitage, soon to become Assistant
Secretary of State under President George Bush, stated in July 1999 that the new station
could be what he called a hybrid helicopter base, combining a runway and hangars on
land but with some part of the facility offshore.“
One year after Inamine was elected, the prefectural government reached the conclu
sion that the shore off Henoko, within the waters of the Camp Schwab Marine Corps base
on the northeastern coast, would be the most appropriate choice for the new facilities.
This, Inamine stated, would make it possible to realign and reduce the overall extent of
American bases on the island, minimize noise for communities, and encourage regional
economic development. Inamine, who supports the Japan-U.S security treaty and believes
it to be an important factor contributing to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, said
that while the “internal” relocation was not the “best choice,” it was a more realistic solu
tion for the problem at hand than to pursue removal of the station to some location
outside Okinawa.®’ The Governor attached four conditions that the central government
had to meet before the relocation agreement could be finalized, including one that
required the replacement facility to be a Joint civil and military airport and another that its
use by the U.S. forces would be limited to fifteen years. Mayor Tateo Kishimoto of Nago
endorsed Inamine’s position a month later.
Far from major population centers, Henoko is adjacent to the 5,000-acre Camp
Schwab Marine Corps base for live firing and amphibious training exercises, and a 300acre ordnance depot which is widely suspected of having stored nuclear weapons in the
past. A “boomtown” during the Vietnam War and the “strong dollar” era, with hundreds
of neon-lit bars, restaurants and brothels, Henoko is now a sleepy hamlet of 1,500 people,
with dilapidated reminders of its boomtown past at its front and in the old village at its
rear. Its inhabitants depend partly on agriculture (vegetables, fimits and livestock) and
fishing, but mainly on wages from the military base (i.e., land rentals and employment),
public and private construction projects, and small family stores. Its coral shore stretching
out from a sandy beach is already used by the Marines for landing exercises while local
fishermen set nets in the nearby waters where dugong, a rare and thrreatened herbivorous
mammal species, have been sighted.
The people of Henoko and the neighboring small villages have been subjected for
^'’An interview with the Kyodo news service. The Okinawa Times, 24 July 1999.
®'Keiichi Inamine, “Kenmin-no Minasama-e,” and “Futenma Hikojo-no Isetsu-nitsuite,” 22 No
vember 1999.
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decades to the noise from low-flying helicopters and jet fighters, aircraft crashes, forest
fires resulting from firing exercises, fears surrounding the suspected storage of toxic
gases, and hazards from live-firing exercises across a highway. Environmentalists fear
that an offshore heliport would pollute the coral sea waters, threatening villagers’ liveli
hoods and the dugong’s habitat. Caught between the possible economic benefits and haz
ards of the sea-based station, however, the residents of Henoko are divided on the issue
of whether to accept the bulk of Futemna’s facilities.
The Governor of Okinawa and the mayor of Nago have both insisted that, unless Ja
pan and the United States commit themselves first to the fifteen-year limit to U.S. mili
tary use, the new Henoko base is unacceptable. Tokyo, however, has remained reluctant
to pursue the Okinawan claim with the United States, while Washington for strategic
reasons has resisted making the limited time commitment.
The Japanese government has presented to Okinawa possible construction plans for
the airfield, to be built on a pile-supported pier, a floating platform, or on land reclaimed
from the coastal sea inside, outside or on the coral reefs. The proposed airfield, with a
2,000-meter runway, is estimated to cost between $1,200,000,000 and $8,300,000,000
and take between eight and eighteen years to build.
That is where the issue stands five years after Japan and the United States agreed to
close the air station at Futenma. The prolonged impasse will delay the implementation of
a key SACO recommendation: construction of “a sea-based facility to absorb most of the
helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station” and return the air station “within
the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and op
erational.”
This means that the air station, along with its noise and hazards in the crowded center
of an expanding city, will remain a serious political issue for years to come. Controversy
over the proposed construction of the off-shore station also seems likely to linger in view
both of opposition locally in Henoko and Nago, and also Okinawa as a whole and be
cause of the technological, environmental and other problems identified in the GAO re
port. Japan and the United States are under pressure from those questioning the proposals
to review the basic question of whether it will be feasible to meet the dual-purposed
SACO mandate: reduce the U.S. military “footprint” in Okinawa and, at the same time,
maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan.
The underlying problem is that Okinawa, long after Japan was defeated in World War
II and nearly three decades after reverting to Japanese sovereignty, remained a pawn in
international politics, with its voice largely neglected by Japan and the United States. In
fact, the former deputy assistant secretary of defense who was heavily involved in the
SACO negotiations, has admitted that the SACO process was “negotiated directly” be
tween the American and Japanese governments. “We did not receive enough input from
our Okinawan friends,” Kurt Campbell, now senior vice president and director of Interna
tional Security Programs, stated. “We have learned a lesson. We understand that, in the
other phases of the dialogue, the Okinawans have to have a full voice in that process.”^
Campbell also noted that “it is neither smart nor stable for the United States to have ..
. . so many of our eggs in one basket on Okinawa. It is in our strategic interests to diver
sify, to be more flexible, and simultaneously, to reduce the burden on the people of Oki
nawa. It is absolutely critical that the United States be not seen as some sort of occupa
tion force.”
“a lecture to the Ryukyu Forum, held on 13 December 2000 at the Naha Terrace Hotel in Naha,
Okinawa.
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More than four decades before, in 1957, General Lemnitzer had directed a “compre
hensive review of all military requirements for land in the Ryukyus, with a view to reduc
ing our existing requirements wherever possible and of limiting new acquisition to the
absolute minimum.”^ For its part, the Japanese govermnent has pledged, on numerous
occasions, to work towards reducing U.S. bases in Okinawa.
Even if all the SACO recommendations were fiilfilled, however, nearly 15 percent of
the main island would continue to lie under American military bases and Okinawa would
still be burdened with 70 percent of the total land area of the U.S. facilities used exclu
sively by the American forces in Japan. In 1953, Secretary Dulles stated the U.S. inten
tion to “continue to exercise its present powers and rights” in Okinawa “so long as condi
tions of threat and tension exist in the Far East.” If “the strategic location of Okinawa is
likely to become more critical in the future [rather] than less ... in terms of a complex
relationship with China and the maintenance of peace across the Taiwan Straits,” as
Campbell predicted, Okinawans could not expect to be relieved of their military burden
for the foreseeable future and even well into the 21st century.
In 1953, Ralph Braibanti noted that the “uneasiness arising from uncertainty” was
“the most serious problem in the Ryukyus,” causing “spiritual hopelessness” among the
Okinawan people after eight years of American occupation.®^ More than five decades
after World War II, and more than ten years after the end of the Cold War, “uneasiness
arising from uncertainty” continues for them.
Many Okinawans hoped that the G-8 summit of the leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) industrialized countries and Russia, held from July 21 to 23, 2000, at the “Bankoku
Shinryo-kan” at the tip of a cape just across the island from Camp Schwab, might focus
international attention on their problems. The summit adopted a number of official
documents including a communique, a charter on the information society and statements
on the global economy, regional issues and the Korean peninsula, but none of them re
ferred to Okinawa.®® Thousands of people encircled the Kadena Air Base, forming a hu
man chain to demonstrate their opposition to the U.S. bases. Once the leaders, officials
and the press corps had left, however, the once-in-a-lifetime event became history to
most Okinawans as quickly as they were forgotten by most of the rest of the world.
If the so-called “Armitage report” is any indication of the strategic policy of the Bush
administration toward the Asia-Pacific region, Okinawa could expect to remain an essen
tial U.S. fortress for many years to come. “Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at
least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote,” the report
stated. “The region features some of the world’s largest and most modem armies, nu
clear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could di
rectly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on
the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flash
point. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering tur
moil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast
Asia.”®®
®®“Statement of General Lemnitzer, Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, on the United States Land
Policy in the Ryukyu Islands,” 4 January 1957.
®^Ralph Braibanti, “The Outlook for the Ryukyus,” Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XXXI (1953).
®®For documents of the summit, see httD://www.g8kvushu-okinawa. go.i p/e/documents /image/
t docu.gjf. or http://www.usinfo.state.gov/toDical /econ/g8okin/okg8bnr.jpg.
“ “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” INSS Special Report,
11 October 2000 (http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/sr iapan.htmll.
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The report, prepared by Richard Armitage, then of Armitage and Associates, Joseph
Nye, and other members of a bipartisan study group called for “continued consolidation
of U.S. bases and rapid implementation of the terms” of the SACO agreement, including
“broader and more flexible deployment and training options for the Marines throughout
the region.” At the same time, however, it emphasized the continued strategic value of
Okinawa. “The U.S. Air Force base at Kadena provides a critical link to American power
projection throughout the region. It is also crucial to the defense of Japan,” it noted. “The
III Marine Expeditionary Force provides a self-sustaining, joint forward echelon for rapid
response to problems in the region, ranging from evacuation of noncombatant persoimel
to serving as cutting edge combat elements to enable large formations to defeat aggres.
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Sion.
In May 2001, Armitage, now Deputy Secretary of State, told a congressional hearing
that the United States would not accept the Okinawan request for limiting the U.S. mili
tary’s use of the relocated Marine Corps air station to fifteen years.
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FROM THE PREFACE by Chalmers Johnson
“Kensei Yoshida’s Democracy Betrayed: The U.S. Occupation of Okinawa is easily
the best history, analysis, and commentary we have on the United States’s domination from
1945 to 1972 over the unlucky people of Okinawa. It is written from an Okinawan perspec
tive. Yoshida is of course aware that when the United States’s formal dominion over Okinawa
ended in 1972 and it condoned a pro forma “reversion” of Okinawa to Japanese sover
eignty, the semicolonial conditions he describes did not end. In fact, they continued and
persist to the present day in an often exacerbated form. For the past fifty-six years, and with
no end in sight, the American military has dominated the territory and 1.3 million people of
the islands in total disi gard of the values and wishes of the Okinaw ans themselves.
“As Yoshida observes, the Americans, like the Japanese before them and the samurai
of Satsuma even before imperial Japan annexed the Ryukyus, seem to value the territory of
Okinawa and the comfortable living arrangements they have built for themselves there
much more highly than the people whom they have displaced and whom they pretend to
defend. In this study, Yoshida stresses the period 1945 to 1972, during which American
imperial rale was explicit and responsibility for the we '.fare of the Okinawans rested squarely
with the Pentagon rather than the period after 1972, when the realities of the cuirentiy
p^irfy-eigh! American militai'y bases were camouflaged behind a fapade of Japanese admin
istration. His book is indispensable reading for those interested in Okinawa today, a place
where revolt against American domination and Japanese betrayal is endemic and which,
when it explodes, is likely to unravel the ."ntire fabric of American military enclaves in East
Asia much as the breaching of the Berlin Wall in 1989 began the unraveling of the Soviet
empire in Eastern Europe.
“One of Vbshida’s most important achievements is his careful documentation of how
well American leaders knew from the beginning that in imposing military colonialism on
the Ckinawars they were violating the United Nations Charter, their own proclaimed ob
jectives in fighting World War U, and virtually all of the political ideals and values they
have espoused as a nation. He quotes numerous high-ranking American officials that they
perfectly well understood that in keeping Okinawa for twenty years after the 1952 Peace
Treaty with Japan (and giving it up onlv under intense Okinawan and Japanese pressure),
they were making a mockery of the pledge in the Atlantic Charter, of August 1941 tnat the
U.S. sought ‘no aggrandizement, territorial or other’ in World,War II. Even as President
Harry Trim, an m December 1945 w'as proclaiming as ‘fundamentals’ of American foreign
policy that ‘We seek no territorial expansion or selfish advantage’ and ‘believe in the even
tual return of sovere.gn rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived
of them by force,’ the military establishment of which he was the putative commander-in
chief was making a hypocrite of him in Okinawa.
“During the height of the Cold War, the Pentagon turned Okinawa into its own pri
vate fortress and safehouse for clandestine activities, providing the Communists with mate
rial for anti-American propaganda at least as valid as American denunciations of the Berlin
Wall. As Yoshida shows, some American officials recognized this and acknovitledged the
contradiction. ...”

